Jump to content
You need to play a total of 5 battles to post in this section.
LoveBote

HMS SHEFFIELD

16 comments in this topic

Recommended Posts

1,454
[-Y-]
Alpha Tester
4,795 posts
7,006 battles

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/15/revealed-full-story-behind-sinking-of-falklands-warship-hms-sheffield

Sure to raise a stink, a report on the sinking of HMS Sheffield during the Falklands War, long with held from public view has been declassified.

article extract "The catalogue of errors and failings that ended in the sinking of a Royal Navydestroyer during the Falklands war has been disclosed after being covered up for 35 years.

Twenty people died and 26 were injured when HMS Sheffield was hit by an Argentinian Exocet missile during the early days of the 1982 conflict. It was the first Royal Navy warship to have been lost since the second world war."

furthermore 

"Marked “Secret – UK Eyes Bravo”, the full, uncensored report shows:

  • ...

please if you reply to this thread, keep it on topic, purely technical and avoid the politics! (or at least do your best to)

also worth a quick read

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/15/exocet-missile-how-sinking-hms-sheffield-made-famous

 

  • Cool 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
2,710
[HINON]
Modder, In AlfaTesters, Beta Testers
6,498 posts
3,751 battles

If I remember, one of our forum members was on that ship. 

 

Am I remembering right @MaliceA4Thought or am I just derping here?

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
370
[HELLS]
Members
1,702 posts
15,518 battles

D.K Brown wrote all about this long ago, as did Norman Friedman and Dennis Brown. Old news, for old hands. What actually happened is that in order to use her SCOT satellite communications, HMS Sheffield had to shut down the radars as their proximity created massive electronic interference with the satcoms and at least one other comms and the ECM systems, and both could not even be energized at the same time without buggering up the other systems. The satcom systems were a retrofit on a ship not designed to carry them, with negative results. They used the satcoms on a rotating fixed schedule instead of one-time late night daily use for necessities only, a no-no in a combat zone. That does not excuse the lack of increased vigilance on the part of the watch officers, who knew that the ship was vulnerable during comms systems use if an air attack occurred.

The ship did not have adequate missile homing radar jamming, despite being capable of using the same Exocet missiles as the Armada Argentina. Mistakes happen in naval combat. The Argentine naval pilots did a masterful job in getting in close at low level to make the attack, because they knew the RN task force had no airborne early warning aircraft or helicopters on the carriers and were totally reliant on shipborne radar coverage. This attack was well planned and executed, shoot and scoot with only a single targeting radar transmission by the attacking aircraft. The radars and shipboard ECM systems were shut down The ship's company paid the price. Honor them.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
46
[NGA]
[NGA]
Members
316 posts
4,657 battles
On 16/10/2017 at 1:13 AM, GrandAdmiral_2016 said:

D.K Brown wrote all about this long ago, as did Norman Friedman and Dennis Brown. Old news, for old hands. What actually happened is that in order to use her SCOT satellite communications, HMS Sheffield had to shut down the radars as their proximity created massive electronic interference with the satcoms and at least one other comms and the ECM systems, and both could not even be energized at the same time without buggering up the other systems. The satcom systems were a retrofit on a ship not designed to carry them, with negative results. They used the satcoms on a rotating fixed schedule instead of one-time late night daily use for necessities only, a no-no in a combat zone. That does not excuse the lack of increased vigilance on the part of the watch officers, who knew that the ship was vulnerable during comms systems use if an air attack occurred.

The ship did not have adequate missile homing radar jamming, despite being capable of using the same Exocet missiles as the Armada Argentina. Mistakes happen in naval combat. The Argentine naval pilots did a masterful job in getting in close at low level to make the attack, because they knew the RN task force had no airborne early warning aircraft or helicopters on the carriers and were totally reliant on shipborne radar coverage. This attack was well planned and executed, shoot and scoot with only a single targeting radar transmission by the attacking aircraft. The radars and shipboard ECM systems were shut down The ship's company paid the price. Honor them.

 

IIRC None of the RN Type 42s had the capability to fire Exocets, only the ARA examples did.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
370
[HELLS]
Members
1,702 posts
15,518 battles
7 hours ago, Monty9185 said:

 

IIRC None of the RN Type 42s had the capability to fire Exocets, only the ARA examples did.

