Would the Pearl Harbor battleships have fared well against Japanese battleships?

[Freecloud]

Alright!  As you guys know, the Japanese launched the attack on Pearl Harbor in order to disable the Pacific Fleet by way of sinking the battleship fleet anchored at the port.  I have a question: Could these American battleships actually go toe-to-toe against their Japanese counterparts?  I mean...they did fight after they were repaired from Pearl Harbor, but they were sentenced to land bombardment (except for a few exceptions like what happened to Fuso / Yamashiro).  Also, the Japanese fleet was made up of more than Yamatos in terms of battleships, so I'm curious how the USN battleships would've fared against the others...aside from their flagship.

 

For this question, I have it in regards to two factors:

 

-The fleet before the Pearl Harbor attack

 

-The fleet after the Pearl Harbor attack (I recall that West Virginia, California, and Tennessee were reconstructed due to their damage)

 

Thanks!

[AdmiralHattori]

The Japanese were outnumbered in terms of battleships like 2:1. If you're talking about comparing battleships specifically like Fuso vs. New Mexico, then that's a different story since we rarely got any interaction of battleships in the Pacific except some instances. If you ignore numbers, I believe the navy that will win is the one who has the best strategy in the battle but in most cases USN has the advantage because they had more classes of BBs compared to the old IJN (exception of the Yamato-class). But in terms of IJN and USN historically speaking, USN prevails all the way because of the number of battleships. This is why the IJN modified their doctrine to face USN by having CVs strike first and soften the USN BBs and then engage with their BBs because the Japanese knew they were at a disadvantage against the USN. IJN in this case were credited for their revolutionary concept of creating a massive strike force (Kido Butai) with their aircraft carriers. It was after the attack on Pearl Harbor that Admiral Nimitz concluded that the heart of any navy at the time will be the aircraft carriers and battleships will become secondary ships. The irony was that the IJN didn't continue to focus on their carriers (even after witnessing the power at Pearl Harbor) and continue to believe battleships to be primary (I like this hotel).

[Cognitive_Dissonance]

No different than "What if Germany had done this . . . " Same scenario, that is really "How could America have been defeated". They always circle around the fact that we as a nation had inferior equipment (to start) due to our isolationist stance and our ill-preparedness from 36-41. The problem with these scenarios are that they are always moot, it is irrelevant. We had one weapon that was superior in every regards. A determined, large workforce, and unparalleled ability to turn factories into war production centers and keep up a huge volume.

 

You could argue that Albert Speer worked miracles late war for Germany, or that Russia worked miracles moving entire factories and rebuilding them out of reach of the Luftwaffe, but Japan never had any such luxury going for it and would have been (was) heavily dependent on the Axis for raw materials. Even conquering large swaths of China and incorporating slave labor and new raw material fields could not have enabled Japan to overcome it's short comings in this regard. Slave labor is notoriously unreliable and will actively sabotage production.

[TenguBlade]

This actually comes down to be closer than I first thought.  Mostly because none of the Pearl Harbor battleships received radar FCS systems, which evens out the Americans' greatest advantage in most engagements.  The Japanese also technically outnumber the American Pacific fleet in capital ships, whether you include Colorado or not, as the Pacific Fleet had 9 battleships at its disposal while the Japanese Combined Fleet had 4 battlecruisers and 6 battleships.

 

The Fuso and Ise classes were designed to counter the New York and Nevada classes, and be a match for the Pennsylvanias.  The newer Tennessees would have the edge over them even without their post-Pearl modernization.  The weak deck armor of the Fusos in particular would make it imperative that they score the first hits in their engagements.  The Japanese have a bit of an edge there, as their emphasis on visual gunnery was greater than the USN, however any hits in return from the American battleships would still hurt them more than a hit from them would to the Standards.

