Interesting historical facts about WW2 Carriers and Air Groups

[Carrier_Junyo]

 

Some great reading for WW2 Carrier warfare fans that can also shed a light on IJN vs USN "national flavors" and what a realistic "loudout" of air groups consisted of. You will notice, there were no 2/0/1, 2/0/2, 3/0/2 loadouts. There were never any 0/1/3 or 0/1/2 loadouts. In fact, 2/1/1, 2/1/2 and 1/1/1 are some of the most historically accurate loadout for USN Carriers. 

 

Essentially, USN Carrier Loadout progressed as follows:

 

Before Battle of Coral Sea

4 squadrons, 18 planes each. 1 x Scout/DB, 1x FT, 1x TB, 1 x DB. So essentially, a 1/1/2 loadout. 72 Planes total. 

 

After Battle of Coral Sea (1 Fighter Squadron of 18 added)

5 squadrons, 18 planes each. 2 x FT, 2 x DB, 1 TB (TB was 16 planes apparently). So 2/1/2 loadout. Total 88 planes. 

 

Late 1943 (Reduction of DBs, increase in FT)

5 squadrons. 

Initially, 2 x FT (22 planes each), 2 x DB (14 planes each), 1 TB (15 planes). 2/1/2 loadout. Total 88 planes. 

 

Late 1944 (Reductin to 1 DB squad, increase in FT)

5 squadrons

 1 x TB (15 planes), 1 x DB (15 planes),  3 x FT (70 planes total, about 24 planes per squad), 3/1/1 loadout. Total up to 100 planes. Note Fighters such as Hellcats and Corsairs could carry bombs and rockets, so essentially they were dual role. 

 

IJN Air Groups:

3 squadrons. 1 x FT (15-27 planes), 1 x DB (15-27 planes), 1 x TB (15-27 planes). 1/1/1 or 2/2/2 loadouts, total 45- 81 planes. 

 

RN Air Groups:

FT (12 to 30), TB (12 to 24), 1/1/0 or 2/2/0 loadout, total 24 to 54 planes. 

 

 

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 There was a great transformation in aircraft carrier tactics beginning in August 1942.  Although naval warfare naturally favors the attack, in just a short time new weapons and technology radically improved the power of the defense.  By 1944, US Navy carriers were seriously threatened only by kamikazes, essentially human-guided missiles, and even they failed to sink a single large American carrier.

     Aircraft carriers were first developed in the 1920s.  In the years before World War II, there were two main schools of thought about naval aviation.  The first was that carrier based planes would scout for the main battleship fleet, soften up the enemy fleet, and spot for the big guns of the battleships.  Although it is now easy to see the flaws in this theory, at the time the vast majority of the navy's firepower came from its guns, with long range aerial ordnance accounting for only a small fraction of the total.  The second theory, a relatively radical one, was that carrier aircraft would destroy everything afloat. (Hughes 88)  Both of these theories proved to be extreme. 

 

 

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Japanese carriers made air strikes on US bases in late 1941, but it took until 1942 for combat between carriers.  In 1942, carrier forces were split so that each carrier was escorted by approximately two cruisers and three destroyers. (Wukovits 39)  These escorts surrounded the carrier at a distance in a circular "wagon wheel" formation.  If the force needed to change direction, each ship would turn to the proper heading, maintaining the circular formation.  This screen of escorts protected the valuable carrier with anti-aircraft fire.  It would also fight off any surface ships which reached the task force and protect the carrier from submarine attack. (Hughes 88-90)  The ships were manufactured so that their speeds were roughly comparable, and a carrier group could travel at about 30 knots.

