About the Yamato Class Battleships

[Bryan_Fury24]

Now,as many of you know,the anniversary of the ill-fated Operation Ten-go by the IJN in WWII has recently passed.

And I;m sure as all of you know,that because of the massive air attack mounted by the USN,the Yamato was lost.

And before that,the sister ship of the Yamato,the Musashi was lost at the battle of Sibuyan sea.

 

Now,these were the most powerful warships,the most incredible war machines ever built by man(at the time until the introduction of the Nimitz-class CVNs and the Soviet Typhoon SSBNs),and no doubt had they been utilized correctly with correct doctrine,could have put the USN/Allied navies in the pacific in a world of hurt.

But,there are two major things that made these monsters incredibly bad ideas:

1-Cost

2-As demonstrated by the British against the Italians(Or was it the French?) and by the Japanese themselves at pearl harbor,the age of the Battleship was in its sunset days. The next word in naval warfare was going to be naval aviation/the aircraft carrier.

So,now the question is,Why?

Why did the Japanese think that building these beasts was a good idea? Surely for the cost of these things,they could have built more cost effective ships,like aircraft carriers or,say more Kongous/Nagatos/etc. I read somewhere that building these ships almost bankrupted them. And the next point leads into my next question:

 

Why were they used in such...Ill-advised manners?

What I mean is When you have capital ships,you know you're gonna want to give those things all the support you can get,(Especially air support)Right? So,While i'm still a little bit hazy on Musashi's battle at sibuyan, Operation Ten-go,in my very honest opinon,was an exercise in suicidal idiocy and incompetence to the point If I was a admiral in the IJN at the time and you floated that abomination of a operation plan to me;one of two things would happen:I'd have you relieved and thrown in prison or flat out shot.
I mean,how in the hell can you go against a massive allied force With no air support?
I could go on,but I'd be massively digressing. All i'm saying is that such ships should have been used more effectively.
Using the Yamato...as a hotel? Ridiculous.

 

Why would you build two powerful,complex war machines and then not only not risk one in fear of losing it,but use them incorrectly and  lose both (One in a extremely pointless manner) anyway?


TL;DR:

What was the real reason for the Yamatos and why did the IJN think they would be Wunderwaffe?
 

[Hillslam]

Great info here as to how the Yamato actually stacks up to her compatriots, when you strip aside all lore and hype.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

 

Probably the single most comprehensive comparison put together on the subject. 

 

And more to your question - the Yamato's reason for being built was an extension of the warrior culture in power at the time in Japan. The above author touches on this to great effect:

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

 

In retrospect, it is difficult to comprehend how Japan's leadership managed to rationalize their way around the economic facts when they contemplated making war on the U.S. After all, these were not stupid men. Indeed, internal Imperial Navy studies conducted in 1941 showed exactly the trends in naval shipbuilding I have outlined above. In the end, however, the Tojo government chose the path of aggression, compelled by internal political dynamics which made the prospect of a general Japanese disengagement in China (which was the only means by which the American economic embargo would have been lifted) too humiliating a course to be taken. 

 

As for Operation Ten Go - it was a stop gap. It was known as a stop gap. It had no chance of successfully stopping the Americans and they were not stupid enough to not know that. But they needed to inflict some casualties before they decided to step up to the bargaining table and sue for peace. They hoped the Yam could pull that off.

 

[icoleman]

 

http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

 

 

 

 

 

Do not listen to any information on that site. It has been posted time and time again here. The community has proven it to be a load of crap countless times. 

[Immortan]

Yamamoto did not want Japan to build more BB's he knew that CV's were the future. Conservative's in the navy overruled him and they were build.

[MakaiArashi]

[AtomicRocketCruiser]

IJN doctrine and procurement all stem from their pre-war obsession with Decisive Battle- the idea that in a war with the USN they would use defense in depth to attrition the US fleet with submarines, aircraft and nighttime torpedo attack before meeting and destroying it battle-line to battle-line in a massive engagement. 

