From the 1914 Naval Review

[brian333]

This is a long read for some of our less patient forum members, but it's about the shortest condensation of the concepts of handling a fleet in battle I've been able to find. Post your questions here and someone will explain the concept you have trouble with. A lot of the jargon used in this paper will come up again and again, so get used to it, learn it, and you will benefit from it.

 

http://www.gwpda.org...al/nr191401.htm

[turmacil]

If nothing else I would like to be able to hammer this thought into the minds of all destroyer players.

 

"The success of a destroyer attack by day depends on many things; but first of all, on the partial demoralisation of the foe, or on the fact, that the foe is already so busily engaged that he is not in a position to offer a vigorous resistance."

 

Very nice read.

[Eaglecorps911]

This is a very nice read and a interesting subject to discuss. Certainly we could get more teamwork out of this if people drilled this read into their heads.

 

Now correct me if I am wrong, throughout the paper the author is trying to convey that the line of ships is flawed right? Unless it is supported by divisions of faster ships and such from the center force which would be the heavy hitters to medium hitters of the fleet, aka center fleet. As in the practices of the time would end up producing stalemates unless the enemy did something to gain an advantage over the line of ships right?

[brian333]

The Line of Battle is a defensive formation primarily. It allows the entire fleet to target a single ship, in theory, and reduce it. However, it also allows the enemy to do the same to you.

 

What you must realize is that this guy was trying to break the 'unified command' theory in which a single admiral had total control over every ship. His points were that no single commander could see the whole battle, and that divisional commanders and ship's captains often missed tactical opportunities because they were waiting for orders, as opposed to having an understanding of the goals the commander had for his unit and using his own initiative and ability to achieve them.

 

Princess Royal's comment about Admiral Arbuthnot was a case in point. He failed to fire a single gun for three hours in one battle because he had not been ordered to do so. When he was taken to task for that, in a subsequent battle he had no clue what he was doing when he crossed paths with his own fleet and engaged the enemy at suicidally stupid range. (The original Lemming Rusher?)

 

On paper the line of battle seemed like a good idea. You could easily wargame the scenario where the line of battle lead to victory. However, in actual practice it lead to stalemate after stalemate, usually with a return to the status quo after the battle. The Russians failed to break the blockade of Port Arthur in 1904 and the Germans failed to break the blockade in 1916. The line of battle is a very conservative approach to naval battle, and as we learned in WoT, the conservative approach is also known as the 'How To Lose Slowly' approach.

 

His point about the various speeds of ships, for example, is valid. If speed is armor, (a debatable point in itself,) why would you place speedy ships in a group with slower ships, thus eliminating their advantage without any intervention by the enemy at all? His point about accurate gunfire is also valid, so why would you try to place your heaviest hitters in a 'fast wing' where they give up accuracy?

 

Eagle, I think you have the gist of the paper's intent. Anyway, it forms a starting point for a basic understanding of naval combat maneuver.

[Eaglecorps911]

brian333, on 17 February 2013 - 10:03 PM, said:

The Line of Battle is a defensive formation primarily. It allows the entire fleet to target a single ship, in theory, and reduce it. However, it also allows the enemy to do the same to you.

What you must realize is that this guy was trying to break the 'unified command' theory in which a single admiral had total control over every ship. His points were that no single commander could see the whole battle, and that divisional commanders and ship's captains often missed tactical opportunities because they were waiting for orders, as opposed to having an understanding of the goals the commander had for his unit and using his own initiative and ability to achieve them.

Princess Royal's comment about Admiral Arbuthnot was a case in point. He failed to fire a single gun for three hours in one battle because he had not been ordered to do so. When he was taken to task for that, in a subsequent battle he had no clue what he was doing when he crossed paths with his own fleet and engaged the enemy at suicidally stupid range. (The original Lemming Rusher?)