     In 1942, naval aviators believed that an air strike from one carrier could sink two to three enemy carriers.  Anti-aircraft defenses were weak.  Because of this, carriers were dispersed in the theory that if the enemy could only find one carrier, they could only sink one carrier.  Massing all the carriers in one screen would endanger them all unnecessarily. (Hughes 103)  The US Navy kept their carriers within supporting distance.  At Midway, the two carrier task forces were kept 25 miles apart - far enough away to make it unlikely that they would be be detected by the same scout plane, but close enough so that each group's fighter screen could support the other. (Lundstrum 323)  In contrast, the Japanese would sometimes spread their carrier task forces out over vast stretches of ocean. 

 

 

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The decisive battle of Midway could have been very different had the Japanese deployed their numerically superior battleships in the front, and not in the rear, of their naval force.  Still seeing the carriers as scouts for the battleships, however, their battleships would not enter the fray.  On both sides, however, submarines were seen as important screening vessels for the carrier fleet.  In several battles subs were able to sink enemy carriers, and they were always useful in recovering downed airmen.   

 

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Each US carrier had an air wing of 94 planes.  In light of the theories of the strength of the attack, only 25% of these planes were fighters, which intercepted enemy search planes and air strikes and escorted the dive bombers and torpedo bombers on strike missions.  The remaining 75% of the air wing were dive bombers and torpedo bombers. (Hughes 102)  Since attacking the enemy before he attacked you was of such great importance, the carrier force had to locate the enemy by scouting.

 

 

 

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As there was no advantage to remaining on the defense, when the enemy was located, an air strike was usually made.  The maximum range for an air strike with dive bombers and torpedo bombers was about 200 miles.  These planes were escorted by fighters, but only 25% of a carrier's planes were fighters and some would be retained to protect the fleet.  For example, in March 1942 two US carriers made a strike on Japanese ships conducting the invasion of New Guinea.  The strike was composed of 48 dive bombers, 25 torpedo bombers, and 18 fighters.  Fifteen planes were retained to protect the carriers. (Cressman 41)  At Coral Sea, two American carriers sent 54 dive bombers, 21 torpedo bombers, and 24 fighters to strike the Japanese fleet.  Forty-three planes were lost out of 99 planes, but a Japanese carrier was sunk.  The Japanese sank an American carrier with a force of 69 planes. (Wukovits 37)  At Midway, three American carriers sank four Japanese carriers at a cost of one carrier lost.  In one instance, an American torpedo bomber force attacked the Japanese without fighter escort and was nearly annihilated, and on the whole casualties were high.  In the whole battle, 126 American planes survived out of 233 planes, a 46% loss rate, and no Japanese planes survived out of 272. (Hughes 97)  While making attacks, planes often came from the direction of the sun to make anti-aircraft fire less effective. 

 

 

 

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  For the November 1943 raid on Rabaul, just over half of the task force's planes were fighters. (Morison, Breaking 331)  In 1944, 65% of US Navy air wings were fighters as opposed to 25% in 1942.  The Japanese, however, had only 34% fighters. (Hughes 102)  The increased number of American fighter planes better allowed a multi-level, or stacked,  CAP, which hadn't been as practical early in th ewar. (Lundstrum 443)  New planes also changed carrier warfare.  In 1943, the Japanese introduced a new dive bomber, but it could carry only 1,000 pounds of bombs, little different from past models, and in 1944 the Japanese introduced a new torpedo bomber which flew at 300 mph.  American improvements were much more impressive.  In 1943, the US introduced the Helldiver dive bomber, capable of carrying 2,000 pounds of bombs, twice that of the Japanese dive bomber.  In 1944, the US introduced the much superior Hellcat fighter with a range of 1,300 miles, much better than the 770 mile range of the Wildcat that it replaced.  It could also be fitted with bombs and sent on airstrikes after air superiority was achieved.  Also new was the Corsair fighter-bomber which could reach 417 mph and could be equipped with rockets and bombs to support amphibious operations. (Reynolds 145-9)  Perhaps as important, the US Navy had a vast supply of well trained new pilots while the Japanese never adequately replaced the excellent pilots they lost early in the war.  Facing inadequate pilots, only 270 Hellcats were lost as they dispatched over 6,000 Japanese planes. (Dunnigan 218) 