 

This concept drove all of their decisions- their focus on night battle training and heavy torpedo armaments on cruisers and destroyers, their obsession with overarmed, top-heavy designs, and an attempted focus on quality over quantity.

 

The Yamato class was the ultimate expression of that doctrine, a battleship that was superior to all others. The IJN knew that they could not build as many battleships as the US, so they sought to build better ones. 

 

Unfortunately for them the war they ended up fighting was a carrier war, where battleships were relegated to being oversized escorts or shore bombardment platforms. 

 

And if you don't understand why the Yamato and Musashi were used poorly you haven't studied the war very much. The war was lost for Japan whether they used these battleships or not - defeat was inevitable. Samar and Ten-go were operations conceived and executed in desperation- in the hope of doing any damage they could to the USN. The top brass of the IJN could not bear the shame of the war ending with their two greatest battleships in port- for them it was better to see them lost in combat, no matter how futile. 

 

There was no air support to be had at Samar because there was none left- no planes to fly and no trained pilots to fly them. They went down in flames at the Marianas. 

 

As for Ten-Go, even if there had been no carriers present the USN had something like 16 battleships at and around Okinawa, including all 4 Iowas and 2 King George Vs. Yamato never stood a chance regardless. 

[Windhover118]

Now,as many of you know,the anniversary of the ill-fated Operation Ten-go by the IJN in WWII has recently passed.

And I;m sure as all of you know,that because of the massive air attack mounted by the USN,the Yamato was lost.

And before that,the sister ship of the Yamato,the Musashi was lost at the battle of Sibuyan sea.

 

Now,these were the most powerful warships,the most incredible war machines ever built by man(at the time until the introduction of the Nimitz-class CVNs and the Soviet Typhoon SSBNs),and no doubt had they been utilized correctly with correct doctrine,could have put the USN/Allied navies in the pacific in a world of hurt.

 

But,there are two major things that made these monsters incredibly bad ideas:

1-Cost

2-As demonstrated by the British against the Italians(Or was it the French?) and by the Japanese themselves at pearl harbor,the age of the Battleship was in its sunset days. The next word in naval warfare was going to be naval aviation/the aircraft carrier.

 

So,now the question is,Why?

Why did the Japanese think that building these beasts was a good idea? Surely for the cost of these things,they could have built more cost effective ships,like aircraft carriers or,say more Kongous/Nagatos/etc. I read somewhere that building these ships almost bankrupted them. And the next point leads into my next question:

 

Why were they used in such...Ill-advised manners?

What I mean is When you have capital ships,you know you're gonna want to give those things all the support you can get,(Especially air support)Right? So,While i'm still a little bit hazy on Musashi's battle at sibuyan, Operation Ten-go,in my very honest opinon,was an exercise in suicidal idiocy and incompetence to the point If I was a admiral in the IJN at the time and you floated that abomination of a operation plan to me;one of two things would happen:I'd have relieved and thrown in prison or flat out shot.

I mean,how in the hell can you go against a massive allied force With no air support?

I could go on,but I'd be massively digressing. All i'm saying is that such ships should have been used more effectively.

Using the Yamato...as a hotel? Ridiculous.

 

Why would you build two powerful,complex war machines and then not only not risk one in fear of losing it,but use them incorrectly and  lose both (One in a extremely pointless manner) anyway?

 

 

TL;DR:

What was the real reason for the Yamatos and why did the IJN think they would be Wunderwaffe?

 

 

The Yamato and Musashi were conceived of and designed in the 1930s before it was fully realized that air power would supplant the battleship. At the time, almost all navies were still under the impression that the Battleship was still the center peace of naval warfare. The Japanese, Americans and British who all developed naval air power in the inter war period assumed the carriers would play a more supporting role. Japanese naval doctrine in the early months of WWII was basically to use their carriers as Battle cruisers. They would scout ahead of the main Japanese formation, making hit and run attacks in order to soften up the enemy fleet. The Battleships would then rush in and finish off the enemy fleet in one large decisive battle. 