On paper the line of battle seemed like a good idea. You could easily wargame the scenario where the line of battle lead to victory. However, in actual practice it lead to stalemate after stalemate, usually with a return to the status quo after the battle. The Russians failed to break the blockade of Port Arthur in 1904 and the Germans failed to break the blockade in 1916. The line of battle is a very conservative approach to naval battle, and as we learned in WoT, the conservative approach is also known as the 'How To Lose Slowly' approach.

His point about the various speeds of ships, for example, is valid. If speed is armor, (a debatable point in itself,) why would you place speedy ships in a group with slower ships, thus eliminating their advantage without any intervention by the enemy at all? His point about accurate gunfire is also valid, so why would you try to place your heaviest hitters in a 'fast wing' where they give up accuracy?

Eagle, I think you have the gist of the paper's intent. Anyway, it forms a starting point for a basic understanding of naval combat maneuver.

Ah gotcha, I did see that he was also arguing the point of command throughout the paper like you said. I just didn't give that a second thought as I figured he was mostly going over the fact of strategy, but thanks for the clearing up. Surely someone would have realized (besides the author) that the strategy was flawed in a way. Was there any case that the conservative way to fight on the high seas was broken and actually devised up something else?

[Battleship_Unknown2]

Eaglecorps911, on 18 February 2013 - 07:28 AM, said:

Ah gotcha, I did see that he was also arguing the point of command throughout the paper like you said. I just didn't give that a second thought as I figured he was mostly going over the fact of strategy, but thanks for the clearing up. Surely someone would have realized (besides the author) that the strategy was flawed in a way. Was there any case that the conservative way to fight on the high seas was broken and actually devised up something else?

It's not a flawed strategy if you lack radar or effective aerial reconaissance. Splitting a fleet without a firm knowledge of where an enemy force lay was a good way to lose half your navy -- as the British nearly learned following the Scarborough raid. Such a detached force was quite nearly intercepted by the High Seas Fleet, which almost certainly would have led to its annihilation. In that event, it is no exageration to state that the British potentially lose the war, as the High Seas Fleet would have attained at least parity, and possibly superiority over the Grand Fleet. At that point, there is little the British could have done to stop the Germans from landing a division or two and conquering the British Isles aside from committing to a pitched, do-or-die battle. There was, for example, no serious RAF force to deter such an invasion.

Line-ahead put the maximum number of guns trained against the maximum number of targets, and concentrated a fleet's strength. Yes, it was low-risk, but when the survival of your thousand-year-old kingdom is at stake, you do not gamble unnecessarilly.

*Edit* I have to add, Horatio Nelson eschewed a single-column line-ahead formation at Trafalgar. However, he knew where his enemy was, had plenty of time to position the two elements of his fleet prior to the shooting starting, and had supreme confidence in his senior captains to hold their own without his direction. In fact, Admiral Collingwood was quoted just before the battle "I wish Nelson would stop signa;ling -- we all know what to do." Second's later, his senior officer hoisted the famous "England expects that every man will do his duty," and a mollified Collingwood sputtered "great man!"

[Eaglecorps911]

Duly noted Princess, I stand corrected. keep up with your posts, I enjoy reading them as they are all informative.

[brian333]

Admirals are by nature conservative. They avoid risky innovation in favor of what works. The Line of Battle is great at preventing the majority of your ships from sinking, and this is the way you keep your job as an admiral: by not letting your ships sink.

 

There were many pre-WW1 attempts to introduce changes of doctrine, but they were wargamed out in ways that proved the doctrine of the previous 200 years to be correct, as opposed to actual testing of the new ideas. For example, the concept of a fast wing deployment was mentioned in the paper. The so-called fast wings of the wargame exercises failed, but the author pointed out that 3kts is not sufficiently fast at the scale of naval battle, while a 12kt difference in wing speed over center speed would be. In the wargames 'fast wings' were saddled with slower ships, which forced sufficiently fast ships to waste their excess speed and conform to the slowest ship's speed.