 

 

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Due to increased anti-aircraft capability and the greater numbers of carriers available, a new method of forming carrier task groups was necessary.  In the Fifth Fleet, there were now 15 carriers.  It would have been impossible to control 15 carriers if each had its own protective screen, but this was now unnecessary.  Therefore, task groups consisted of four carriers protected by three to five cruisers and twelve to fourteen destroyers.  With this method, there were only four separate carrier groups, making the entire carrier force much easier to control while the effective anti-aircraft protection made them safe from enemy attack.  It was more difficult to coordinate the air power from within a four carrier task force, which resulted in somewhat clumsy air operations, but the increased defensive power made this a worthy tradeoff.  The Japanese had fewer carriers, lacked escorting ships, and had not significantly improved their anti-aircraft defense.  Unlike the US fleet, the major Japanese warships were often kept separate from the carriers specifically for use in surface actions, so their anti-aircraft firepower wasn't available to protect the carriers.  Therefore, the Japanese provided a screen of 12 less effective escorts to a group of two carriers. (Macintyre 255-6) 

 

 

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The battles of the Philippines Sea in June 1944 and Leyte Gulf in October 1944 destroyed Japanese naval aviation.  Even by the Philippines Sea battle the US fleet could fight more conservatively and be satisfied with destroying Japanese naval air power and protecting the beachhead without actually sinking Japanese carriers.  At Leyte Gulf Admiral Halsey failed to realize this and allowed himself to be lured away from protecting the vulnerable troops transports.  Although the Japanese carriers were destroyed, they were nearly impotent sacrificial bait.  For the Americans, disaster was narrowly averted at the beachhead.  With the Japanese carrier threat eliminated, the US Navy's primary worry was attack from land based aircraft, with kamikazes becoming the greatest threat.  By the end of the war, a new auto-loading 3 inch AA gun was in development which could fire 50 rounds per minute.  Tests showed that it was as effective against kamikazes as five 40mm gun quads mounts with a total of 20 barrels. (267-8)  By the February 1945 naval air raids on Japan, 70 % of carrier aircraft were fighters, and they protected the fleet by arriving early over Japanese air bases and dominating the skies. (Morison, Victory 21)  Had the Japanese carrier force survived into 1945, it would have faced a vastly improved American fighter plane, the Bearcat, which was being delivered as the war was ending, and new attack aircraft like the Skyraider which could carry as much as 8,000 pounds of bombs. (Dunnigan and Nofi 210, 219)  The Bat, the world's first radar equipped self guided glide bomb, a revolution in naval technology, was first used in 1945. (Rowland 342-3)  But with the US fleet largely invulnerable to Japanese air power by 1944, poor Japanese anti-aircraft protection, and overwhelming US numbers, the Japanese fleet didn't stand a chance of surviving through 1944.  With the destruction of Japanese naval aviation went any hope that Japan had of victory.  

 

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An aircraft carrier had to have a combination of high speed and a long flight deck to operate a large air group.  Carrier commanders thought in terms of the deck load strike, which was the largest group of aircraft that could be assembled on deck and successfully launched in a single operation. Aircraft were spotted (positioned on deck for launch) by the flight deck crew, who manhandled the aircraft into place. On Japanese carriers, fighters and dive bombers were spotted about 30' (9m) apart and torpedo bombers about 33' (10m) apart. By 1943 the Americans had begun taking advantage of the tightly folding wings on their aircraft by spotting aircraft with wings still folded. This permitted more aircraft to be spotted on deck.

Spotting took about 40 minutes on the Japanese carriers of 1941, and another 20 minutes was required to warm up the aircraft engines.