 

This concept of the decisive is what drove Japanese strategy for the majority of the war. They would spent the rest of the war trying to destroy the US Navy in one massive blow hopefully bringing the United States to the negotiating table. Japanese strategy and doctrine surrounding the usage of their carriers is best demonstrated in the Battle of Midway. The Japanese Carriers were sent ahead of the main Japanese formation to knock out Midway and support the invasion forces. They would then lie in wait for the American Carriers once they appeared. The trailing Japanese battleships were then to come in and finish off the American force. Unfortunately for the Japanese, American code breaking allowed the US Navy to lay a trap of their own. 

 

By late 1944, the Japanese carrier force was extremely depleted. They only had a handful of carriers left and not enough pilots to fight a true carrier battle. It was during the battle of Leyte Gulf that the Japanese committed their Battleships which were effectively their last strategic reserve. Once could say it was the Japanese naval version of the Battle of the Bulge. The Japanese used their last carriers as bait to draw the American carrier force away from the invasion beaches. Although the center force was badly damaged by air attacks on the Sibuyan sea, the plan actually worked and the Japanese were able to force a surface engagement off Samar. However, the determined destroyer and air attacks from the escort carriers caused the Japanese to lose their nerve and retreat. Leyte Gulf demonstrated the growing desperation in the Japanese military. This was highlighted by the first use of the Kamikaze program. 

 

This leads us to Operation Ten Go. The Kamikaze program was in full swing and their was an expectation within the high command for the Navy to do their part. In a strange attempt to retain their own honor, the Japanese Navy organized their own massive Kamikaze attack with the Yamato at its heart. The Yamato was to beach itself on Okinawa and act as a massive artillery battery until destroyed. Allied air power prevented the Japanese force from getting close. 

 

In conclusion. The Yamato and Mushashi were designed and built in a period where the Battleship was still considered the supreme power on the ocean. They were conceived to be able to fight any other Battleship afloat and win. Although in retrospect, they were a huge waste of resources, they were at the time of their construction, conceived to make sense. 

[ExESGO]

Why did the IJN waste so much resources on battleships? Simple: The Battle of Tsushima.

 

You also have to consider the doctrine of the IJN (which pretty much was born from Tsushima): Kantai Kessen or Decisive Battle.

The IJN was constantly looking for battleship on battleship fights, and they had their chance, but they never capitalized on it.

[JAD1920]

How do you discount the Combined Fleet webpage? I understand that there is bias in some of the information, but it seems quite well to me. 

 

The Yamato Class was built before the true extant of carrier battle. It was the Coral Sea that ultimately decided what the war was going to be like in the Pacific. In the 1930s Billy Mitchell demonstrated that it was possible for aircraft to take down a battleship. Navy brass was skeptical because the ship could not fire back at the aircraft. The Battleship would still be a primary naval engagement vessel for sea faring nations. Even after Pearl Harbor, aircraft carriers were still considered 2nd in terms of naval warfare because of the lack of actual ship to ship/air armaments and could not defend itself from anything bigger than a destroyer if it's flight crews could not launch. As mentioned above the Yamato was designed for a decisive engagement that would never come and was an white elephant for the rest of her existence. I also contest that the Yamato is "better" than other allied BBs. Since we do not know her layout or citadel configuration this will never be answered as to her capabilities to take on other BBs in a line battle. The Yamato Class was Japan's only answer to modern Battleship construction. The other battleships of the IJN were outdated and outclassed by other allied ships. Kiroshima still lost in the end in her duel with the Washington. 

[NGTM_1R]

Do not listen to any information on that site. It has been posted time and time again here. The community has proven it to be a load of crap countless times. 

 

They haven't, and if you're discounting the entire CombinedFleet site over that one page you're a moron.

[icoleman]

 

They haven't, and if you're discounting the entire CombinedFleet site over that one page you're a moron.

 

Crag would be disappointed to see a moronic commented that dissed his effort in explaining why the site was a bunch of nonsense. 

