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Admiral Kimmel

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My friend started a petition I think the Wows community might be interested in.  Here it is for those who are interested.

http://chng.it/wK57NCKs

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I’m not sure why this hasn’t already happened. Many of his contemporaries said in memoirs they felt he took the political fall so the country wouldn’t lose faith in our government along with Gen Short. Washington with held intelligence or intelligence gathered in Washington wasn’t shared with intelligence gathered in the Pacific which would have painted a better picture of a possible attack. Washington believed the attacks would be in the Asian areas not in Hawaii and did not share that with Pacific command. MacArthur has 18 hours warning of the attack on Pearl but his Air Force was destroyed on the ground. He wasn’t punished, but he was an American hero which we desperately needed. 
 

Ultimately Nimitz was the right man for the Pacific campaign so removing Kimmel wasn’t a destructive decision but I hate for him and his family to have Pearl ties around his neck. I also believe his oldest son was sunk in command of a sub and the 2nd son wanted a command at sea badly but Adm King kept him in Washington and said his family had sacrificed too much for the war already 

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53 minutes ago, wstugamd said:

I’m not sure why this hasn’t already happened. Many of his contemporaries said in memoirs they felt he took the political fall so the country wouldn’t lose faith in our government along with Gen Short. Washington with held intelligence or intelligence gathered in Washington wasn’t shared with intelligence gathered in the Pacific which would have painted a better picture of a possible attack. Washington believed the attacks would be in the Asian areas not in Hawaii and did not share that with Pacific command. MacArthur has 18 hours warning of the attack on Pearl but his Air Force was destroyed on the ground. He wasn’t punished, but he was an American hero which we desperately needed. 
 

Ultimately Nimitz was the right man for the Pacific campaign so removing Kimmel wasn’t a destructive decision but I hate for him and his family to have Pearl ties around his neck. I also believe his oldest son was sunk in command of a sub and the 2nd son wanted a command at sea badly but Adm King kept him in Washington and said his family had sacrificed too much for the war already 

His family has campaigned for it multiple times, and actually, in 1999 the senate passed a non binding resolution with 54 votes in favor to restore his rank, but President Clinton refused to.

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Kimmel wasn't removed for Pearl Harbor.

He was removed for recklessly risking the remaining fleet to save the Marines on Wake Island.  He was repeatedly warned, by was too bullheaded to listen.

The 'Wake Rescue' operation was double classified in that we didn't want it to appear we didn't care about and needlessly sacrificed the Marines there...  But we did.  In particular, Halsey was super ticked-off at holding back.  But it was classified until the 1950s, and by then, nobody cared what these guys said.

Had we allowed Kimmel to save/evacuate Wake and confront the Japanese Navy 6 months early, we could have lost big and set the war back a year...  Or we could have won big and shortened the war by two years.

History is a fickle thing to play with.

 

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59 minutes ago, AVR__Project said:

Kimmel wasn't removed for Pearl Harbor.

He was removed for recklessly risking the remaining fleet to save the Marines on Wake Island.  He was repeatedly warned, by was too bullheaded to listen.

The 'Wake Rescue' operation was double classified in that we didn't want it to appear we didn't care about and needlessly sacrificed the Marines there...  But we did.  In particular, Halsey was super ticked-off at holding back.  But it was classified until the 1950s, and by then, nobody cared what these guys said.

Had we allowed Kimmel to save/evacuate Wake and confront the Japanese Navy 6 months early, we could have lost big and set the war back a year...  Or we could have won big and shortened the war by two years.

History is a fickle thing to play with.

 

Can you provide citation? Reading through the lines the story seems plausible

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5 hours ago, wstugamd said:

Can you provide citation? Reading through the lines the story seems plausible

It was an historical discussion I had with a Navy Commander back in the 1980s.

We had time on our hands so we talked a lot of navy History.  It's well documented at the Navy Academy... 

Something about disobeying orders from a superior.

And McArthur got fired for that too.  Sorry...  I don't have a citation for that either.

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6 hours ago, wstugamd said:

Can you provide citation? Reading through the lines the story seems plausible

I looked a few things up.

Kimmel was relieved by Admiral Stark.  Stark was relieved as CNO by King in March 1942.
"Stark faced a Court of Inquiry over his actions leading up to Pearl Harbor.[13] The Court concluded that Stark had not conveyed the danger or provided enough information to Kimmel, but he had not been derelict."
[
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. DANFS]

Fact is that Stark was micro-managing naval operations and giving vague orders to Kimmel and later Pye and Nimitz  Critical intel connections were denied to the field commanders, had to pass through Stark, and the command decisions were made in Washington.  Kimmel was given orders (or lack of orders), and disobeyed them by not sitting on his butt.  All of this traffic is STILL classified, or destroyed.

On the 22nd, 5 days after Kimmel being escorted out, Pye got an order from Stark - - all of which all that is publicly known is the title page == "Wake is now and will continue to be a liability".  And like a good troop, he read it and burned it.

Security was different in those days.  I'm wondering if Roosevelt himself didn't order that fleet turned around.

After all, if we soundly spanked the IJN and chased them off, he might not get his war with Germany.

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It was my understanding that Pearl Harbor has to be the reason as the wake rescue ships continued for 5 days after Kimmel was relieved. 
 

As for McAurthur, IIRC he recommended US forces continue north into China after Chinese troops began pouring in to North Korea. The president didn’t want to get into a war with China and so relieved McAurthur. 

Edited by Horama

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On 5/16/2020 at 9:37 PM, Horama said:

As for McAurthur, IIRC he recommended US forces continue north into China after Chinese troops began pouring in to North Korea. The president didn’t want to get into a war with China and so relieved McAurthur

In a 1973 article from Time magazine, President Truman was quoted as saying in the early 1960s (citation December 3rd, 1973 issue of TIME)

"I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a [edited], although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail."

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On 5/16/2020 at 11:29 AM, AVR__Project said:

Kimmel wasn't removed for Pearl Harbor.

He was removed for recklessly risking the remaining fleet to save the Marines on Wake Island.  He was repeatedly warned, by was too bullheaded to listen.

The 'Wake Rescue' operation was double classified in that we didn't want it to appear we didn't care about and needlessly sacrificed the Marines there...  But we did.  In particular, Halsey was super ticked-off at holding back.  But it was classified until the 1950s, and by then, nobody cared what these guys said.