 

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Another difference between Japanese and American carrier design was that the Japanese insisted on refueling and rearming aircraft on the hangar decks. The Americans preferred to refuel and rearm on the flight deck.  Japanese carriers typically had two hangar decks enclosed by the hull, while American carriers typically had a single open hangar deck. The Japanese did not use crash barriers, and, as a result, the flight deck had to be cleared while landing aircraft, and each aircraft had to be struck below as soon as it had landed. As a result, the Japanese had a longer turnaround time for rearming and refueling their aircraft, and any bomb that penetrated a Japanese flight deck exploded in an enclosed and poorly-ventilated space, with the kind of consequences seen at Midway.

 

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American fleet carriers typically carried four squadrons of 18 planes each. At the start of the war, these were a scout squadron, a bomber squadron, a torpedo squadron, and a fighter squadron. The scout squadron flew the same model of dive bombers as the bomber squadron and usually functioned as a second bomber squadron when it was not performing its scouting role. However, the scout squadron was normally armed with 500lb (227 kg) bombs instead of the 1000lb (454 kg) bombs of the bomber squadron, which increased the range of the scouts. The Battle of the Coral Sea convinced the Americans that more fighters were required, and the fighter squadron was increased to 24 aircraft. After Midway, the fighter contingent was increased to two squadrons of 18 or 19 fighters, the approximate limit of what the fleet carriers of 1942 could operate. The authorized air group for most U.S. fleet carriers thus became 36 fighters, 36 dive bombers, and 16 torpedo bombers in July 1942.

At about the same time, the commander of Task Force 17 (Hornet), George Murray, and the captain of the Hornet, Charles Mason, developed a set of deck load strike plans based on war experience. The fighters were organized into flights of eight aircraft, the first for combat air patrol, the second spotted on the flight deck with the first deck load strike, the third in the hangar with the second deck load, and the fourth as reserve combat air patrol. This increased flexibility and reduced the time required to launch a strike.

As the war progressed, it was found that there was little a dive bomber could do that fighters or torpedo bombers could not do as well. The two dive bomber squadrons were reduced to 14 planes each in late 1943 and then to a single squadron of 15 planes by late 1944. The number of torpedo bombers remained roughly constant as the number of fighters was increased. With the growing kamikaze threat, fleet carriers began to ship as many fighters as could be squeezed on board -- up to 70 on an Essex, with the dive bomber and torpedo bomber contingents reduced to just one squadron each of 15 planes. The Essexes were designed to carry a fifth reserve squadron, but this promptly became an operational fighter squadron.

 

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Japanese fleet carrier air groups consisted of a squadron each of dive bombers, fighters, and torpedo bombers. These typically had 15 to 27 planes, depending on the operating capacity of the carrier.  (Unlike American carrier air groups, each Japanese carrier air group was permanently assigned to a particular carrier.)  Japanese air groups increased slightly in size and included somewhat more fighters as the war progressed, but the Japanese failure to adopt deck stowage of aircraft prevented their carrier air groups from reaching the size of their American counterparts. The Japanese were also hindered by the design of the folding wings on their aircraft, especially on the dive bombers, which could fold up little more than the wing tips.

An important advantage held by the Japanese until 1943 was their proficiency at coordinating air groups from separate carriers into a single massive strike. The Americans did not begin to master this technique until 1943, and the carrier battles of 1942 were characterized by uncoordinated strikes by relatively small groups of U.S. aircraft.

 

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 A typical British air group in 1942 was composed of just 12 to 30 fighters and 12 to 24 torpedo bombers. Dive bombers were not carried until 1943.