 

After the failed attempts to destroy the Russian fleet in Port Arthur the Japanese began to use non-standard battle arrangements, which were largely untested. In the Battle of the Yellow Sea, an attempt to catch the Russians in a 'pincer' maneuver failed, and the Russian fleet slipped through the claw, resulting in a stern chase. When they faced a significant fleet at Tsushima, they reverted to the old style and 'crossed the T' of the Russian fleet with results that can only be described as war-winning.

 

This was taken as further validation of the Line of Battle, and few serious looks were given to the fact that the Japanese knew the Russian fleet was coming, where it had to go, and laid in wait for it. Also, though the Russian fleet had some modern ships, it was largely composed of old, poorly maintained ships with inexperienced and under-trained crews, while the Japanese fleet had been honed to a fine edge and battle-tested.

[Eaglecorps911]

After all like people always say, why fix it when it ain't broke. xD  At least IJN actually tested something in battle though it didnt work out as planned. They wised up and went back and won if i read your post right brian.

[DR_McNinja]

this is a very interesting read, thanks for posting it  :Smile_great:

[brian333]

Eagle, that is the generally accepted view, however, in the paper the author argues it is an error. while the Line of Battle works, the centralized command and control system itself was flawed, and failed to take advantage of the various abilities of division leaders and captains. There could be examples of times when the initiative of a commander in a battle could quickly seize opportunities which will be lost if he is required to simply follow orders.

 

Such a case occurred in the Battle of Denmark Straits when Lindemann was forced to continue on course rather than run down Prince of Wales and finish her. Orders precluded opportunity, and the fleeting moment was lost. In hindsight, Lindemann was correct, Lutjens was wrong, but Lutjens was following orders.

 

Captain Evans of Taffy 3 fame didn't wait for orders, with famous results. He used initiative and seized an opportunity, which set the example for Roberts to follow. Both ships were sunk, along with Hoel, Gambier Bay, and St.Lo, but the strategic and tactical value of their loss was justified by the results. The USN didn't have an issue with Captains showing initiative if it resulted in success.

[Eaglecorps911]

brian333, on 18 February 2013 - 08:50 AM, said:

Eagle, that is the generally accepted view, however, in the paper the author argues it is an error. while the Line of Battle works, the centralized command and control system itself was flawed, and failed to take advantage of the various abilities of division leaders and captains. There could be examples of times when the initiative of a commander in a battle could quickly seize opportunities which will be lost if he is required to simply follow orders.

Such a case occurred in the Battle of Denmark Straits when Lindemann was forced to continue on course rather than run down Prince of Wales and finish her. Orders precluded opportunity, and the fleeting moment was lost. In hindsight, Lindemann was correct, Lutjens was wrong, but Lutjens was following orders.

Captain Evans of Taffy 3 fame didn't wait for orders, with famous results. He used initiative and seized an opportunity, which set the example for Roberts to follow. Both ships were sunk, along with Hoel, Gambier Bay, and St.Lo, but the strategic and tactical value of their loss was justified by the results. The USN didn't have an issue with Captains showing initiative if it resulted in success.

Gotcha, much clearer now, thank you very much. Makes much more sense as taking initiative as long as it justifies an means to an end. AkA losses do not surpass those of the losses of the enemy. Unless you are forced to follow such orders thus losing the opportunistic moment when it does come up.

[Battleship_Unknown2]

I personally believe the line of battle to be the best tactics for the job. It did see to the annihilation of the Russians at Tsushima, and it would have similarly destroyed the Germans at Jutland, had the British been granted an hour or so of visibility beyond a few thousand yards.

 

If you're interested in reading more, Eagle, about the thought process at work, pick up a copy of The Rules of the Game by Andrew Gordon. While the book doesn't discuss the elimination of line-ahead perse, it does deal with the attempt by a sect of British officers in the 1880s and 1890s to cast of the shackles of centralized command.