Had we allowed Kimmel to save/evacuate Wake and confront the Japanese Navy 6 months early, we could have lost big and set the war back a year...  Or we could have won big and shortened the war by two years.

History is a fickle thing to play with.

 

Not according to Prange; At Dawn We Slept Ch. 69, Morison; History of U.S. Naval Operations WWII, Vol 3, FADM King and ADM Richardson's memoirs.  Well documented that SECNAV Frank Knox, after his visit to PH and return to Washington on Dec 14, reported to FDR that Kimmel, Short and Martin should be relieved.  Stimson agreed since his investigator, who was going to PH independently of Knox, died in a plane crash.  Knox report was very accurate and the publicized portions somewhat increased the public outcry for heads.  Besides recommending the firings, Knox also recommended the inquiry which would become the Robert's Commission and separating CINCUS from one of the Fleet commands. 

On 5/16/2020 at 6:31 PM, AVR__Project said:

It was an historical discussion I had with a Navy Commander back in the 1980s.

We had time on our hands so we talked a lot of navy History.  It's well documented at the Navy Academy... 

Something about disobeying orders from a superior.

And McArthur got fired for that too.  Sorry...  I don't have a citation for that either.

Spent many hours in the Nimitz Library and know of nothing like this documented at USNA.  Up until the time of his relief Kimmel was still fighting his fleet, or attempting to.  Thus the attempted Wake relief.  

On 5/16/2020 at 7:37 PM, AVR__Project said:

I looked a few things up.

Kimmel was relieved by Admiral Stark.  Stark was relieved as CNO by King in March 1942.
"Stark faced a Court of Inquiry over his actions leading up to Pearl Harbor.[13] The Court concluded that Stark had not conveyed the danger or provided enough information to Kimmel, but he had not been derelict."
[
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. DANFS]

Fact is that Stark was micro-managing naval operations and giving vague orders to Kimmel and later Pye and Nimitz  Critical intel connections were denied to the field commanders, had to pass through Stark, and the command decisions were made in Washington.  Kimmel was given orders (or lack of orders), and disobeyed them by not sitting on his butt.  All of this traffic is STILL classified, or destroyed.

On the 22nd, 5 days after Kimmel being escorted out, Pye got an order from Stark - - all of which all that is publicly known is the title page == "Wake is now and will continue to be a liability".  And like a good troop, he read it and burned it.

Security was different in those days.  I'm wondering if Roosevelt himself didn't order that fleet turned around.

After all, if we soundly spanked the IJN and chased them off, he might not get his war with Germany.

From the Nimitz Gray Book, which includes message traffic between OPNAV (CNO) and CINCPAC relating to Wake prior to Kimmel being relieved.  The War Diary reports the relief on Dec 17 but the documented message traffic is missing. 

DEC 15 2149 OPNAV TO CINCPAC
YOU ARE AUTFORIZED AT YOUR DISCRETION TO REINFORCE WAKE
AND MIDWAY, TO RESTOCK THEM WITH AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES
AND TO REMOVE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.

DEC 15 2301 CINCPAC TO OPNAV
Wake must be:- One, supplied with ammunition and reinforced
with fighter planes; Two, evacuated or;
Three, abandon the garrison and defense workers totaling
about 1400 men. To unload ammunition and stores and embark
a portion of defense workers will take at least· 2
days~ Embarking all personnel for evacuation should be
accomplished in less than 1 day.  With unfavorable weather
these times will be indefinitely increased. Ammunition

that can be supplied will be sufficient for about 1 month
at present rate of expenditure. Have planned to reinforce
Wake and evacuate about 700 defense workers and am dispatching
1 CV 3 CA and a DD squadron escorting Tangier with
ammunition and supplies departing today. Also plan a diversional
attack on Eastern Marshalls with 1 CV - 3 CA and a
squadron of destroyers who sailed yesterday.

DEC 16 0050 OPNAV TO CINCPAC
OPERATIONS REPORTED IN YOUR 152302 ARE HEARTILY CONCURRED
IN.

DEC 16 2200 OPNAV TO CINCPAC
AT YOUR CONVENIENCE REQUEST YOUR ESTIMATE AS TO DATE ON
WHICH AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER FROM YOUR FLEET MAY BE AVAILABLE
SAN DIEGO TRANSPORTING ASSEMBLED MARINE AND ARMY
AIRCRAFT FROM SAN DIFGO TO HAWAIIAN AREA AND NUMBER OF
HER 0WN AIRCRAFT TO BE RETAINED FOR DEFENSE ENROUTE.
YOUR 132101.· FOR YOUR INFORMATION USS KITTYHAVVK AND
HAMMONDSPORT CONVERTED SEA TRAINS WILL ARRIVE SAN DIEGO
ABOUT 1 JANUARY TO LOAD ASSEMBLED AIRCRAFT FOR HAWAII
OR FOR DELIVERY FAR EAST VIA AUSTRALIA IN ACCORDANCE
FOR DECISION TO BE MADE LATER. THESE SHIPS CAN EACH
CARRY EITHER ABOUT 48 PURSUIT AIRPLANES ASSEMBLED OR
ABOUT 100 CRATED.

This next one may be considered overly verbose and covering too much ground as messages go.  It's clear from the above that the CNO agreed with CINCPAC's Dec 15 message.  But there is no mention of bringing on a general fleet engagement anywhere in the message traffic.  Perhaps this is one of the messages responsible for Stark being considered a micromanager.  Lundstrom: The First South Pacific Campaign uses the Gray Books extensively in his analysis, and nowhere is it intimated that Kimmel's relief was tied to Wake.