 

For Full articles, see below:

 

Source: http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/A/i/Aircraft_Carriers.htm

 

Source: http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/carriertactics.html

 

 

[_Nyarlathotep_]

This is also dependent upon the type or class of CV. Both American and Japanese carriers eventually carried less torpedo bombers and more dive bombers because a bomb could disable a flight deck very efficiently. Fighter squadrons increased in size, especially in the USN, which boasted massive fighter squadrons at some point. Both the USN and IJN came to the conclusion that light carriers should provide fleet protection while the larger carriers provide offensive punch. IIRC, there was a proposal to transition light carriers to pure fighter carriers in the USN that was simply never completed due to the early termination of the war. After the war, air groups under went further modifications, take the Midway in 1946:

• 33 F4U-4 Corsairs VF-75
• 4 F6F-5P Hellcat
• 4 F6F-5N Hellcat
• 32 F4U-4B Corsair VBF-75
• 24 SB2C-5 Helldiver VB-75
• 24 Helldiver VT-75
• 2 TBM-3E Avenger

 

Different CV had different loads throughout the war as tactics and needs evolved. 

[MeKanism]

Red text is only for mods. please replace

[NargilFenris]

Good info. Will have to go through all the block quotes.

[11thACRColdsteel]

Nice post dude...thanks...

[Carrier_Junyo]

Red text is only for mods. please replace

 

Done. Didn't know.

[Carrier_Junyo]

This is also dependent upon the type or class of CV. Both American and Japanese carriers eventually carried less torpedo bombers and more dive bombers because a bomb could disable a flight deck very efficiently. Fighter squadrons increased in size, especially in the USN, which boasted massive fighter squadrons at some point. Both the USN and IJN came to the conclusion that light carriers should provide fleet protection while the larger carriers provide offensive punch. IIRC, there was a proposal to transition light carriers to pure fighter carriers in the USN that was simply never completed due to the early termination of the war. After the war, air groups under went further modifications, take the Midway in 1946:

• 33 F4U-4 Corsairs VF-75
• 4 F6F-5P Hellcat
• 4 F6F-5N Hellcat
• 32 F4U-4B Corsair VBF-75
• 24 SB2C-5 Helldiver VB-75
• 24 Helldiver VT-75
• 2 TBM-3E Avenger

 

Different CV had different loads throughout the war as tactics and needs evolved. 

 

Ah, I didnt know that Torpedo squadrons were phased out at the end and replaced by Dive Bombers. So I guess, 3/0/2, may have been historically accurate for the Midway, and 2/0/2 perhaps, but certainly not 2/0/1 loadout. 

 

One thing is for sure, dive bombers did not suck as much as they do in the game. If they didnt suck in the game, I'd be totally ok with not having any TBs for USN Carriers. But, we all know RNG...

[_hat_]

Nice read LoS. Thanks for the post.

[crzyhawk]

Mid 44 (Battle of the Philippine Sea) , a T9 airgroup (Essex class) was typically: 40 VF, 32 VB 18 VT.  the lone T8 (Enterprise) 34 VF, 31 VB 14 VT.  The T6's carried ~24 VF, 9 VT.

 

IJN carried T9 and T8 both (Taiho and Shokaku): 26 VF, 26 VB, 17 VT.  T5: 21 VF, 9 VT (nearly the same as USN T6 lol) and the T7ish Junyo: 27 VF, 18 VB, 6 VT

 

 

http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Phillipine_Sea.htm

 

 

[MrDeaf]

 

Ah, I didnt know that Torpedo squadrons were phased out at the end and replaced by Dive Bombers. So I guess, 3/0/2, may have been historically accurate for the Midway, and 2/0/2 perhaps, but certainly not 2/0/1 loadout. 

 

One thing is for sure, dive bombers did not suck as much as they do in the game. If they didnt suck in the game, I'd be totally ok with not having any TBs for USN Carriers. But, we all know RNG...

 

If USN CVs weren't so terribly gimped by the number of airplanes in their groups, that might be fixable.

They really should be locked to 4-man flights and up to the same number of squads as its rivals, instead of this nonsense 5 to 6 aircraft in 3 to 5 squadrons

 

 

Mid 44 (Battle of the Philippine Sea) , a T9 airgroup (Essex class) was typically: 40 VF, 32 VB 18 VT.  the lone T8 (Enterprise) 34 VF, 31 VB 14 VT.  The T6's carried ~24 VF, 9 VT.