 

At the time, there was an increasing reliance on signalling to accomplish everything in battle. A flagship would raise a grouping of flags on a haylard attached to a mast, and then haul them down to execute a command. The process had grown from a novelty during Nelson's era into the central command structure of an entire fleet, and some officers believed -- correctly -- that reliance on it was a mistake. Haylards could be shot away; signal officers killed, and suddenly you have a flagship unable to issue orders. More importantly, captains -- sometimes miles away from their admiral and unable to see his orders except via relay from other ships -- often spot openings that must be exploited in a matter of moments, or those chances are lost.

 

Sir George Tryon, commander of the Mediterannean Fleet in 1893, was the main proponent of a low-signaling system that expected captains to adhere to an admiral's movements rather than his flags and, simultaneously, to think on their own when not ordered to the contrary. Unfortunately, while out on mauneuvers one June day, Tryon -- who may have been suffering from the very early stages of dementia -- gave an order while his fleet was sailing in two columns that the lead ships should cross paths. This would cause a collision, and everyone on the bridges of both HMS Victoria and HMS Camperdown knew it... except sir George. But because Tryon had trained his captains to adhere to minimum orders from the flagship, and because just such an order had been given using this 'reduced flags system,' both ships rammed right into each other. Victoria sank, and with her Tryon, and so went his innovative system. Of greatest importance, a young John Jellicoe -- who would later command the Grand Fleet at Jutland -- nearly drowned while escaping Victoria.

 

Following the disaster, the Royal Navy reacted by harshly condemning Tryon's system, even though it was the admiral -- and not his system -- that had made the error. As a result of this counter revolution, some 22-23 years later at Dogger Bank and Jutland, numerous signaling mistakes cost the British dearly. If Tryon's system had been in place, Beatty quite possibly might have sunk all the German battlecruisers at Dogger Bank, Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas wouldn't have stupidly led the Queen Elizabeths into Scheer's waiting arms, and the High Seas Fleet likely wouldn't have escaped during the night, when dozens of British senior captains spotted the enemy force crossing their wakes, headed for Germany.

 

All in all, it's a pretty good read.

[brian333]

Princess Royal said it far better than I did. It's apparent this subject is something PR has studied in depth.

 

The purpose of my posting the link was not to establish a doctrine of naval tactics, but to form a common understanding among the playerbase of what tactics were used, why, and what their faults were. It forms a common starting place for the discussion of fleet maneuver.

 

I think we'll have far too many independent minded players to form true Line Ahead formations outside of established Flotilla Battles, but when we do get a powerful center group it will be hard to beat. It will also open opportunities for DD strikes and what I term 'stupid close' engagements where less powerful weapons can defeat powerful armor schemes.

 

At the least, if you have read the paper you can begin to formulate an idea of what is expected of your ship in the overall tactics of fleet action.

[Battleship_Unknown2]

brian333, on 19 February 2013 - 01:01 AM, said:

Princess Royal said it far better than I did. It's apparent this subject is something PR has studied in depth.

The purpose of my posting the link was not to establish a doctrine of naval tactics, but to form a common understanding among the playerbase of what tactics were used, why, and what their faults were. It forms a common starting place for the discussion of fleet maneuver.

I think we'll have far too many independent minded players to form true Line Ahead formations outside of established Flotilla Battles, but when we do get a powerful center group it will be hard to beat. It will also open opportunities for DD strikes and what I term 'stupid close' engagements where less powerful weapons can defeat powerful armor schemes.

At the least, if you have read the paper you can begin to formulate an idea of what is expected of your ship in the overall tactics of fleet action.

I wasn't trying to show you up, Brian. I hope that isn't what you thought. If so, I appologize.

The more I think about it, the more I want to start the game playing in a clan/guild/whatever setting, and then pretty much exclusively play that way. I love accurate naval tactics, and the idea of a pitched melee disgusts me in anything but Guadalcanal-like conditions.

[brian333]

Show me up if you can because I learn from mistakes. I also have no e-go to offend or stroke, and don't take anything I read on the internet personally. Heck, I don't even use my real name on the internet, it's brian 333 because Brian Boru and 332 other alternatives were taken already.