[Windhover118]

 

 

 

Do not listen to any information on that site. It has been posted time and time again here. The community has proven it to be a load of crap countless times. 

 

I wouldn't discount the site completely. I just read through the article that the link leads to. Most of the information is more or less correct. The only real glaring error that jumped out at me was when the author referred to the Ranger as only somewhat capable and in need of a refit. The Ranger was a very capable carrier. I have always found is odd that the Navy deemed her too slow for use in the Pacific even when the carriers were being escorted by even slower North Carolina and South Dakota Class Battleships. There could be more errors but that is just what jumped out at me on the first read through. 

 

Having said that, I would not use the site as a source. I don't like to use opinion peaces to be honest. While most of the articles information doesn't seem to too inaccurate, the simple fact is that it is still the authors opinion's. The article itself doesn't actually site any real sources. If a person has no prior knowledge of the subject matter, I would honestly say that Wikipedia would be a better source of information. 

[Elouda]

The issue with that site, or more precisely that article, is that while the underlaying numbers and data gather are for the most part correct, the scoring system use to determine what is 'better' is opaque at best and completely arbitrary at worst.

 

The site itself certainly does also have good pieces, like the TROMs for various IJN vessels.

[Drakenred]

It (Ranger) needed more than a "Refit" it needed its hull lengthend and re-engined, and for no real gain in aircraft carried (and a marginal gain in speed) because the gain in space gained would have offset the lack of stores and munitions on board for its existing air group.

 

Bascialy for a Carrier the greater its avalible sustained speed = being able to create its own headwind for takeoffs for aircraft in any direction it needs to manuver = haveing more options when it comes to operating aircraft at launch and more importantly haveing the sprint speed it needs to get to where you promised your returning aircraft you would be, and more especialy when the craphits the fan getting your ship to where you want it to be to operate(for example Coral Sea, Midway) (and being able to manuver to deal with attacking aircraft)

 

So bascialy your "Very Capable carrier" did not have the speed it needed to operate to its best advantage, did not have the storses on board endurance it was felt was needed to operate in the Pacific, and did not have the speed and endurance needed to operate with the fleet as a unit.

 

Basicaly the Ranger was what it was. But it had too many strikes against it to be a front line carrier. Fortunatly we learned from that mistake with later carriers.

[RedBear87]

But,there are two major things that made these monsters incredibly bad ideas:

1-Cost

2-As demonstrated by the British against the Italians(Or was it the French?) and by the Japanese themselves at pearl harbor,the age of the Battleship was in its sunset days. The next word in naval warfare was going to be naval aviation/the aircraft carrier.

 

So,now the question is,Why?

Why did the Japanese think that building these beasts was a good idea? Surely for the cost of these things,they could have built more cost effective ships,like aircraft carriers or,say more Kongous/Nagatos/etc. I read somewhere that building these ships almost bankrupted them. And the next point leads into my next question:

Because they didn't have a viable time machine just yet. When the Yamato was designed and approved for construction carrier embarked aircraft were in rapid development, in particular planes capable of engaging at substantially long ranges were just being rolled out, the aircraft carrier was generally recognised as a precious addition, even by those countries that failed to introduce them, but it was still not a viable substitute for a battleship.

 

Neither the Taranto raid nor Pearl Harbor demonstrated the viability of carriers as substitute for battleships, sinking/disabling stationary targets taken by surprise is one thing, hitting manoeuvring ones fully prepared for AA combat is another. The turning points were the sinking of PoW/Repulse and the Battle of the Coral Sea, the first demonstrated the vulnerability of battleships without air cover in face of coordinated and massed air strikes, the second was the début of a new kind of naval warfare which saw the opposite sides operating always beyond guns' range.

 

As for why Yamato instead of another design, that was the almost foregone conclusion of the Japanese choice of quality over quantity. It wasn't really a wrong choice if you try to think in a 1930s mindset instead of a WWII one, that particular mindset existed even in the United States, it resulted in the Montana class, it was only because of a number of coincidences that similar ships were not built in the U.S. before facts, not theories, demonstrated that they were not really worth their money.