They were built with the capabilty to install them on short notice. Politics is what prevented their installation (not invented here syndrome and RN supplier complaints, so politically unacceptable). Installation would have required surrendering the 4.5-inch gun on Batch I ships. There are different viewpoints on this issue published about this, as it was a design issue. The RN wanted the capability, but the politicos rejected a foreign weapons system. These ship were designed and built during the hyperinflation period of the 1970s and early 80s. Given the parlous state of the UK economy, cost control was a principle design factor, thus loss of capabilities desired by the RN, but rejected by MOD during procurement, was inevitable. The RN had a heavy axe applied in the 24 month period leading up to the ultimate crisis. Had the war started six week later, it may not have been possible for the UK to contest the Argentine takeover at all. They managed it, but is was a close run thing, and they paid a high price in blood and treasure for unpreparedness for a crisis occuring outside the NATO core operating zone in the North Atlantic, Arctic and the Med. Take a hard lok at the ship casualties, both losses and damaged. The UK still has not fully understood the grand strategic lessons learned. Look at what they are doing with their submarine, amphibious and escort forces currently. The emporer has no clothes. The RN has lost its' way. Sad, this...

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Alpha Tester
2,296 posts
4,440 battles
On 15/10/2017 at 8:11 PM, Doomlock said:

If I remember, one of our forum members was on that ship. 

 

Am I remembering right @MaliceA4Thought or am I just derping here?

Hey there, sorry been away a few days...  I was (mostly) on Antelope :)   Whatever the reports that are released "show" it will never be the full story and the "whole" of the story.  There were many things done in that fight that were not good or could have been much better, but again, for most of the people there, this was their first actual combat and mistakes will be made, you just hope that they are not fatal ones and that their training was adequate.

Theres no mention in the report of the software changes that took place 24 hours later to all the missile tracking systems or the construction materials and methods either but there seems to be a focus on a couple of officers who were at fault, although in the "euphoria of the Falklands" it was decided not to court martial them.   Sorry  that doesn't happen..  if there was a suspicion of fault.. court martial, even if a quiet one behind closed doors (of which there were some).    That's like saying its the Airliner captains fault when the captain is dead and theres only wreckage left.. it's the easy political or official option.

This article, was I thought, a good one  http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/falkland-islands/45704/bbc-finds-evidence-french-helped-argentines-sink-our-ships  but again, only part of the story as is most journalism.

Ultimately, HMS Sheffield went to war, and because of the skill and courage of the Argentinian pilots, and some errors by her personnel and her equipment, she was sunk..  as was my ship.

At the end of the day, irrespective of the errors, mistakes and acts of heroism and bravery on both sides, the casualties are the people who need to be remembered, not the politicians and no matter the reasons or the facts, to me, the people who paid the price are those that either didn't return or those who returned but to lives that were not what they should have been whatever side they were on in the fighting.

Official reports and political reports don't hold much water with me.. they are like statistics...    Lies, damn lies and statistics/official reports.

M

 

 

  • Cool 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
1,454
[-Y-]
Alpha Tester
4,795 posts
7,006 battles
13 hours ago, MaliceA4Thought said:

Hey there, sorry been away a few days...  I was (mostly) on Antelope :)   Whatever the reports that are released "show" it will never be the full story and the "whole" of the story.  There were many things done in that fight that were not good or could have been much better, but again, for most of the people there, this was their first actual combat and mistakes will be made, you just hope that they are not fatal ones and that their training was adequate.

Theres no mention in the report of the software changes that took place 24 hours later to all the missile tracking systems or the construction materials and methods either but there seems to be a focus on a couple of officers who were at fault, although in the "euphoria of the Falklands" it was decided not to court martial them.   Sorry  that doesn't happen..  if there was a suspicion of fault.. court martial, even if a quiet one behind closed doors (of which there were some).    That's like saying its the Airliner captains fault when the captain is dead and theres only wreckage left.. it's the easy political or official option.

This article, was I thought, a good one  http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/falkland-islands/45704/bbc-finds-evidence-french-helped-argentines-sink-our-ships  but again, only part of the story as is most journalism.

Ultimately, HMS Sheffield went to war, and because of the skill and courage of the Argentinian pilots, and some errors by her personnel and her equipment, she was sunk..  as was my ship.