DEC 17 0115 OPNAV TO CINCPAC
CHANGE TASK OF SUB-PARAGRAPH DOG MY 090139 TO READ:-
RAID ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND FORCES" - IT BEING
UNDERSTOOD THE WORD FORCES INCLUDES POSITIONS AND INSTALLATIONS
OF ALL CHARACTER~
YOUR ESTIMATE OF SITUATION ACCORDS IN GENERAL WITH IDEAS
OF CNO. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME FEATURES WHICH YOU ARE
HEREBY REQUESTED CAREFULLY TO RECONSIDER:

FIRST, KNOX IS NOT YET SATISFIED THAT HAWAIIAN ISLANDS ARE
SAFE FROM CAPTURE. CNO CONSIDERS IT POSSIBLE FOR JAPANESE
CARRIERS AGAIN TO DESTROY A LARGE PART OF THE SHORE BASED
AIRCRAFT AND IF THIS OCCURS A SECOND TIME THEY CANNOT BE
REPLAACED EXCEPT AFTER A LONG PERIOD. JAPANESE CARRIER
STRENGTH IS SUCH THAT YOU CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT LANDINGS
BY JAPANESE TROOPS WILL NOT BE MADE ON UNDEFENDED ISLANDS
OF THE HAWAIIAN GROUP AND SEIZURE OF AIRFIELDS OR DESTRUCTION
OF PLANES ARE STILL POSSIBLE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. THE
ENTIRE DEFENSE SYSTEM OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS IS UNDER
REVIEW BY THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS. CNO HAS RECOMMENDED
STATIONING TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT ON ALL THE LARGER ISLANDS
IN ORDER TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY AIR TO CREATE A LARGER
BASE AREA WITH MUTUALLY SELF SUPPORTING FORCES;

SECOND, UNTIL OAHU DEFENSES ARE BUILT UP TO SATISFACTORY
STATUS PEARL HARBOR SHOULD BE USED BY YOUR VESSELS ONLY
FOR SHORT PERIODS AND WHEN SUCH USE IS ESSENTIAL. NO
REGULAR OVERHAULS SHOULD BE SCHEDULED FOR THE NAVY YARD
BUT ALL ITS ACTIVITIES DEVOTED TO SUPPLY AND TO EMERGENCY
REPAIR PURPOSES AND At.TERATIONS T H;l.T CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED
QUICKLY. UPKEEP PERIODS SHOULD BE SHORTENED AND SHIPS
KEPT AT SEA AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT REGARD AT THIS
TIME TO RELAXATION PERIODS FOR PERSONNEL. EVERY POSSIBLE
MEANS SHOULD BE DEVISED AND EXECUTED WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE
TO SECURITY AGAINST AIRCRAFT OR TORPEDO OR GUN ATTACK OF
SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND SHORE FACILITIES;

THIRD, THE MARSHALL ISLAND BASES CONSTITUTE A CONTINUOUS
THREAT TO YOUR FORCES AND SHIPPING TO HAWAII AND THE FAR
EAST AS WELL AS THREAT TO WAKE AND MIDWAY. CONSIDER THAT
THESE JAPANESE BASES SHOULD BE RAIDED AND DESTROYED WHEN
PRACTICABLE AND UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES NOT DNLY
BECAUSE OF THESE THREATS BUT AS SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR WAKE
AND MIDWAY AND FOR THE GREAT MORAL VALUE WHICH SUCCESSFUL
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL HAVE FOR THE ARMY, NAVY AND
PEOPLE OF UNITED STATES AS YOU NOW PLAN.

CNO RECOGNIZES NEED FOR UTMOST SECRECY BUT DESIRES TO
BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS WHEN
PRACTICABLE;

FOURTH, WHILE YOUR 'PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT IS CONSIDERED
SOUND, CNO INVITES ATTENTION TO THE DANGER OF EMPLOYING
THE SAME TYPE OF DEPLOYMENT OR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS
ALONG FIXED LINES OVER EXTENDED PERIODS. IN THIS, AS
IN ALL OTHER OPERATIONS, DECEPTION AND SURPRISE ARE
ESSENTIAL;

FIFTH, WHILE TRANS-PACIFIC SHIPPING TO AUSTRALIA AND
BEYOND MAY EVENTUALLY BE REDUCED IT WILL INCREASE OVER
THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR
ARMY AND NAVY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA AND LTTER
(UPPER OR LOWER?) AUSTRALIA.
IT ALSO MAY BECOME NECESSARY AT TIMES TO ESCORT SHIPPING
BETWEEN. WEST COAST AND THE CANAL.
DESIRE YOUR COMMENT AFTER DUE CONSIDERATION OF FOREGOING.

Point in all this?  ADM Kimmel was relieved over the PH Attack.   It just took 10 days to do it officially.  There was no other way it was going to go.  Having CO of TF-1 take over as a caretaker had only one outcome: conserve the Fleet until the actual relief (Nimitz) arrived.  Thus Wake was abandoned.  Morison believes a fleet engagement would have been probable had Kimmel retained command until Nimitz arrival but Knox's intervention with FDR caused his relief early.

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8 hours ago, Lethal215 said:

Not according to Prange; At Dawn We Slept Ch. 69, Morison; History of U.S. Naval Operations WWII, Vol 3, FADM King and ADM Richardson's memoirs.  Well documented that SECNAV Frank Knox, after his visit to PH and return to Washington on Dec 14, reported to FDR that Kimmel, Short and Martin should be relieved.  Stimson agreed since his investigator, who was going to PH independently of Knox, died in a plane crash.  Knox report was very accurate and the publicized portions somewhat increased the public outcry for heads.  Besides recommending the firings, Knox also recommended the inquiry which would become the Robert's Commission and separating CINCUS from one of the Fleet commands. 

Spent many hours in the Nimitz Library and know of nothing like this documented at USNA.  Up until the time of his relief Kimmel was still fighting his fleet, or attempting to.  Thus the attempted Wake relief.  

Point in all this?  ADM Kimmel was relieved over the PH Attack.   It just took 10 days to do it officially.  There was no other way it was going to go.  Having CO of TF-1 take over as a caretaker had only one outcome: conserve the Fleet until the actual relief (Nimitz) arrived.  Thus Wake was abandoned.  Morison believes a fleet engagement would have been probable had Kimmel retained command until Nimitz arrival but Knox's intervention with FDR caused his relief early.

If you can look past all the 'Memoirs' on how the authors whose subjects single-handedly won the war.....
You begin to see the pattern.  Was Kimmel fired for Pearl Harbor?  Or was the Washington brass trying to save their own skin?
If Kimmel pulled off an outright victory over Wake here...   They couldn't blame PH on him without his voice being heard. 

And he would simply tell the truth and be a competent hero, even after he was dismissed.  It was HIS plan. 

They couldn't have Kimmel showing competency here, it would mess with their plans.  People might start looking at the Washington brass for the actual perpetrators of the crime.  The Wake operation had to be stopped.