Why were they used in such...Ill-advised manners?

What I mean is When you have capital ships,you know you're gonna want to give those things all the support you can get,(Especially air support)Right? So,While i'm still a little bit hazy on Musashi's battle at sibuyan, Operation Ten-go,in my very honest opinon,was an exercise in suicidal idiocy and incompetence to the point If I was a admiral in the IJN at the time and you floated that abomination of a operation plan to me;one of two things would happen:I'd have you relieved and thrown in prison or flat out shot.

I mean,how in the hell can you go against a massive allied force With no air support?

I could go on,but I'd be massively digressing. All i'm saying is that such ships should have been used more effectively.

Using the Yamato...as a hotel? Ridiculous.

 

Why would you build two powerful,complex war machines and then not only not risk one in fear of losing it,but use them incorrectly and  lose both (One in a extremely pointless manner) anyway?

When and where could have they used them differently? The only instance I could think of is Midway, but it remains a matter of conjunctures, I myself would not be confident with the possible outcomes.

 

As for what you would have done in place of a Japanese admiral, the point is exactly that you're not one, you're not a Japanese navy officer who had been told that this plan has been approved by the divine Emperor, applying your own mindset and beliefs on what others did at the time is pointless if you're actually trying to understand what they did.

 

 

About the debate on that page of CombinedFleet, the specific "baddest" page is bad, but of course it doesn't subtract from the value of CombinedFleet as a whole, in particular its precious TROMs.

[Windhover118]

It (Ranger) needed more than a "Refit" it needed its hull lengthend and re-engined, and for no real gain in aircraft carried (and a marginal gain in speed) because the gain in space gained would have offset the lack of stores and munitions on board for its existing air group.

 

Bascialy for a Carrier the greater its avalible sustained speed = being able to create its own headwind for takeoffs for aircraft in any direction it needs to manuver = haveing more options when it comes to operating aircraft at launch and more importantly haveing the sprint speed it needs to get to where you promised your returning aircraft you would be, and more especialy when the craphits the fan getting your ship to where you want it to be to operate(for example Coral Sea, Midway) (and being able to manuver to deal with attacking aircraft)

 

So bascialy your "Very Capable carrier" did not have the speed it needed to operate to its best advantage, did not have the storses on board endurance it was felt was needed to operate in the Pacific, and did not have the speed and endurance needed to operate with the fleet as a unit.

 

Basicaly the Ranger was what it was. But it had too many strikes against it to be a front line carrier. Fortunatly we learned from that mistake with later carriers.

 

I am not saying that the Ranger was better than any of the other US carriers that operated in the Pacific. Consider for a moment that the US carriers were being escorted by the North Carolina and South Dakota class Battleships. This would mean that the speed of the task force would be limited to 28 knots maximum. Also consider that in 1943, HMS Victorious was deployed to the Pacific and operated along side USS Saratoga. HMS Victorious was only about a knot faster than Ranger, has roughly the same range and carried less aircraft than Ranger. All I am saying is that had the need arose, there is no reason Ranger could not have operated in the Pacific. The author of the article posted discounted Ranger completely.

[AdmiralPiett]

 

Crag would be disappointed to see a moronic commented that dissed his effort in explaining why the site was a bunch of nonsense. 

 

Considering the site is maintained by a co-author of one of the most important books written on the naval history of the Asia-Pacific War in the English language (Shattered Sword), that the site has a considerable bibliography of which I am abundantly familiar with, the author of the site is constantly asked to read and review newly published books on the naval war in the Pacific, the person has been published in peer-reviewed academic journals and certain parts of the site itself are considered highly credible as a source one can cite when writing on the IJN, I would say you are patently incorrect. Now, that battleship comparison page may consist of errors and a lot of subjective opinion, but that does not discredit the rest of the site. Specifically the TROMs section which is absolutely superb.