At the end of the day, irrespective of the errors, mistakes and acts of heroism and bravery on both sides, the casualties are the people who need to be remembered, not the politicians and no matter the reasons or the facts, to me, the people who paid the price are those that either didn't return or those who returned but to lives that were not what they should have been whatever side they were on in the fighting.

Official reports and political reports don't hold much water with me.. they are like statistics...    Lies, damn lies and statistics/official reports.

M

 

 

This is interesting to hear, and also a timely reminder to pundits such as myself, to think before we comment on the subject. Historians will examine less the heroism and sacrifice of sailors and more the reasons for successes and failures. I am sure it is a neverending story for those who took part in these events, rather than academically dry history - two tellings of the past that can only clash. 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Alpha Tester
2,296 posts
4,440 battles
On 18/10/2017 at 8:55 AM, nuttybiscuit said:

This is interesting to hear, and also a timely reminder to pundits such as myself, to think before we comment on the subject. Historians will examine less the heroism and sacrifice of sailors and more the reasons for successes and failures. I am sure it is a neverending story for those who took part in these events, rather than academically dry history - two tellings of the past that can only clash. 

Hey nutty :)   Sorry, if it came across as having a go, I apologise.   Please do comment on these things..  commenting on them keeps the memory of the people involved alive, and that is the most important part.  We are getting short on memories of WW2.. I think pretty much all of WW1 has gone..  it's only modern conflicts that still have people who can talk about them who were there.

As you probably guessed.. my angst is against the people who make the wars and then don't have to suffer the consequences of actually being there and having to put up with the long term legacy of having served in these things.

Both sides have normal people who bear the brunt of the decisions by the politicians and are mostly abandoned when they come home from having served.  Then we get all the official reports and statements from those same politicians about what should have been done, or could have been done better when a lot of what went wrong is previous political decisions that forced those serving to have to scramble to make up for those deficiencies and then get lambasted by the same politicians for not coping with the problems they themselves caused...  

Most people think of the Falklands as Argentina and Thatcher, but to me its about people like Simon Weston, "H",  my shipboard colleagues and other people from both sides who went and did the job they were paid for with no choice and in some cases never came home to friends, family and loved ones :Smile_sad:

But this is sounding a bit like a rant so I should stop.

Ultimately.. please continue commenting and investigating and learning, but from my personal point of view..  official reports and political statements are usually more unreliable than most genuine historical observation.  :Smile_honoring::Smile_Default:

Malice

 

  • Cool 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Beta Testers
294 posts
3,783 battles

It's worth noting that neither Sheffield nor her people died in vain, many lessons were learned and applied by navies all over the world from this loss.  Some were very easy problems to remedy, i.e. ensuring there would ALWAYS be QUALIFIED personnel on station in the CIC and on the Bridge while operating in areas where hostile action was simply possible, not just likely.  In the USN while operating in such areas the ship at a minimum would be in Condition 3 (wartime steaming) ensuring combat essential stations would be manned and CIC Watch Officers both qualified and authorized to activate and fire defensive systems and weapons (i.e. EW, Chaff/Flares, CIWS, RAM) and order maneuvers to unmask batteries against perceived threats.  Many water and air tight fittings  were closed and dogged down if they weren't essential for movement about the ship, especially doors, hatches and other fittings below the main deck.

 

From HMS Sheffield and also USS Stark and USS Samuel B Roberts lessons were re-learned about damage control and the drills became a bit more than the proforma "walk through/talk through" or classroom exercises they had often been.  Charged firehoses are very hard to maneuver around corners and up or down steep ladders, especially when one is wearing firefighting suits, boots, helmet and oxygen breathing gear.  You're going to react in emergencies the way you train.  Case in point we were fortunate in that the ship was at Condition 1 (General Quarters) for a series of engine room fire drills (and a diabolical Executive Officer laid on a series of DC drills for everyone NOT an engineer :cap_haloween: when from #3 Generator room came the call 'FIRE FIRE FIRE - Class Bravo Fire (fuel oil fire) in #3 Generator - this is NOT a drill!'  Oh crap!