Fletcher and Wilson were ready to disobey orders and plow through anyway.  Fletcher would have actually been in striking range in the evening of the 22nd - in time to halt the Japanese invasion.  But Fletcher had some sort of ethic to tuck it in and follow orders.
The Hiryu and Soryu would have complicated matters, and their only only experience attacking naval ships at this point was the parking lot at PH.  Maybe the Midway magic might happen 6 months earlier.  All the aviators were new to this.

The US Navy turned and ran away from a fair fight.  They didn't like that at all.

Edit:  Did Fletcher know two Japanese CVs were out there?  I'll bet he never got the intel passed down...   This is what made him so reluctant to stick his neck out.  He might have thought all 6 were waiting.

Edited by AVR__Project

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I think reinstating Kimmel would be completely fair.  The defense of Pearl Harbor, and the US fleet while in harbor fell first and foremost to the US Army and General Short.  Short's performance in this was execrable.  Whether Wake was reinforced or not, the likelihood at the time was it would fall to a Japanese attack and reinforcing defeat is a mistake in warfare.  Maybe Wake could have been saved, but it is hardly a sure bet without hindsight.

I would say on the whole Kimmel did a good job in command of the Pacific Fleet.  The fleet went to general quarters and began a resolute defense against the Japanese attack within minutes of it starting.  The US Army's response was more on the order of an hour plus and really only became effective to an appreciable degree during the second wave.

MacArthur should have been left in the PI too for his poor performance given he knew of the Japanese war declaration before any strikes or landings there.

 

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16 hours ago, Murotsu said:

MacArthur should have been left in the PI too for his poor performance given he knew of the Japanese war declaration before any strikes or landings there.

MacArthur is a fascinating man because his accomplishments are sharply contrasting peaks and valleys.  He did several things very well and when you want to start elevating him into "great" status, you see a bunch of the dumb things he's done.

 

I'm from the Philippines but grew up in the USA.  My grandparents were in their prime when the US still called the Philippines a territory.  My grandfather on dad's side of the family was a local in service with the US Army.  Was part of the mass of surrendered troops when the US capitulated to the invading Japanese forces.  He escaped and went into guerilla warfare against the Japanese.  Grandpa from mom's side of the family was never in the military but did take part as a guerilla fighter.  I remember my grandparents, especially from dad's side, thinking very highly of MacArthur, most especially the fulfillment of his promise to return.  He did, and he brought a sh*tload of the US military with him.

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Was it MacArthur who was described as 'when he was great, he was great, when he was bad he was terrible'?

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On 5/16/2020 at 10:10 AM, wstugamd said:

MacArthur has 18 hours warning of the attack on Pearl but his Air Force was destroyed on the ground. He wasn’t punished, but he was an American hero which we desperately needed. 

Maybe because the actual blame should have been placed on Maj. Gen. Lewis Hyde Brereton, commander of Far East Air Force, who disobeyed orders to disperse the air fleet to remote locations until it was too late.  His aborted B-17 raid on Formosa also cost Mac nearly his entire bomber force (they were caught on the ground refueling).  Mac didn't fire him for some reason, and the guy went on to plan the Ploiești raid.

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5 hours ago, mofton said:

Was it MacArthur who was described as 'when he was great, he was great, when he was bad he was terrible'?

I don't know if someone said that in those exact words, but when you look at the man's history, yes, it's true.

 

His command of US forces to defend the Philippines was downright embarrassing.

Yet he had overall command of Allied Forces in New Guinea and methodically secured it, a crucial area north of Australia, and worked his way back to the Philippines.

His tenure as Military Governor of post-war Japan helped pave the way for its rebuilding, as well as a softer peace while some folks back home in the US wanted blood.

At the onset of the Korean War with UN forces pinned in the southeast at Pusan, he does a roundabout amphibious operation at Inchon, surprising the North Koreans and collapsing their offensive.

His command of UN forces in North Korea, desire to escalate the war with Atomic Bomb use, his clashes with President Truman tarnishes his legacy.

 

You'd be hard pressed to find a modern US military leader so prolific, brilliant, and idiotic at the same time.

He was a 5 Star General of the Army in the USA, only George Marshall was senior to him.  Kind of scary.

Edited by HazeGrayUnderway

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On 5/21/2020 at 10:08 PM, HazeGrayUnderway said:

I don't know if someone said that in those exact words, but when you look at the man's history, yes, it's true.

 

His command of US forces to defend the Philippines was downright embarrassing.

Yet he had overall command of Allied Forces in New Guinea and methodically secured it, a crucial area north of Australia, and worked his way back to the Philippines.

His tenure as Military Governor of post-war Japan helped pave the way for its rebuilding, as well as a softer peace while some folks back home in the US wanted blood.

At the onset of the Korean War with UN forces pinned in the southeast at Pusan, he does a roundabout amphibious operation at Inchon, surprising the North Koreans and collapsing their offensive.

His command of UN forces in North Korea, desire to escalate the war with Atomic Bomb use, his clashes with President Truman tarnishes his legacy.

 

You'd be hard pressed to find a modern US military leader so prolific, brilliant, and idiotic at the same time.

He was a 5 Star General of the Army in the USA, only George Marshall was senior to him.  Kind of scary.

From the sounds of things, he was an excellent aggressive general but a poor defender.  Some aggressive generals just collapse when they don't have the initiative.

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On 5/20/2020 at 6:59 PM, AVR__Project said:

If you can look past all the 'Memoirs' on how the authors whose subjects single-handedly won the war.....
You begin to see the pattern.  Was Kimmel fired for Pearl Harbor?  Or was the Washington brass trying to save their own skin?
If Kimmel pulled off an outright victory over Wake here...   They couldn't blame PH on him without his voice being heard. 

And he would simply tell the truth and be a competent hero, even after he was dismissed.  It was HIS plan. 

They couldn't have Kimmel showing competency here, it would mess with their plans.  People might start looking at the Washington brass for the actual perpetrators of the crime.  The Wake operation had to be stopped.

Fletcher and Wilson were ready to disobey orders and plow through anyway.  Fletcher would have actually been in striking range in the evening of the 22nd - in time to halt the Japanese invasion.  But Fletcher had some sort of ethic to tuck it in and follow orders.
The Hiryu and Soryu would have complicated matters, and their only only experience attacking naval ships at this point was the parking lot at PH.  Maybe the Midway magic might happen 6 months earlier.  All the aviators were new to this.