 

As for why the major navies kept building BBs in the interwar years, it was quite simple. BBs were still extremely powerful up until the mid-to-late 1930s when the capabilities of naval aviation began to increase exponentially. In the words of the RN:

 

"Yet no other great Naval Power, though with less risk that we ourselves should run, proposes to do away with capital ships. Should we be the first to do so? Surely not, unless the question is settled beyond all possible doubt. We do not find that the question is so settled. It may never be settled without the test of war, but the information at present at our disposal leads us to believe that the day of the capital ship is not over, now or in the near future; to assume that it is, and to cease to build them, would lead to grave risk of disaster."

"If [the air power] theories turn out well founded, we have wasted money; if ill founded, we would, in putting them to the test, have lost the Empire." - Two quotations from a Committee of Imperial Defence meeting which discussed the vulnerability of capital ships to air attack in July, 1936.

[Daigensui]

They haven't, and if you're discounting the entire CombinedFleet site over that one page you're a moron.

 

It's discountable given that it's the work of an amateur who has NO understanding of the Japanese side.

 

Considering the site is maintained by a co-author of one of the most important books written on the naval history of the Asia-Pacific War in the English language (Shattered Sword), 

 

Which had done more to establish its own myths as much as it tried to discredit Fuchida.

[Drakenred]

 

I am not saying that the Ranger was better than any of the other US carriers that operated in the Pacific. Consider for a moment that the US carriers were being escorted by the North Carolina and South Dakota class Battleships. This would mean that the speed of the task force would be limited to 28 knots maximum. Also consider that in 1943, HMS Victorious was deployed to the Pacific and operated along side USS Saratoga. HMS Victorious was only about a knot faster than Ranger, has roughly the same range and carried less aircraft than Ranger. All I am saying is that had the need arose, there is no reason Ranger could not have operated in the Pacific. The author of the article posted discounted Ranger completely.

 

 

I will go into this a bit later

[Kookaburras]

Yamamoto did not want Japan to build more BB's he knew that CV's were the future. Conservative's in the navy overruled him and they were build.

 

Yamamoto generally disagreed with a lot of things Japanese military did, he knew that starting the war with the US was a bad idea. 

[Windhover118]

 

 

I will go into this a bit later

 

I await your response. 

[AdmiralPiett]

 

It's discountable given that it's the work of an amateur who has NO understanding of the Japanese side.

 

 

Which had done more to establish its own myths as much as it tried to discredit Fuchida.

 

Do you have any academic articles, book reviews or books to back up such a view? I have never seen one and this is directly in my field. Considering that all it did was port over the current Japanese views, including those put forth in the Senshi Sosho, my understanding is that it is far from myth-making. No serious Pacific War historian has doubted Shattered Sword's validity and it is on the reading list at the United States Naval War College. I'm sure there are some errors in it, as there are in any work of history, but to discredit the entire book seems foolish. Fuchida's reputation was destroyed in Japan decades ago, and has only been destroyed in the west in the last several years. It is to the point that you can't cite anything he says without finding a more credible source to back it up because the more one looks into the events he spoke about, the more incorrect stuff has been found (Also see: http://www.amazon.com/Attack-Pearl-Harbor-Strategy-Deceptions/dp/1612001971). Now, I have no desire to argue with someone on the internet and I mean you no disrespect of course. I don't want to derail this topic and I have a thesis to write, so I don't have time to do hardcore research and writing on this at the moment. Therefore I will end the discussion here.

 

Edit: I did some poking around in various academic databases to see if there were any bombshells that had been dropped in the field recently. There were none. In fact, Anthony Tully (one of the co-authors of Shattered Sword) just had another article published in the Naval War College Review last week expanding on the newest historiography of the Battle of Midway written in Japanese.

[NGTM_1R]

 

Crag would be disappointed to see a moronic commented that dissed his effort in explaining why the site was a bunch of nonsense. 