 

Melees will happen. I hope that when they do a smart squadron forms up and pounds the crap out of them using insights into armor strengths and weaknesses and gunfire power and limitations. In other words, I seriously hope that someone who studies the game succeeds, and is not constantly nerfed by matchmaker to conform to some idiotic 50% win standard by placing the one good player on a  team of fail-players.

 

The game should reward the player who invests the time, energy, and intelligence required to succeed. WoT seems to have begun punishing that somewhere around upgrade 6.0.

[Eaglecorps911]

PrincessRoyal, on 18 February 2013 - 06:09 PM, said:

I personally believe the line of battle to be the best tactics for the job. It did see to the annihilation of the Russians at Tsushima, and it would have similarly destroyed the Germans at Jutland, had the British been granted an hour or so of visibility beyond a few thousand yards.

If you're interested in reading more, Eagle, about the thought process at work, pick up a copy of The Rules of the Game by Andrew Gordon. While the book doesn't discuss the elimination of line-ahead perse, it does deal with the attempt by a sect of British officers in the 1880s and 1890s to cast of the shackles of centralized command.

At the time, there was an increasing reliance on signalling to accomplish everything in battle. A flagship would raise a grouping of flags on a haylard attached to a mast, and then haul them down to execute a command. The process had grown from a novelty during Nelson's era into the central command structure of an entire fleet, and some officers believed -- correctly -- that reliance on it was a mistake. Haylards could be shot away; signal officers killed, and suddenly you have a flagship unable to issue orders. More importantly, captains -- sometimes miles away from their admiral and unable to see his orders except via relay from other ships -- often spot openings that must be exploited in a matter of moments, or those chances are lost.

Sir George Tryon, commander of the Mediterannean Fleet in 1893, was the main proponent of a low-signaling system that expected captains to adhere to an admiral's movements rather than his flags and, simultaneously, to think on their own when not ordered to the contrary. Unfortunately, while out on mauneuvers one June day, Tryon -- who may have been suffering from the very early stages of dementia -- gave an order while his fleet was sailing in two columns that the lead ships should cross paths. This would cause a collision, and everyone on the bridges of both HMS Victoria and HMS Camperdown knew it... except sir George. But because Tryon had trained his captains to adhere to minimum orders from the flagship, and because just such an order had been given using this 'reduced flags system,' both ships rammed right into each other. Victoria sank, and with her Tryon, and so went his innovative system. Of greatest importance, a young John Jellicoe -- who would later command the Grand Fleet at Jutland -- nearly drowned while escaping Victoria.

Following the disaster, the Royal Navy reacted by harshly condemning Tryon's system, even though it was the admiral -- and not his system -- that had made the error. As a result of this counter revolution, some 22-23 years later at Dogger Bank and Jutland, numerous signaling mistakes cost the British dearly. If Tryon's system had been in place, Beatty quite possibly might have sunk all the German battlecruisers at Dogger Bank, Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas wouldn't have stupidly led the Queen Elizabeths into Scheer's waiting arms, and the High Seas Fleet likely wouldn't have escaped during the night, when dozens of British senior captains spotted the enemy force crossing their wakes, headed for Germany.

All in all, it's a pretty good read.

That sounds like a good read, I shall pick up a copy in the near future for sure. I love naval tactics myself, I would soon join you two in a clan before anyone else's because it sounds like you guys know what you are doing. And that I like as I love to team up and play as a team. But as brian said we are sure to get more people playing alone then together unless you get competent minded peeps.

[Battleship_Unknown2]

Eaglecorps911, on 19 February 2013 - 06:53 AM, said:

That sounds like a good read, I shall pick up a copy in the near future for sure. I love naval tactics myself, I would soon join you two in a clan before anyone else's because it sounds like you guys know what you are doing. And that I like as I love to team up and play as a team. But as brian said we are sure to get more people playing alone then together unless you get competent minded peeps.