The US Navy turned and ran away from a fair fight.  They didn't like that at all.

Edit:  Did Fletcher know two Japanese CVs were out there?  I'll bet he never got the intel passed down...   This is what made him so reluctant to stick his neck out.  He might have thought all 6 were waiting.

The only "memoir" mentioned that had a subject involved in the war was King's, and that was in context to Knox's recommendation to FDR to relieve Kimmel.  After the Naval Court of Inquiry, King was scathing of Stark in his endorsement and relieved him as CINCNAVEUR.  He's more tempered in the semi memoir and actually regretted his harsh criticism later.  All the other sources mentioned were highly respected historians that have looked into these matters with which I'm sure you're familiar.  I also included the message traffic that went back and forth between CINCPAC and CNO.  By your own admission you have no citations for your argument, but you did converse with a commander in the 80's on the topic.  Problem is, that commander would have been commissioned in the 60's, maybe enlisted in the 50's if an LDO, and would have no firsthand knowledge of the subject with respect to Kimmel's relief.  Earlier, you mention Stark's micromanaging but only quote Wikipedia.  I don't know how you could draw any of your speculation from the citations at the bottom of the page.  Besides, the Wikipedia entry is very incomplete.  As for your hypotheticals above, they also include questions that can reasonably be answered.  Just ref the links

Wheeler's book on Kinkaid, Kimmel's brother in law, who was to relieve Fletcher in command of Crudiv 6, covers the Wake relief in Chapter 7.  It's thorough, well sourced and probably one of the best narratives on the subject.  Kinkaid was only along as an observer during the Wake relief expedition before he could officially take command.  Fletcher remained the type commander and a CTF afterwards as history relates.   Of interest, are Kinkaid's post expedition thoughts:

image.thumb.png.2ca69f60509b9716d9a29b582f1025d6.png

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/NHC/NewPDFs/USN/USN, KINKAID OF THE SEVENTH FLEET (Bio).pdf  see Ch.7.

Besides Wheeler and Lundstrom's books, also see Robert Cressman's book on Wake; he's also the author of the revised USN WWII Chronology:

https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/AMagnificentFight.pdf

Further primary source reference can be found in CINCPAC's command summary.  Wheeler (who references Lundstrom's First Team, much of which is also in his  S. Pac Campaign) makes significant use of CAPT Steele's Running Estimate, or the Nimitz Gray Book I previously mentioned.  Start on p.1 and just go:  Wake, Pacflt campaign plans, message traffic, COAs and estimates of the situation are all interspersed to p.85.  Specifically see p.67 onward for VADM Pye and his staff's estimates.

http://www.ibiblio.org/anrs/docs/Volumes/Nimitz_Graybook Volume 1.pdf

Much can also be gleaned within the Pearl Harbor Attack report by Congress:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol23.pdf  p.1062-72 VADM Pye's testimony in front of the Robert's Commission on Wake relief.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol05.pdf  p.2338-45 for ADM Stark on the Knox report.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol06.pdf  p.2561-63 for ADM Kimmel's testimony on his relief.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol17.pdf  p.2727-2734 for messages between Stark and Kimmel on his retirement.  How poorly Kimmel is treated can be discerned here. 

Cited from your Wiki cut and paste is CDR Holwitt's PHD dissertation, which is also the basis for a USNI book:  His entry on ADM Stark p.179-184 is an accurate observation and relies heavily upon the two memoirs I previously cited that you disparage.  

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiWspXevs_pAhUMd6wKHdfnAlwQFjAAegQIBRAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fetd.ohiolink.edu%2F!etd.send_file%3Faccession%3Dosu1127506553%26disposition%3Dattachment&usg=AOvVaw2HDU1B2h8BIS1DAPhUXYHD

On the subject at hand,  was ADM Kimmel relieved for PH, Wake, disobedience of orders or as a scapegoat to save FDR and Knox?  Considering the clamoring from the press and need for a scapegoat, I go with PH.

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3 hours ago, Lethal215 said:

The only "memoir" mentioned that had a subject involved in the war was King's, and that was in context to Knox's recommendation to FDR to relieve Kimmel.  After the Naval Court of Inquiry, King was scathing of Stark in his endorsement and relieved him as CINCNAVEUR.  He's more tempered in the semi memoir and actually regretted his harsh criticism later.  All the other sources mentioned were highly respected historians that have looked into these matters with which I'm sure you're familiar.  I also included the message traffic that went back and forth between CINCPAC and CNO.  By your own admission you have no citations for your argument, but you did converse with a commander in the 80's on the topic.  Problem is, that commander would have been commissioned in the 60's, maybe enlisted in the 50's if an LDO, and would have no firsthand knowledge of the subject with respect to Kimmel's relief.  Earlier, you mention Stark's micromanaging but only quote Wikipedia.  I don't know how you could draw any of your speculation from the citations at the bottom of the page.  Besides, the Wikipedia entry is very incomplete.  As for your hypotheticals above, they also include questions that can reasonably be answered.  Just ref the links

Wheeler's book on Kinkaid, Kimmel's brother in law, who was to relieve Fletcher in command of Crudiv 6, covers the Wake relief in Chapter 7.  It's thorough, well sourced and probably one of the best narratives on the subject.  Kinkaid was only along as an observer during the Wake relief expedition before he could officially take command.  Fletcher remained the type commander and a CTF afterwards as history relates.   Of interest, are Kinkaid's post expedition thoughts:

image.thumb.png.2ca69f60509b9716d9a29b582f1025d6.png

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/NHC/NewPDFs/USN/USN, KINKAID OF THE SEVENTH FLEET (Bio).pdf  see Ch.7.