 

IJN carried T9 and T8 both (Taiho and Shokaku): 26 VF, 26 VB, 17 VT.  T5: 21 VF, 9 VT (nearly the same as USN T6 lol) and the T7ish Junyo: 27 VF, 18 VB, 6 VT

 

 

http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Phillipine_Sea.htm

 

 

 

Yeah, the IJN aircraft kept getting bigger, but there was no clever design with making them fold up nice and compact for the carriers. These aircraft grew to the point that older CVs could no longer use them, as they would not fit on the elevators.

 

If M6A Seiran was built as a carrier based aircraft, it could have drastically increased the number of aircraft carried for IJN CVs.

[BadlyBrowned]

 

Ah, I didnt know that Torpedo squadrons were phased out at the end and replaced by Dive Bombers. So I guess, 3/0/2, may have been historically accurate for the Midway, and 2/0/2 perhaps, but certainly not 2/0/1 loadout. 

 

One thing is for sure, dive bombers did not suck as much as they do in the game. If they didnt suck in the game, I'd be totally ok with not having any TBs for USN Carriers. But, we all know RNG...

 

The specialized torpedo bomber was phased out post-WWII because the end of the battleship era meant that torpedoes lost much of their importance and newer attack aircraft designs combined dive bombing and torpedo bombing capabilities. As Nyarlathotop said, in the immediate post-WWII era, the Helldiver became the primary strike aircraft of the USN. It would have been replaced by the versatile BTD-1 Destroyer torpedo / dive bomber, but production was cut short (<30 aircraft) because of the end of the war and changing USN requirements until it finally re-emerged as the successful A-1 Skyraider attack aircraft that could fulfill the roles of both the dive bomber and torpedo bomber. 

 

Looking at the evolution of USN air groups specifically through WWII, I would argue the dive bomber aircraft as being "phased out" because of the utility of Hellcats and Corsairs as fighter-bombers, fixing the issues with the Mk13 torpedo, and the delays and other technical issues with the SB2C Helldiver. 

 

(Info taken from "US Navy Aircraft Carriers 1942-45" and "US Navy Aircraft vs IJN Yamato Class Battleship")

 

Standard Essex Class carriers air group composition:

 

	Fighters	Dive Bombers	Torpedo Bombers
Commissioned (1943)	36	36	18
July 1944	54 (4 night)	24	18
December 1944	73 (4 night)	15	15

 

The fighter group kept growing and growing until the peak of the kamikaze threat led to massive fighter air groups on fleet carriers. In 1945 two Essex-class air groups actually discarded their dive bombers and operated with 93 fighters and 15 torpedo bombers. 

 

Standard Independence class air group composition:

 

	Fighters	Dive Bombers	Torpedo Bombers
Commissioned (1943)	24	12	9
October 1943	12*	9	9
November 1943	25	0	9
End-WWII	36	0	0

 

* Less fighters because the Hellcat took up more space than the Wildcat.

 

For the Independence class carriers, they had issues with the non-folding wings of the Dauntless dive bombers so those were quickly discarded for a fighter and torpedo bomber air group. Very late in the war the light carriers were approved for all fighter air groups, as their main purpose was to provide Combat Air Patrol for the fleet. However, only the Cabot ended up operating with an all fighter wing before the war ended.

 

I do not have exact numbers for the escort carriers, but I can tell you that they carried FM-1/FM-2 Wildcats (the larger Hellcats/Corsairs couldn't operate on their smaller decks) and Avengers. So no dedicated dive bombers. 

 

This is all to say that the USN did not ditch torpedo bombers for dive bombers, instead I'd say the opposite is closer to the truth. True, early in the war issues with the Mk 13 torpedo meant that dive bombers were the USN's primary strike aircraft. However, late in the war torpedo bombers were essential in taking out armored IJN capital ships like the Musashi and Yamato. The post-war configurations without Avengers are odd considering the intra-war disdain for the SB2C, but clearly the torpedo was still a priority as the USN required the next strike aircraft (BTD-1 & Skyraider) to be capable of both torpedo and dive bombing.