 

That call was rebroadcast throughout the ship by CIC.  The Captain, Chief Engineer and Damage Control Assistant were watching the progress of the Engine Room fire drill from a vantage point in the forward engine room.  #3 Generator was all the way aft and Central Control Station / DC Central was half way in between.  NONE of the officers were in DC Central, we had a Chief and 3 First Class Petty Officers monitoring the drills from DC Central.  The Chief had the electrical load switched from #3 to #1 generator and the Aft DC locker team leader didn't wait for orders, he dispatched his investigators to set boundaries, isolate the affected space, ensure the watch-standers were out of the space and accounted for and triggered the Halon fire suppression system while the rest of the team began staging their equipment and prepared to enter the space to fight the fire.

 

Preparations were completed and permission to enter was being granted in the short time it took for the Skipper, ChEng and DCA to come pounding into DC Central, demanding reports.  Before we could finish briefing the 3 officers the fire team on-scene leader was reporting 'Fire out!  Reflash watch set!"  From initial report to 'Fire out' had taken less than 10 minutes.  No fumbling.  No 'what do I do now?'  No delays and best of all no one hurt.  

 

Yes, this was a real, major fire.  I was one of the PO1s in Central Control / DC Central even though I was not an engineer.  There was a need in DC Central and I got "volunteered" the Navy way.  :Smile_teethhappy:  

 

Repair #3 up to that moment had something of a reputation of being the least well trained of the three DC teams in the ship.  Not any more.  When the SHTF they handled it and handled it well.

 

Back to the subject at hand, every CO and Chief Engineer grabbed every opportunity to ensure their ships had their normal DC equipment allowance on hand at a bare minimum and hid away extra stocks of everything we could beg, borrow or (yes) steal including shoring timbers, fire fighting foam concentrate and so on.  And train, train, train.

 

Our Operations Officer insisted that ALL of the First Class POs and above in his department (including me) qualify as CIC Watch Supervisor / Officer even if we normally worked elsewhere in the ship.  He was a big believer that the more qualified personnel he had at hand the fewer chances there would be for another "Stark incident" (hit by two Exocet if you recall) without any attempt to defend the ship because he felt the CIC personnel in Stark failed.  Qualifying for that position was the only time I stood watches in Combat, and part of those qualifications required actually doing everything short of pulling the trigger.  It's a heady experience to issue orders to the Bridge and the ship actually maneuver in response to those orders.  It was nearly the most fun I'd ever had with my pants on, THE most fun was to be at the helm and actually maneuver that 7,800 ton jet powered dragster!  :cap_like: 

 

I fully expect that additional lessons will come from the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S McCain collisions, especially in how topside watches (Bridge, CIC and lookout) watches will be stood and standards reinforced.  Neither of those collisions nor the other accidents suffered by 7th Fleet units over the last year should have been allowed to happen. 

Edited by CAPT_Rob
  • Cool 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
1,454
[-Y-]
Alpha Tester
4,795 posts
7,006 battles
1 hour ago, CAPT_Rob said:

It's worth noting that neither Sheffield nor her people died in vain, many lessons were learned and applied by navies all over the world from this loss. (..)

Thanks Rob for a sensitive and considered reply to this thread, definitely of interest to amateur observers (inc myself along with google to help with some abbreviations! ;) as surely to those with experience on the job, like yourself. 

I think that this years series of tragic incidents in the USN 7th fleet must certainly resonate with the publication of this report (makes me wonder if its declassification now is not related some how).

  • Cool 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Beta Testers
294 posts
3,783 battles
1 hour ago, nuttybiscuit said:

Thanks Rob for a sensitive and considered reply to this thread, definitely of interest to amateur observers (inc myself along with google to help with some abbreviations! ;) as surely to those with experience on the job, like yourself. 

I think that this years series of tragic incidents in the USN 7th fleet must certainly resonate with the publication of this report (makes me wonder if its declassification now is not related some how).

It does resonate with all of us who've served at sea.  Accidents do happen and most often because someone was careless, as in (I believe) all four 7th Fleet incidents.

 

On the other hand, when it all went to hell in the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions the crews remembered their damage control training and in at least one case (Fitzgerald) someone made the hard (VERY HARD) choice to close watertight doors or scuttles to stop further flooding and possible loss of the ship.  I said "VERY HARD" because it was evident that there were personnel still trapped in the compartment that HAD to be sealed off before flooding progressed to the point where the ship herself was imperiled.  I don't think the McCain suffered as much damage below the waterline as Fitzgerald did, even though the butcher's bill was higher.  But in both cases training kicked in and their people did the right things when they needed to be done.  If either ship had sunk there easily could have been far more casualties.  