We need to come up with a good name. Also... shotgun on rear admiral in charge of BBs/BCs. :biggrin:

[Eaglecorps911]

PrincessRoyal, on 19 February 2013 - 07:10 AM, said:

We need to come up with a good name. Also... shotgun on rear admiral in charge of BBs/BCs. :biggrin:

Yeah we would need too indeed. Damn you got rear admiral.. Blah Ill take the next in line.  How about The royals? xD Yeah I know cheesy.

[Battleship_Unknown2]

Eaglecorps911, on 19 February 2013 - 07:15 AM, said:

Yeah we would need too indeed. Damn you got rear admiral.. Blah Ill take the next in line.  How about The royals? xD Yeah I know cheesy.

I can work on it. I'm an author... I'm pretty good on coming up with catchy names. I don't want something too ubiquitous, because there are going to be a bazillion 'the 5th fleet;' 'the 8th fleet' etc. floating around. Just because we'd employ a firm military structure doesn't mean we'd need to have a wholly historically accurate name.

We'd also probably want to settle on, at most, 3 nationalities we're going to play, at least at the start (yes, I know the game will launch with just Japan and the U.S., but I hope that Britain, Germany, Italy and France will follow shortly, in addition to Russia)... and that's where the choices are going to get hard.

Also, maybe I'd prefer the rank of Princess over rear admiral. *Fluffs hair.*

[brian333]

Let's see how real-life tactics work out in game first.

 

As for names: Navigation Hazard, Blockade Runners, Armada of Admirals, Combined Fleet, Combat Cadets, Blue Water Warriors

 

Heck, I could come up with a million mediocre names. feel free to use any or all of these, or use them for inspiration of great names.

[Eaglecorps911]

PrincessRoyal, on 19 February 2013 - 07:28 AM, said:

I can work on it. I'm an author... I'm pretty good on coming up with catchy names. I don't want something too ubiquitous, because there are going to be a bazillion 'the 5th fleet;' 'the 8th fleet' etc. floating around. Just because we'd employ a firm military structure doesn't mean we'd need to have a wholly historically accurate name.

We'd also probably want to settle on, at most, 3 nationalities we're going to play, at least at the start (yes, I know the game will launch with just Japan and the U.S., but I hope that Britain, Germany, Italy and France will follow shortly, in addition to Russia)... and that's where the choices are going to get hard.

Also, maybe I'd prefer the rank of Princess over rear admiral. *Fluffs hair.*

Ah I see hehe. Your highness then ;)

brian333, on 19 February 2013 - 07:36 AM, said:

Let's see how real-life tactics work out in game first.

As for names: Navigation Hazard, Blockade Runners, Armada of Admirals, Combined Fleet, Combat Cadets, Blue Water Warriors

Heck, I could come up with a million mediocre names. feel free to use any or all of these, or use them for inspiration of great names.

Aye I bet

I would like us three to stick together if it wasnt too much to ask if you dont mind me saying this. Of course others are able to join im not saying just us three only.

[Battleship_Unknown2]

Well, I'll tell you right now that I favor British, German and potentially Italian ships over all others, so if you're planning on sailing primarily American/Japanese after they release the other nationalities, I am likely a bad choice. It's not that I hate American or Japanese ships by any means, I simply vastly prefer the other three.

[PhilJD_NA]

PrincessRoyal, on 19 February 2013 - 07:28 AM, said:

Also, maybe I'd prefer the rank of Princess over rear admiral. *Fluffs hair.*

Your favourite ship should also be a 'big cat' battlecruiser - hopefully they will let you change her name to the appropriate one also :)

[the source websight is a fantastic place for all sorts of WW1 info' for those with the interest and the time to investigate it fully].

[sharlin648]

I'll be keeping an eye out for you Princess Royal, we'll have to squadron together. *nods* But seriously, your posts are informative, well thought out and insightful, do keep posting :)