Besides Wheeler and Lundstrom's books, also see Robert Cressman's book on Wake; he's also the author of the revised USN WWII Chronology:

https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/AMagnificentFight.pdf

Further primary source reference can be found in CINCPAC's command summary.  Wheeler (who references Lundstrom's First Team, much of which is also in his  S. Pac Campaign) makes significant use of CAPT Steele's Running Estimate, or the Nimitz Gray Book I previously mentioned.  Start on p.1 and just go:  Wake, Pacflt campaign plans, message traffic, COAs and estimates of the situation are all interspersed to p.85.  Specifically see p.67 onward for VADM Pye and his staff's estimates.

http://www.ibiblio.org/anrs/docs/Volumes/Nimitz_Graybook Volume 1.pdf

Much can also be gleaned within the Pearl Harbor Attack report by Congress:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol23.pdf  p.1062-72 VADM Pye's testimony in front of the Robert's Commission on Wake relief.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol05.pdf  p.2338-45 for ADM Stark on the Knox report.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol06.pdf  p.2561-63 for ADM Kimmel's testimony on his relief.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol17.pdf  p.2727-2734 for messages between Stark and Kimmel on his retirement.  How poorly Kimmel is treated can be discerned here. 

Cited from your Wiki cut and paste is CDR Holwitt's PHD dissertation, which is also the basis for a USNI book:  His entry on ADM Stark p.179-184 is an accurate observation and relies heavily upon the two memoirs I previously cited that you disparage.  

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiWspXevs_pAhUMd6wKHdfnAlwQFjAAegQIBRAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fetd.ohiolink.edu%2F!etd.send_file%3Faccession%3Dosu1127506553%26disposition%3Dattachment&usg=AOvVaw2HDU1B2h8BIS1DAPhUXYHD

On the subject at hand,  was ADM Kimmel relieved for PH, Wake, disobedience of orders or as a scapegoat to save FDR and Knox?  Considering the clamoring from the press and need for a scapegoat, I go with PH.

I thank you for your careful and exhaustive research.  You take this very seriously and I can see and appreciate that.

Especially today, we want to honor and remember these folks who did their best in the service of their country.

In this war, there are a zillion 'what if's, like if the Polish Army had a Klingon Heavy Cruiser...  It can get silly. (no citation here)

Then there are secrets, like the USAAF bombing a non-belligerent French town in 1945, killing hundreds and levelling the town -- for no reason whatsoever.
It's the secrets that create controversy.  There is still information from the US Civil War classified Top Secret because it can still cause serious damage to US security if it is released. (no citation here)
What it is can only be speculated...  maybe something buried in an embarrassing spot.

Information is declassified in waves, since Classified information must be inventoried, cataloged, and guarded.  So documenting secrets are expensive.
Before WW2, it was common practice to simply destroy the information and be done with it.  There was little attempt to preserve anything for historians.

Look at the torpedo situation in 1942 as a painful example of how the Navy handled secrets.  Peacetime Navy was geared to protect careers, not fight a war.  It took a while for our military to replace the 'position holders' with innovative fighting men.  But that happened, and we fixed all the problems.
And Classified information stopped disappearing - because we needed to learn from it.

And so we have memoirs based on pre-1943 classified information that was destroyed, but presented 'as remembered'.
This has led a lot of people down the path to blame Roosevelt for PH.   Zero information leaves a void, and conspiracy imagination abounds.

If you hold the 'Wake Relief' experience up next to the Inoperative Torpedo fiasco -- happening at the same time, you get a good lense to view this portion of history with.
I don't point at sources.  I point at a LACK of sources.  Then we see what was happening in the world and make a best guess what was really going on.

----------------------------------

And here's a silly 'what if' just to humor the elbows...

What if Kimmel sailed all the ships out of Pearl Harbor???   Some say if caught at sea, it would be an even bigger loss of life.

My take is that it is a very large ocean, and the Japanese weren't looking for a sailing fleet, nor did they have time to do a search.
They would show up...  look at each other...  shrug their shoulders...  and fly back to the carriers to go home.  There would be no attack.

I did look through your sources and noticed that Kimmel was supposed to be relieved in February or March.  But it didn't happen that way.  Aaaaaaaahhhhh   ...   Missing information.

 

Edit:  And as a final note:  Most people blamed Pearl Harbor on the Japanese.  There was no need for any kind of 'blame-game' unless someone in high position was feeling guilty.

Edited by AVR__Project

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21 hours ago, AVR__Project said:

And so we have memoirs based on pre-1943 classified information that was destroyed, but presented 'as remembered'.
This has led a lot of people down the path to blame Roosevelt for PH.   Zero information leaves a void, and conspiracy imagination abounds.

I concur with much of this, although I think, as honorable gentleman, those who testified in the myriad inquiries that made up the PH report were truthful and accurate to the best of their recollection while using the documents on hand.  The shame is that almost all of the material that existed of a classified nature prior to PH was included as exhibits, and much of the rest which is missing, was non existent or destroyed when various ships were lost.  Historical record keeping seems very poor and war diaries non existent prior to King's promulgation that they be kept.  That's what makes the Gray Book so important for the early months after PH.  One can also see why there is a lack of documentation in the Atlantic in the first 6 months of the war due to the massacre of shipping along the East Coast, Caribbean and Gulf during Operation Drumbeat.  The lack of assets and preparedness borders on criminal and required the Brits to reverse lend lease ASW trawlers of their own to assist.  That's on FDR, King and Stark; the jawboning and lack of speed with which PGs and SCs were procured is embarrassing.  Abbazia in Mr. Roosevelt's Navy does a great job discussing how FDR pushed the limits of the law and tweaked the Germans at every opportunity hoping that when we entered, it would be in the Atlantic.  PH was a shock to them all, but warnings were there.  The lack of HUMINT (unlike the Japanese in HI and on the West Coast) to flesh out the rest of our otherwise excellent COMINT was prescient.  The whole gang from CINCPAC on up has egg on their face; it just fell to Kimmel and Short to be the sacrificial lambs.  Knox and FDR with the Robert's Commission saw to that, and as if to justify their crucifixion, public opinion excerpts were included within the report!

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol24.pdf  p.1287-1304

21 hours ago, AVR__Project said:

What if Kimmel sailed all the ships out of Pearl Harbor???   Some say if caught at sea, it would be an even bigger loss of life.

My take is that it is a very large ocean, and the Japanese weren't looking for a sailing fleet, nor did they have time to do a search.
They would show up...  look at each other...  shrug their shoulders...  and fly back to the carriers to go home.  There would be no attack.