 

As this relates to World of Warships, seeing as there are various Tier X Battleships to contend with (unlike IRL post-WWII USN), it would be illogical to completely remove TBs from USN CV loadouts. Furthermore, the massive fighter air groups in late-war USN carriers were a response to the kamikaze threat, which we don't have in-game. In summary, WoWS should balance USN CV loadouts towards better gameplay, not for historical accuracy. 

[Carrier_Junyo]

Good info there Badly. 

 

I wanted to clarify that my point about historical accuracy was about gaining a better understanding of the reason behind the air groups, so that they could be applied in-game. 

 

The main point i liked about the article I read about the change from a nearly all Strike air group in 1942 and single carrier task groups, to fighter-heavy air groups and 4-Carrier Task Groups. In 1942, as the article mentioned, the emphasis was on attack, because defense was weak. Towards the end of the war, emphasis was on defence and Air Superiority, but without sacrificing flexibility and attack power (also thanks to the dual purpose fighter-bombers). 

 

My point was that the "all strike" air groups as currently exist in the game, such as 0/1/3, did not exist at all, and were not sensible at all from a strategic or tactical point of view. 

 

Yes, the "All fighter" air groups or "nearly all fighter" air groups were a response to Kamikaze attacks, since there were no IJN Carrier forces left and the IJN was pretty much nearly all destroyed. So there were no real surface threats requiring attack planes in the air groups.

 

So, translating this into World of Warships, BOTH Air and surface threats abound, so depending on the composition of the fleet, the CV airgroup should be either Fighter-heavy, or quite balanced. So neither "all fighter" nor "all strike" air groups should exist, since both threats exist. 

 

The only exception to this rule, would be if different carriers (players) could chose loadouts and team together, as a fleet, to complement each other and work as a co-ordinated fleet. So, for example, CVEs could be all fighter, and have a Air Superiority duty, while some Fleet Carriers could be nearly all Strike, and carry out attacks against surface ships. But as we know, CV's cannot division together, so this is not an option currently. 

[TheBossNC]

What they could do on the CVE and fleet carrier is make a CVE line so there would be an equal tier CVE. Then we just need CV divisions.

[Pirate_Badcat]

Great info. I hope WG is reading to see that the carriers air groups need a major overhaul.

[crzyhawk]

Something to remember about the early USN air groups is that one of the bomber squadrons was actually designated as a scouting squadron. They were not really part of the strike package, although spare planes could be used as strike aircraft. The IJN built the tone class so they didn't have to divert any of their bombers to search duties.

[Edgecase]

Something to remember about the early USN air groups is that one of the bomber squadrons was actually designated as a scouting squadron. They were not really part of the strike package, although spare planes could be used as strike aircraft. The IJN built the tone class so they didn't have to divert any of their bombers to search duties.

 

Did they carry bombs while scouting, or leave them behind to increase range/duration?

[crzyhawk]

Doctrine called for 500 lb general purpose (HE) bombs on scouts. Bombers were supposed to carry 1000 pound delayed action (SAP) bombs.

 

While the scouts carried bombs, it takes balls of steel to attack an enemy fleet with 1-2 planes and no escort. That said, Enterprise scouts famously did just that at Santa Cruz hitting Zuiho twice with two bombs dropped.

[Edgecase]

Doctrine called for 500 lb general purpose (HE) bombs on scouts. Bombers were supposed to carry 1000 pound delayed action (SAP) bombs.

 

While the scouts carried bombs, it takes balls of steel to attack an enemy fleet with 1-2 planes and no escort. That said, Enterprise scouts famously did just that at Santa Cruz hitting Zuiho twice with two bombs dropped.