 

Nagato and Mutsu would very much have been matches for the Maryland and West Virginia.  Perhaps even had the edge over them considering the Japanese ships were modernized and upgraded to a much-greater degree than their American rivals until the latter were sunk at Pearl.  If we're talking strictly ships involved in the Pearl Harbor raid, Colorado wouldn't be present, but if she were, then the three of them could have overwhelmed the two Japanese Big Seven members by the higher volume of fire even if the IJN battleships had been modernized to a greater extent.

 

The Kongo sisters are the most interesting to think about of the battleships on either side.  They have 50% more speed compared to the American dreadnoughts, and while having the lightest broadsides their guns are by no means worthless against the American fleet.  Jutland proved that battlecruisers are very vulnerable to gunfire from other capital ships, but the Kongos' guns had higher maximum range by about 4000 yards, and being a more agile target would be harder to score reliable hits on than the slower-moving Americans.

 

This kind of decisive battle would ultimately come down to how the Japanese can use their advantages over the Americans and to the lighter ships.  If the cruisers and destroyers could block or stall a flanking force led by Kongos long enough for the slower American dreadnoughts to react, then it would likely end in defeat for Japan.  If the Japanese either succeed in flanking with their battlecruisers or manage to keep the range open with their superior fleet speed (25+kts as opposed to 21) and put their gunnery advantage to work, then it could very well be in their favor.

 

On the other hand, if one sides' carriers gains air superiority early on, then it won't matter what else happens because the carrier aircraft will decide the battle from there - this is more likely to happen for the IJN as they had six fleet carriers with seasoned aircrews, while the Americans had four carriers and crews not tested by combat yet.  The Japanese cruisers and DDs have torpedoes with capability far beyond what the USN estimated they were at the time (it wasn't until Tassafaronga that their assumptions about the Type 93 were corrected, and forcefully so) and thus a large torpedo attack could potentially turn the tide of battle in its own way.  American early-war cruisers also generally fell short of their IJN counterparts due to the latter cheating in construction on tonnage, not to mention that the IJN has 18 heavy cruisers in their fleet (2 Furutakas, 2 Aobas, 4 Myokos, 4 Takaos, 4 Mogamis, 2 Tones) compared to 2 heavy cruisers, 4 large light cruisers (probably a match for a CA), and 2 light cruisers in the Pacific Fleet - and the IJN also had battlecruisers that the USN didn't, so any potential threat from faster forces could be better-dealt with by them than the Americans.

 

It would also depend heavily on the context of the engagement.  The odds could stack in the IJN's favor if this hypothetical confrontation didn't happen before early spring of 1942 and was the opening shot of the war like Pearl Harbor was, because by then the Japanese would have had the Yamato operational for sure and perhaps Musashi as well (since they would likely accelerate completion and acceptance of the ships in anticipation of the decisive battle they were built for). The USN could have deployed South Dakota for sure by that time (and it seems she was destined for the theater anyhow), but whether they would accelerate/waive the vibration problems with NC and her sister to deploy them (as well as Indiana and possibly Massachusetts if they rushed her) as well depends on how seriously they took the IJN.  Not to mention that, if the threat were deemed severe enough, the USN could justify the re-deployment of the three New Mexicos, the two New Yorks, Ranger, Hornet, Wasp, and a number of lighter Atlantic Fleet assets to the Pacific and secure a numerical advantage.

[Edselman]

Well, I think they could've beat all Japanese battleship classes except the Yamato-class. They had a definite armor advantage over their Japanese counterparts and if it can down to a slugfest, they probably would be able to shake off the damage much easier than the faster, lighter armored Japanese battleships/battlecruisers. If this fight took place around or in Pearl Harbor itself where there is limited speed, the Japanese couldn't use their speed advantage too efficiently. The American battleships were also much better with TS protection as some ships in Pearl Harbor where able to stay afloat with multiple torpedo hits while the ship was unprepared. By contrast, a Japanese equivalent was much more susceptible to torpedoes. If it's solely battleships on battleships you're talking about then I guess torpedoes wouldn't be a concern. I'd say overall, the fight could go both ways depending on the environment. In a confined space, the Americans would defiantly tear the Japanese apart because they wouldn't be able to use their speed. In an open space, the fight would be much more even. The fight would go both ways but I think the Americans would win 6 time would of 10 because of the armor advantage.