You may be right on that one.  Zimm's Attack on Pearl Harbor kind of covers this scenario mathematically, as did some TV special, and I feel you may be correct.  Big ocean, little ship theory.  Problem is, except for TF-1 and TF-2's BBs, PACFLT is scattered all over the Pacific and no able to concentrate for a fleet action.  The ships that remain in PH need land based air for support since the CVs are no where close.  Interesting scenarios can be built base on time of warning etc.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol21.pdf last link, I promise.  One can look at the PACFLT dispositions and refight this thing with a ton of variables.  See p. 4556-4565 for organization and locations.

It's been a good discussion, touched on a lot of territory, and imaginary hypotheticals are always good ways to refight scenarios that didn't go your way in hopes that in the future, the result is better.

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23 hours ago, Lethal215 said:

I concur with much of this, although I think, as honorable gentleman, those who testified in the myriad inquiries that made up the PH report were truthful and accurate to the best of their recollection while using the documents on hand.  The shame is that almost all of the material that existed of a classified nature prior to PH was included as exhibits, and much of the rest which is missing, was non existent or destroyed when various ships were lost.  Historical record keeping seems very poor and war diaries non existent prior to King's promulgation that they be kept.  That's what makes the Gray Book so important for the early months after PH.  One can also see why there is a lack of documentation in the Atlantic in the first 6 months of the war due to the massacre of shipping along the East Coast, Caribbean and Gulf during Operation Drumbeat.  The lack of assets and preparedness borders on criminal and required the Brits to reverse lend lease ASW trawlers of their own to assist.  That's on FDR, King and Stark; the jawboning and lack of speed with which PGs and SCs were procured is embarrassing.  Abbazia in Mr. Roosevelt's Navy does a great job discussing how FDR pushed the limits of the law and tweaked the Germans at every opportunity hoping that when we entered, it would be in the Atlantic.  PH was a shock to them all, but warnings were there.  The lack of HUMINT (unlike the Japanese in HI and on the West Coast) to flesh out the rest of our otherwise excellent COMINT was prescient.  The whole gang from CINCPAC on up has egg on their face; it just fell to Kimmel and Short to be the sacrificial lambs.  Knox and FDR with the Robert's Commission saw to that, and as if to justify their crucifixion, public opinion excerpts were included within the report!

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol24.pdf  p.1287-1304

You may be right on that one.  Zimm's Attack on Pearl Harbor kind of covers this scenario mathematically, as did some TV special, and I feel you may be correct.  Big ocean, little ship theory.  Problem is, except for TF-1 and TF-2's BBs, PACFLT is scattered all over the Pacific and no able to concentrate for a fleet action.  The ships that remain in PH need land based air for support since the CVs are no where close.  Interesting scenarios can be built base on time of warning etc.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol21.pdf last link, I promise.  One can look at the PACFLT dispositions and refight this thing with a ton of variables.  See p. 4556-4565 for organization and locations.

It's been a good discussion, touched on a lot of territory, and imaginary hypotheticals are always good ways to refight scenarios that didn't go your way in hopes that in the future, the result is better.

One of the other discussions the Commander and I (a USAF SSGT) argued talked about was my impression the Japanese carriers were poorly built pieces of junk.  He convinced me otherwise.  They had much more devotion to their skillsets than the US sailors brought to the table.  The only point we were agreed upon was the fact that NOBODY had a CV versus CV battle under their belt right after Pearl Harbor.

The Kimmel Wake Resupply mission could have gone either way, but it WOULD HAVE GONE SOME WAY.  You throw carrier group versus carrier group, and something is going to happen if we ended up with Sara and Lex fighting Hiryu and Soryu off Wake.  No Navy commander in the Pacific had Intel what they were facing, but they were charging right into the thick of it.

The folks in Washington had the intel.  They had a pretty fair assessment of ship movements.  If they did nothing, it would have been a fair fight at Wake.  They knew 'something' was going to happen.  As fired up as the American Sailors were..  I'd say that something was going to be a real pounding for the smug and overconfident IJN.

Militarily, any rational commander would give this the green light.

And I recall what the Commander said about the command decisions were ultimately made by civilians.  And it wasn't time for a victory.  If we won, and won big, the American public would be satisfied our current military could handle the war with what they've got.  Some of the public would be against the draft, against emergency war-powers, and against flipping our manufacturing over to total war.
America needed to be stabbed in the back a few more times so this war effort could build momentum.

So we made martyrs of the brave Marines on Wake, and the Army soldiers in the Philippines.  We adopted slogans, "I Shall Return", "Remember Wake", and "Remember PH" to push out the victory for as long as it takes....  as long as it is LONG into the future.
But these are not military things..  They are POLITICAL.  And for the US, the civilians were calling the shots.

And you likely won't find a source for that information because it would either be Classified or it has been burned.  This information would be Harmful to the Security of the US.....  even today.

And so it's just a polite conversation only.  Is it true?  I wasn't born yet.  But this discussion brings to light things happening today, and where we are heading.  Our military is there to fight the wars, but the civilians tell the military who the enemy is.

Edited by AVR__Project

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1 hour ago, AVR__Project said:

One of the other discussions the Commander and I (a USAF SSGT) argued talked about was my impression the Japanese carriers were poorly built pieces of junk.  He convinced me otherwise.  They had much more devotion to their skillsets than the US sailors brought to the table.  The only point we were agreed upon was the fact that NOBODY had a CV versus CV battle under their belt right after Pearl Harbor.

 

Japanese carriers, at least most of the ones up to 1941, were poorly laid out.  The Akagi and Kaga in particular were just awful in this respect.

92c47fda497ad00c587d4ad8c1fb87fb--akagi-aircraft-carrier-battleship.jpg

p_Picture3.jpg

As you can see with Akagi, the hangers were divided into three sections.  The forward held fighters, the amidships section dive bombers, and the aft "special" attack (eg., torpedo) bombers.  The hangers were laid out in size to fit then extant aircraft with little thought to future aircraft designs, sizes, or weights.  The sloped after section of the flight deck left less room for spotting a strike, a legacy of following RN carrier design.

You can see how poorly the smokestack arrangement was done.  That elevators on the carrier were designed specifically for each section of the hanger and the aircraft in that section is another mistake.  This means future changes in aircraft could result in the elevator being unusable for the new design.