 

USN CVs with one of the 6-man DB squadrons split up into 2-man DB scout wings would be amazing. Unless you're a destroyer. But at least it would put it on par with the number of squadrons (and hence eyeballs) the IJN CVs have at T6+. They'd have to do something about those launch timers, though, 10s for a 2-man squadron wouldn't work.

[aethervox]

Wonderful Post, OP, about the US CVs.

Thing is you say WW2 Carriers and Air Groups as if (by implication) there is information on every nation.

You mention the UK in passing but no detail.

 Are you able to provide more detailed information on Japan, Germany, France, Italy or the UK, as well.

I do like the idea that WG might expand the choices for Carrier plane load outs (perhaps specific ship dependent only).

[tremor3258]

Germany did not ever quite reach putting the planes they wanted to on the Graf - they seemed to be considering a torpedo/dive bomber/fighter assortment - infighting over aircraft production resources was a major factor, plus Germany's surface combatants weren't strong enough to fight the Royal Navy, and submarines were having more success in the commerce raiding role.  They had some plans for a carrier fighter but Graf was moving so slow it didn't happen.

 

The IJN did not utilize an organic scouting component like the USN dive bombers carrying smaller bombs - their carrier aircraft also did not advance at the same sort of pace (USN aircraft were almost a whole different generation by the end of the war) thanks to political infighting and resource limitations.

 

France had only completed one aircraft carrier before the war (based on a partially completed battleship hull) - wiki indicates Bearn had a squadron of torpedo bombers, a recon squadron, and a short fighter squadron.  She had no combat encounters, but did help transport aircraft.  The Joffre were intended to replace her, but were never completed thanks to the outbreak of World War II.  All these only carried around 40 aircraft.

 

The Italian Regia Marina had two liners undergoing to conversion to aircraft carriers; neither was completed.  The intentions also seemed to be a fighter, scout-bomber, and torpedo bomber component (probably, they were looking at biplanes as one craft considered to have a CV-edition, and those probably would have been torpedo bombers, given the Italian experience with the effectiveness of Swordfish earlier).  The Italian armistice caused work to halt.

 

Royal Navy seemed to end up similar to the USN, including deck park.  Most of their carries seem to be carrying mainly Hellcat squadrons by 45, with a torpedo squadron (Avengers) along as well.  And like the USN Hellcats, these also could be considered fighter-bombers.

 

Interestingly - Ark Royal carried fighter-bomber (two-seaters, obsolete given the rapid progress in aircraft in the late 30s) and the famous Swordfish, but then switched one squadron of fighter-bombers for dedicated fighters shortly into the war (so 1/1/1 ).  The Royal Navy carriers are famous for carrying a decent amount of armor on the flight deck, but their battle damage proved really hard to repair. 

 

 

[HazeGrayUnderway]

What throws off the aircraft loadouts and WoWS with how it handles aircraft and what they do, is that a number of these planes were able to fulfill multiple roles.

 

The F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair were definitely able to use bombs and rockets.  That flexibility gave the fighter oriented CVLs like Independence-class surface / ground attack power despite having more limited counts of bombers.

 

The game doesn't allow strafing of ships.  Think damaging and incapping modules;  Think fighters strafing ships, damaging AA & Secondaries before the bombers come in.

 

For the USN, the SB2C Helldiver (designated ingame as a DB) and TBF Avenger (designated ingame as a TB) could sling bombs or torpedoes.

 

That's just scratching the surface and I haven't even looked at the IJN naval aircraft yet.

 

In WoWS, you have zero control over any of that flexibility.

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There is a site dedicated to USS Enterprise.  Most important for this thread is the historical air group assignments The Big-E had from Pearl Harbor timeframe until she had her last combat operation.  Keep in mind, those newer US naval fighters weren't "pure fighters" only.  Lastly, the link is important because you'll be hard pressed to find any other ship having that kind of air group history for its entire wartime service for us to view.