[mofton]

The Kongo sisters are the most interesting to think about of the battleships on either side.  They have 50% more speed compared to the American dreadnoughts, and while having the lightest broadsides their guns are by no means worthless against the American fleet.  Jutland proved that battlecruisers are very vulnerable to gunfire from other capital ships, but the Kongos' guns had higher maximum range by about 4000 yards, and being a more agile target would be harder to score reliable hits on than the slower-moving Americans.

 

This kind of decisive battle would ultimately come down to how the Japanese can use their advantages over the Americans and to the lighter ships.  If the cruisers and destroyers could block or stall a flanking force led by Kongos long enough for the slower American dreadnoughts to react, then it would likely end in defeat for Japan.  If the Japanese either succeed in flanking with their battlecruisers or manage to keep the range open with their superior fleet speed (25+kts as opposed to 21) and put their gunnery advantage to work, then it could very well be in their favor.

 

Kongo and Haruna were in the South China Sea just after Pearl Harbor, if you're excluding Colorado (on the US West Coast) then those two should go too, which is valuable. Having matching numbers so each ship on the other side can be engaged is very valuable.

 

An early '42 scenario like you have might have them back.

[HazeGrayUnderway]

If the IJN had a big BB vs BB slugfest, you guys know it was going to be a formation fight.  Kongo-class would be a part of that formation.  Which also makes the point of the USN Standards being slow moot when it comes to formation fighting.  This was EXACTLY the kind of thing the USN Standard BBs were constrained for.

[Freecloud]

No different than "What if Germany had done this . . . " Same scenario, that is really "How could America have been defeated". They always circle around the fact that we as a nation had inferior equipment (to start) due to our isolationist stance and our ill-preparedness from 36-41. The problem with these scenarios are that they are always moot, it is irrelevant. We had one weapon that was superior in every regards. A determined, large workforce, and unparalleled ability to turn factories into war production centers and keep up a huge volume.

 

You could argue that Albert Speer worked miracles late war for Germany, or that Russia worked miracles moving entire factories and rebuilding them out of reach of the Luftwaffe, but Japan never had any such luxury going for it and would have been (was) heavily dependent on the Axis for raw materials. Even conquering large swaths of China and incorporating slave labor and new raw material fields could not have enabled Japan to overcome it's short comings in this regard. Slave labor is notoriously unreliable and will actively sabotage production.

 

Oh!  What I meant by my question is how each USN battleship would stack up against a IJN battleship...like Pennsylvania vs Nagato, California vs Kongo, etc.

[mr3awsome]

If the IJN had a big BB vs BB slugfest, you guys know it was going to be a formation fight.  Kongo-class would be a part of that formation.  Which also makes the point of the USN Standards being slow moot when it comes to formation fighting.  This was EXACTLY the kind of thing the USN Standard BBs were constrained for.

Not necessarily. Its more likely that the Kongous would be detatched and operate as a sheep dog to the American sheep. 

A la British & German battle-cruisers at Jutland. 

[TenguBlade]

Kongo and Haruna were in the South China Sea just after Pearl Harbor, if you're excluding Colorado (on the US West Coast) then those two should go too, which is valuable. Having matching numbers so each ship on the other side can be engaged is very valuable.

 

An early '42 scenario like you have might have them back.

Well, technically speaking Nagato, Mutsu, Hyuga, Ise, Fuso, and Yamashiro weren't heavily-involved in the Pearl Harbor attack either.  The Japanese had deployed Kongo and Haruna primarily to contain any British threat that popped up after war broke out with America and secondarily for shore bombardment - if they'd known a decisive battle was coming, especially since they knew the approximate strength of the Pacific Fleet's battleships, they probably wouldn't lose the opportunity to gain a numerical advantage.

[Murotsu]

 

Leaving aside the fire control and worth of each side's main armament, the Japanese battle line is seriously deficient compared to the US one.