Further, the Japanese paid scant attention to damage control, and things that aren't obvious like elevator cycle times,  or how shops and storage of materials and munitions were done.  It was more a case of find a space and cram it in.  A lot of space was wasted in the design because the Japanese naval engineers simply built the carrier on top of the existing hull and machinery rather than try and redesign the ship as a whole as the US did with Lexington and Saratoga.

They did get better with succeeding classes built from the keel up as carriers but almost all of their conversions were pretty crappy.  It doesn't help that Japan was saddled with a shipbuilding industry that couldn't keep up with rapid advances in technique.  They continued to rely on riveting even as the US (in particular) went to welding.  Their marine plants operated at much lower steam pressures meaning they were heavier and less efficient than US (again in particular) ones and that disparity only grew.

While nobody had had a carrier v. carrier battle by Pearl Harbor, the British had had a number of actions where their carriers were faced by land based aircraft attacking them.  The USN had paid attention to those and had far more access to details than the Japanese.  More importantly, the USN systematically studied and detailed each action they fought and applied lessons learned both in tactics and technology while the Japanese were largely static.  That meant with each successive engagement the Japanese found themselves more and more at a disadvantage.

As for Wake, an axiom of war is "Never reinforce defeat."  Wake was really a lost cause.  It was also really not a military necessity as the Pacific War as a whole came to show.

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2 hours ago, Murotsu said:

Japanese carriers, at least most of the ones up to 1941, were poorly laid out.  The Akagi and Kaga in particular were just awful in this respect.

92c47fda497ad00c587d4ad8c1fb87fb--akagi-aircraft-carrier-battleship.jpg

p_Picture3.jpg

As you can see with Akagi, the hangers were divided into three sections.  The forward held fighters, the amidships section dive bombers, and the aft "special" attack (eg., torpedo) bombers.  The hangers were laid out in size to fit then extant aircraft with little thought to future aircraft designs, sizes, or weights.  The sloped after section of the flight deck left less room for spotting a strike, a legacy of following RN carrier design.

You can see how poorly the smokestack arrangement was done.  That elevators on the carrier were designed specifically for each section of the hanger and the aircraft in that section is another mistake.  This means future changes in aircraft could result in the elevator being unusable for the new design.

Further, the Japanese paid scant attention to damage control, and things that aren't obvious like elevator cycle times,  or how shops and storage of materials and munitions were done.  It was more a case of find a space and cram it in.  A lot of space was wasted in the design because the Japanese naval engineers simply built the carrier on top of the existing hull and machinery rather than try and redesign the ship as a whole as the US did with Lexington and Saratoga.

They did get better with succeeding classes built from the keel up as carriers but almost all of their conversions were pretty crappy.  It doesn't help that Japan was saddled with a shipbuilding industry that couldn't keep up with rapid advances in technique.  They continued to rely on riveting even as the US (in particular) went to welding.  Their marine plants operated at much lower steam pressures meaning they were heavier and less efficient than US (again in particular) ones and that disparity only grew.

While nobody had had a carrier v. carrier battle by Pearl Harbor, the British had had a number of actions where their carriers were faced by land based aircraft attacking them.  The USN had paid attention to those and had far more access to details than the Japanese.  More importantly, the USN systematically studied and detailed each action they fought and applied lessons learned both in tactics and technology while the Japanese were largely static.  That meant with each successive engagement the Japanese found themselves more and more at a disadvantage.

As for Wake, an axiom of war is "Never reinforce defeat."  Wake was really a lost cause.  It was also really not a military necessity as the Pacific War as a whole came to show.

On the Wake Mission:   One of the options was to evacuate.

So after blowing the Japanese Navy out of the water, they could gather up all their toys, plant a dense land/sea minefield, and leave.

And for the record, we were not defeated at sea.  
But the Commander was right.  As fighting ships, (both men and machines) the Kaga and Akagi were the most dangerous ships in 1941.

The weakest IJN ships were the Shokaku sisters.  Even though they were Essex equivalents, the flying crew was all green.  Hell, they almost landed on the Yorktown on the Coral Sea battle.

But the Sara and Lex were facing the Hiryu and Soryu at Wake.  And that would have been one hell of an even fight.  Unfortunately, the US chickened out.

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I would say that, yes, Kaga and Akagi were not as well redesigned as aircraft carriers as were Lex and Sara.  They definitely bear more of a resemblance to their capital ship origins, and appear more flimsy with in above hull construction.  Having a hard time finding maps of the Wake relief expedition online, so I took a few pictures and am posting them here.  Let all the armchair Admirals refight this one.:cap_viking: 

Vadm Pye ordered the recall of Fletcher and Brown at 0911/22 Dec.

Realize that TF-11 (Lex, Vadm Brown) at 0850/23 Dec bears 125@744nm from Wake, TF-14 (Sara, Radm Fletcher) is 425nm W at 0800/23Dec fueling for second time and TF-8 (Enterprise, Vadm Halsey) at 0850/23Dec bears 085@1080nm.

CDR Cunningham surrendered at around 0730/23 Dec, or started to.

Radm Abe exits the area NW of Wake at 1850 23/Dec.

Pye and the TF commanders are informed (COMINT) that Cardiv 2 (Hiryu and Soryu, Radm Yamaguchi)) and Crudiv 8 (Radm Abe, Tone and Chikuma) and maybe Cardiv 5 are now in the area, with message traffic from Wake indicating continued air attack from land based bombers (24th Air Flotilla in the Marshalls) and now CV aircraft on the 21st.  What also wasn't known, but suspected, was that the Wake attack group from the Marshalls had been reinforced and Crudiv 6 (Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako and Furutaka) are screening to the East of Wake.  

Here are two maps to help.

Lundstrom in First Team:

1422293748_WakeLundstrom.thumb.jpg.62251651fd9ac7da1237fb9388bfc0a3.jpg

And Morison:

805861515_MorisonWake1.thumb.jpg.5482ddcf686c369b6d5f0d843493bf48.jpg

86059506_MorisonWake2.thumb.jpg.49c639555c5b00a40ab5dccf97dc680f.jpg

Ready, GO!

 

 

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I would recall the Wake Relief Force.

Wake Island never had value and to risk a major engagement for something with no value would be irresponsible.

Pearl Harbor and a bunch of the Pacific Fleet is still in ruins, so risking precious capital ships in December 1941 for worthless Wake Island would be stupid.

Edited by HazeGrayUnderway

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