 

Crag was also a moron, and never good debater. His arguments rarely had weight on their own unless borrowed from others, and I pretty much disproved them myself a few times.

 

 

It's discountable given that it's the work of an amateur who has NO understanding of the Japanese side.

 

 

Which had done more to establish its own myths as much as it tried to discredit Fuchida.

 

Yeah, sure. Pull the other one. If all you have is your word, I have no interest in it Dai; you've tried appealing to yourself as authority before and it's frequently meaningless because you never back it up with anything. If you had a real authority you'd already be posting it with excruciating detail; that's how it works with you.

[Drakenred]

The big problem with the USS Ranger starts off with one very simple detail. Its flight deck was just a little bit too short,

 

Ranger, While its kind of vague (one source I had referred to her flight deck as being longer than her absolute length which is nonsense) was around 730 ft, it was not much longer than that due to the design

 

Saratoga/Lexington 880 ft

 

Enterprise 802-ft

　

Hornet 824 ft

 

Essex (short bow) 844 ft

 

Why is this important? Simple. You have to load and fly off a strike package of aircraft to a target, and if you read those same reports and stories the one thing that strikes you is that often the back half were (a) Bombers that needed a longer takeoff run and B it was not unusual for those part of those planes to have a heavier ordinance load because they had more room to take off. And the future was promising for things to get worse on that score.

 

Second one of the problems they had was self inflicted, and ironically for being a design that was supposed to be based on lessons learned, this one was almost exactly like its predecessors (Lexington and Saratoga) in that it had a Island that was tacked onto the side of the ship too late in the designing and production to prevent the problem it ultimately caused, because it was not properly designed in from the start. this caused (Granted on a smaller scale) a stability issue which was offset the same was as the Lexington (use some of the originally planed fuel oil capacity for offsetting the weight of the Island) and this tended to cut into the operational rage of the ship.

 

This led to a third problem. The ship had a chronic fuel shortage which cutting into its operational time at speed (and again its operational range) meaning it would have to refuel more often. However Ironically this was not as much of a problem.. because due to putting a almost identical design defect into the ship they ultimately ended up reducing the "Stores on board" for the day to day operation of everything including the aircraft. . .(all other "Fleet carriers" had more stores on hand for everything, meaning less time needed to restock while underway, more of a consideration in the Pacific than the Atlantic)

 

Another side effect of this design flaw was the fact that Lexington and Saratoga, Despite there own almost identical design flaw which cut into there operational time, had FAR more endurance over the same speed ranges than the Ranger,(never mind the fact that they could operate at faster speeds than the Ranger, and this despite the fact that there own designs caused similar issues in endurance in the first place)

And Again, they also had proportionally larger stores, thus again reducing the need for at sea replenishment giving the ships a longer reach.

 

Again if they had done the proposed long hull refit of the Ranger MOST of those problems would have been negated (new more efficient and powerful engines + Better placement of boilers offsetting the islands weight, + longer hull, longer flight deck, more stores capacity better AA capacity. . . ) but the end result would have been a massive expenditure and opportunity cost for a ship that would not have remained in service any longer than it ultimately did, because unfortunately the Essex’s could still do anything the Ranger could... but better.

 

Basically this was a LARGE part of the reason for the recommended hull extension projects that were never started. Plus we needed a carrier deck for training, taking her out of commission to stretch her would have slowed down other projects, (and de-facto cost us a ship that was at least USEFULL as a training carrier in the process) and in the end would have delivered a carrier that would probably not have had as long a useful life as she ultimately had.

[Windhover118]

The big problem with the USS Ranger starts off with one very simple detail. Its flight deck was just a little bit too short,

 

Ranger, While its kind of vague (one source I had referred to her flight deck as being longer than her absolute length which is nonsense) was around 730 ft, it was not much longer than that due to the design

 

Saratoga/Lexington 880 ft

 

Enterprise 802-ft

　

Hornet 824 ft

 

Essex (short bow) 844 ft

 

Why is this important? Simple. You have to load and fly off a strike package of aircraft to a target, and if you read those same reports and stories the one thing that strikes you is that often the back half were (a) Bombers that needed a longer takeoff run and B it was not unusual for those part of those planes to have a heavier ordinance load because they had more room to take off. And the future was promising for things to get worse on that score.