 

Starting with the ​Kongo​'s, you have four very weak battlecruisers here.  Their armor is almost cruiser-like by 1939.  Against heavy guns of 12" and up -- not even just the predominance of 14" to 16" guns on older US BB -- the four Kongo's are going to be clobbered as soon as they take hits.  Their speed is of ZERO advantage in a tactical action, just as Hood's was of no help at Denmark Straight for example.  High speed versus low speed is only useful for running away from a fight, not getting into one.  If you are in range to fire, the other guy's BB is too.  The Kongo​'s are mostly targets due to their overall weak armor.

 

The deck armor and other armor arrangements on the remaining Japanese BB are poor too, particularly the deck armor.  Japanese BB have roughly half the deck armor of their US counterparts.

 

Then there's the turret arrangements on the Yamashiro and Ise classes.  They have poor arcs of fire compared to the US BB with their guns concentrated in fewer turrets with better arcs.

 

Next, the Japanese BB are poorly subdivided compared to their US counterparts.  The Japanese continued to have watertight hatches and scuttles below the armored deck and what the US would call "damage control deck."  On US BB their modernizations, and the post WW 1 ones, eliminated all hatches below the 3rd (and later 2nd) deck.  "Up and over" was the means to move between watertight subdivisions of the ship.

This is a big help to prevent progressive flooding.  The best Pearl Harbor example would be California.  Only her in port condition and having many scuttles and covers open for in port inspection and work allowed her to sink.  The same damage to a Japanese BB would likely have caused it to sink regardless of readiness.

 

Add to this that Japanese damage control was poor compared to US standards.  Damage control on IJN ships was lead by a junior officer and usually considered an undesirable position to be assigned.  Damage control parties were centralized and specialized.  That is, on a Japanese ship they had a firefighting team, a flooding team, etc.  These were kept together at a central location so the damage control officer could assign them as needed.

 

US practice had multiple teams that could control any type of damage scattered by area across the ship.  This gave them many advantages over the Japanese system.  First, they were closer to the damage they were expected to control, regardless of what it might be.  This meant faster response times and opening fewer watertight hatches meaning less chance of spreading a fire, smoke, or flooding.  Second, being spread out, they were less likely to be wiped out in a shell hit.

 

Japanese BB also had less reliable systems in terms of electrical and other plant systems.  I mean this in terms of redundancy.  US BB had more and larger emergency diesels installed, used more mixed systems... (like electric and steam driven fire pumps for example).  Machinery subdivision was also much better than Japanese practice, particularly on the US turbo-electric battleships.

 

US BB also eliminated port holes in the hull for the most part.  This was done to assist in preventing flooding due to the ship settling or getting a list.  

It's all these sorts of details that make US BB's far, far more resilient to damage compared to their Japanese counterparts.  In a battle line v. battle line fight, the IJN is going to have serious problems right from the start.

 

[FloatingTankAce]

Nagumo wast actually quite concerned about this and felt that his force of BB's would not fare well against the fleet at Pearl. Yamato was back in Japan getting her finishing touches. 

[Xlap]

Well IMO it would depend on some things like weather conditions, positioning of the fleets and who strikes first. The Pacific fleet still didnt had radar gunnery, so IJN BBs might had a advantage on range. Also IJN had faster ships, but less armoured. So IMO if IJN could decide the terms of engament they would have a advantage if they could use well both range and speed. But on a straight brawl USN would have the advantage.

 

Also both Yamato and Musashi entered in service in late 1941 and mid 1942, while the Iowas would only enter in service in 1943. So if a battle happens until late 1942 IJN could have a advantage with those super BBs, after 1943 the Iowas with their superios gunnery would change the balance.

[Lampshade_M1A2]

In a daytime large scale battle I think the American battle line would be the victors. At night things things are clearly in the IJN's favor during this point of time. I don't have much faith that long range torpedo attacks would achieve very much during a daytime battle. Unless the USN fleet commander was brain-dead the Japanese could never hope to take advantage of the very long range of the Type 93 torpedo.