 

Unfortunately in both ships the areas impacted included berthing spaces and when you are at sea, unless the ship is at "General Quarters" (battle stations) even in the middle of the day there is likely to be between 20 to 40% of the crew off watch and sleeping.  In USN destroyers and cruisers most of the crew berthing is either at or below the waterline both forward and aft of the main engineering spaces.  Unless you are familiar with the ship, when the lights go out fully with no aux lighting you can easily and rapidly become trapped in the absolute blackness and get "turned around" and confused about where you are in relation to the exits.  This may have contributed to the numbers of people trapped and lost in both ships and earlier in HMS Sheffield.  In her case people got trapped at their stations by fire and flooding and for at least some the very hard choice was taken by the officers leading the damage control effort to not open those compartments and thereby allow the fire and flooding to spread. 

 

One cardinal rule of Damage Control learned the hard way in both World Wars is "once a compartment is sealed, it STAYS sealed unless or until permission to open specific doors, hatches or scuttles is granted by Damage Control Central where they have (or should have) a much more complete picture of the situation than the kid wanting to open that door and get his buddies out.  If that compartment is flooding, opening that door may not only allow the personnel trapped a chance but may also allow flooding to progress and once open you may not be able to get that door shut again because of the weight and pressure of the tons of water rapidly flowing through and endanger the ship, the "lifeboat" EVERYONE is counting on.

Edited by CAPT_Rob
  • Cool 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Beta Testers
294 posts
3,783 battles
On 10/17/2017 at 7:14 PM, MaliceA4Thought said:

Hey there, sorry been away a few days...  I was (mostly) on Antelope :)   Whatever the reports that are released "show" it will never be the full story and the "whole" of the story.  There were many things done in that fight that were not good or could have been much better, but again, for most of the people there, this was their first actual combat and mistakes will be made, you just hope that they are not fatal ones and that their training was adequate.

Theres no mention in the report of the software changes that took place 24 hours later to all the missile tracking systems or the construction materials and methods either but there seems to be a focus on a couple of officers who were at fault, although in the "euphoria of the Falklands" it was decided not to court martial them.   Sorry  that doesn't happen..  if there was a suspicion of fault.. court martial, even if a quiet one behind closed doors (of which there were some).    That's like saying its the Airliner captains fault when the captain is dead and theres only wreckage left.. it's the easy political or official option.

This article, was I thought, a good one  http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/falkland-islands/45704/bbc-finds-evidence-french-helped-argentines-sink-our-ships  but again, only part of the story as is most journalism.

Ultimately, HMS Sheffield went to war, and because of the skill and courage of the Argentinian pilots, and some errors by her personnel and her equipment, she was sunk..  as was my ship.

At the end of the day, irrespective of the errors, mistakes and acts of heroism and bravery on both sides, the casualties are the people who need to be remembered, not the politicians and no matter the reasons or the facts, to me, the people who paid the price are those that either didn't return or those who returned but to lives that were not what they should have been whatever side they were on in the fighting.

Official reports and political reports don't hold much water with me.. they are like statistics...    Lies, damn lies and statistics/official reports.

M

 

 

Hello Malice.  I think the Argentine's showed a lot more skill and courage than anyone truly expected, and a number of them were lost while trying.  The modern battlefield is not a forgiving place.

 

I agree, ultimately HMS Sheffield, HMS  Antelope and the rest of the task force went to sea and to war with the training and equipment that they had, not with what hindsight says they should have had and they did their very best with it.  Honor and courage were the only two commodities in plentiful supply on both sides.  The personnel lost are the ones who should be remembered. 

 

"Official reports and political reports don't hold much water with me.. they are like statistics...    Lies, damn lies and statistics/official reports."  I like that.  May I borrow it?