 

Second one of the problems they had was self inflicted, and ironically for being a design that was supposed to be based on lessons learned, this one was almost exactly like its predecessors (Lexington and Saratoga) in that it had a Island that was tacked onto the side of the ship too late in the designing and production to prevent the problem it ultimately caused, because it was not properly designed in from the start. this caused (Granted on a smaller scale) a stability issue which was offset the same was as the Lexington (use some of the originally planed fuel oil capacity for offsetting the weight of the Island) and this tended to cut into the operational rage of the ship.

 

This led to a third problem. The ship had a chronic fuel shortage which cutting into its operational time at speed (and again its operational range) meaning it would have to refuel more often. However Ironically this was not as much of a problem.. because due to putting a almost identical design defect into the ship they ultimately ended up reducing the "Stores on board" for the day to day operation of everything including the aircraft. . .(all other "Fleet carriers" had more stores on hand for everything, meaning less time needed to restock while underway, more of a consideration in the Pacific than the Atlantic)

 

Another side effect of this design flaw was the fact that Lexington and Saratoga, Despite there own almost identical design flaw which cut into there operational time, had FAR more endurance over the same speed ranges than the Ranger,(never mind the fact that they could operate at faster speeds than the Ranger, and this despite the fact that there own designs caused similar issues in endurance in the first place)

And Again, they also had proportionally larger stores, thus again reducing the need for at sea replenishment giving the ships a longer reach.

 

Again if they had done the proposed long hull refit of the Ranger MOST of those problems would have been negated (new more efficient and powerful engines + Better placement of boilers offsetting the islands weight, + longer hull, longer flight deck, more stores capacity better AA capacity. . . ) but the end result would have been a massive expenditure and opportunity cost for a ship that would not have remained in service any longer than it ultimately did, because unfortunately the Essex’s could still do anything the Ranger could... but better.

 

Basically this was a LARGE part of the reason for the recommended hull extension projects that were never started. Plus we needed a carrier deck for training, taking her out of commission to stretch her would have slowed down other projects, (and de-facto cost us a ship that was at least USEFULL as a training carrier in the process) and in the end would have delivered a carrier that would probably not have had as long a useful life as she ultimately had.

 

I actually won't dispute anything that you said. The simple fact is that the Navy did have very good reasons for not wanting the Ranger to operate in the Pacific. The point I was trying to make earlier is that it wasn't entirely out of the question. In the article posted earlier which is what made me bring it up, the author brought up a situation of a worst case scenario where the Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown were all sunk at Midway. Thus leaving only Saratoga and Wasp as the only carriers capable of operating in the Pacific. In that scenario it would not be inconceivable for Ranger to be transferred to the Pacific even if only to temporarily boost the Pacific Fleet until more Essex Class and Independence Class carriers came online. Despite all of the design flaws you pointed out, the reason I say it is not out of the question is because of HMS Victorious. In 1943 when the Saratoga was operating as the only carrier in the Pacfic (Enterprise needed repairs) the British sent Victorious to operate along side the Saratoga. It could be argued that Victorious wasn't anymore suited to the task than Ranger. She was smaller (even shorter flight deck), carried less aircraft and was only about a knot faster. The British also had not practiced under way replenishment which would be a problem that plagued the British Pacific Fleet later on in the war. All I am saying is that if Victorious can do it, then so could Ranger. 

 

I guess that would lead to the question of why didn't she? Well the simple fact is that the situation was never desperate enough to transfer Ranger. She was the largest carrier in the Atlantic Fleet and played an important role supporting allied operations in North Africa and Europe. During the same time period that the Americans requested a British carrier be sen't to the Pacific, Ranger was actually undergoing a refit so she actually couldn't have been transferred.