 

Respects sir.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
302
[BROOK]
Beta Testers, In AlfaTesters
2,022 posts

The 7th Fleet in relation to this engagement shows that you cannot cheap on proper crew sizes, training and rest schedules. The USN certainly doubled down on the technology intergration of it's fleet but due to recent (the last decade or so with onset from the 90s) personnel drawdowns that weren't carriers has shown that in the end, it comes down to the SAILOR and the tools you provide them, not the other way around.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Alpha Tester
2,296 posts
4,440 battles
On 21/10/2017 at 5:50 PM, CAPT_Rob said:

Hello Malice.  I think the Argentine's showed a lot more skill and courage than anyone truly expected, and a number of them were lost while trying.  The modern battlefield is not a forgiving place.

 

I agree, ultimately HMS Sheffield, HMS  Antelope and the rest of the task force went to sea and to war with the training and equipment that they had, not with what hindsight says they should have had and they did their very best with it.  Honor and courage were the only two commodities in plentiful supply on both sides.  The personnel lost are the ones who should be remembered. 

 

"Official reports and political reports don't hold much water with me.. they are like statistics...    Lies, damn lies and statistics/official reports."  I like that.  May I borrow it?

 

Respects sir.

Of course you may use it :)

One day I may post a shot story which reflects why I have such a healthy hate of official and government reports:)  Perhaps I will do so on 23rd May next year.  That would be 36 years after the fact..  that may be enough time for me.  (then again, I may just round it upto 40 years we will see)

M

 

 

 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Alpha Tester
2,296 posts
4,440 battles
On 21/10/2017 at 3:28 PM, CAPT_Rob said:

It does resonate with all of us who've served at sea.  Accidents do happen and most often because someone was careless, as in (I believe) all four 7th Fleet incidents.

 

On the other hand, when it all went to hell in the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions the crews remembered their damage control training and in at least one case (Fitzgerald) someone made the hard (VERY HARD) choice to close watertight doors or scuttles to stop further flooding and possible loss of the ship.  I said "VERY HARD" because it was evident that there were personnel still trapped in the compartment that HAD to be sealed off before flooding progressed to the point where the ship herself was imperiled.  I don't think the McCain suffered as much damage below the waterline as Fitzgerald did, even though the butcher's bill was higher.  But in both cases training kicked in and their people did the right things when they needed to be done.  If either ship had sunk there easily could have been far more casualties.  

 

I so agree.

The hardest decision you can make in the military is to "knowingly" do something that will likely kill a shipmate even in the knowledge that it will likely save the lives of many more.  

I doubt that anyone who has not been in that situation can imaging the horror inside when you make that decision and watch that watertight door close and lock.

I dream about that moment that I had to do the same to this day, 35 years later and knowing it was the right thing to do is of absolutely NO help whatsoever and when I did it, I threw up, and I sometimes still do today when I wake up from the dream.

Whilst I was recovering from my own injuries, a nurse told me that everyone thought that Mark was probaly dead already before the door was closed, but probably is not a certainty and I will never know.

It's about the people, the people, the people and however much we may analyse and "objectively" point out things that could be improved, it's still about the people at the time in the situation.

War is not for or about glory, fame or honour.. war is doing a job you were paid to do in difficult conditions because someone else has said you must and you do it to the best of your ability and train like hell so that everyone can do whatever they need to in their sleep.  That is everyones best chance of coming home.

M

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
69
[LTNY]
Members
335 posts
4,079 battles
On 15/10/2017 at 8:17 PM, nuttybiscuit said:

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/15/revealed-full-story-behind-sinking-of-falklands-warship-hms-sheffield

Sure to raise a stink, a report on the sinking of HMS Sheffield during the Falklands War, long with held from public view has been declassified.

article extract "The catalogue of errors and failings that ended in the sinking of a Royal Navydestroyer during the Falklands war has been disclosed after being covered up for 35 years.

Twenty people died and 26 were injured when HMS Sheffield was hit by an Argentinian Exocet missile during the early days of the 1982 conflict. It was the first Royal Navy warship to have been lost since the second world war."

furthermore 

"Marked “Secret – UK Eyes Bravo”, the full, uncensored report shows:

  • ...

please if you reply to this thread, keep it on topic, purely technical and avoid the politics! (or at least do your best to)

also worth a quick read

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/15/exocet-missile-how-sinking-hms-sheffield-made-famous

 

 

Very interesting read.

 

I am so glad we lost that war.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    No registered users viewing this page.

×