 

The Kongos could prove quite useful to the IJN fleet but if they're put into the battle line they will not fair very well. Their armor is simply too thin and they are outgunned.

 

When you compare the Fuso and Ise classes to the American "standard" battleships they don't come off very well. They had the advantage of a few knots of speed but their armor was inferior and their turret arrangements meant that the odds of a critical hit occurring to magazines or machinery was significantly higher. I'd argue that the USN 14"/45 and 14"/50 caliber guns were generally superior to the IJN 14"/45.

 

The Nagato was a much better design and in modernized form one could make the argument that they were better ships than the Colorado class. However there are 3 Colorados to 2 Nagatos and in a battle line engagement the Nagato's principle advantage of speed won't count for too much.

 

A question about this scenario, how would the IJN force the USN fleet to battle before they are ready? The Japanese expectation may have been that the entire Pacific fleet would immediately steam off to relieve the Philippines but in reality a lack of fuel tankers and other assets would have prevented this. The USN would only move en-masse when it was well prepared to do so. Pre-war US military planning expecting the Philippines to hold out for far longer than it did.

[Eisennagel]

 

The IJN knew from the get go their battleships cannot go toe to toe with USN battleships except for the Yamato and Musashi.  Hence they were targeted.  And for the most part, this is also the reason why the IJN relied on its "torpedo" strategy with the cruisers and destroyers, along with the aircraft carriers.

[Royeaux]

On 6/11/2017 at 1:54 PM, Murotsu said:

 

Leaving aside the fire control and worth of each side's main armament, the Japanese battle line is seriously deficient compared to the US one.

 

Starting with the Kongo's, you have four very weak battlecruisers here.  Their armor is almost cruiser-like by 1939.  Against heavy guns of 12" and up -- not even just the predominance of 14" to 16" guns on older US BB -- the four Kongo's are going to be clobbered as soon as they take hits.  Their speed is of ZERO advantage in a tactical action, just as Hood's was of no help at Denmark Straight for example.  High speed versus low speed is only useful for running away from a fight, not getting into one.  If you are in range to fire, the other guy's BB is too.  The Kongo's are mostly targets due to their overall weak armor.

 

The deck armor and other armor arrangements on the remaining Japanese BB are poor too, particularly the deck armor.  Japanese BB have roughly half the deck armor of their US counterparts.

 

Then there's the turret arrangements on the Yamashiro and Ise classes.  They have poor arcs of fire compared to the US BB with their guns concentrated in fewer turrets with better arcs.

 

Next, the Japanese BB are poorly subdivided compared to their US counterparts.  The Japanese continued to have watertight hatches and scuttles below the armored deck and what the US would call "damage control deck."  On US BB their modernizations, and the post WW 1 ones, eliminated all hatches below the 3rd (and later 2nd) deck.  "Up and over" was the means to move between watertight subdivisions of the ship.

This is a big help to prevent progressive flooding.  The best Pearl Harbor example would be California.  Only her in port condition and having many scuttles and covers open for in port inspection and work allowed her to sink.  The same damage to a Japanese BB would likely have caused it to sink regardless of readiness.

 

Add to this that Japanese damage control was poor compared to US standards.  Damage control on IJN ships was lead by a junior officer and usually considered an undesirable position to be assigned.  Damage control parties were centralized and specialized.  That is, on a Japanese ship they had a firefighting team, a flooding team, etc.  These were kept together at a central location so the damage control officer could assign them as needed.

 

US practice had multiple teams that could control any type of damage scattered by area across the ship.  This gave them many advantages over the Japanese system.  First, they were closer to the damage they were expected to control, regardless of what it might be.  This meant faster response times and opening fewer watertight hatches meaning less chance of spreading a fire, smoke, or flooding.  Second, being spread out, they were less likely to be wiped out in a shell hit.

 

Japanese BB also had less reliable systems in terms of electrical and other plant systems.  I mean this in terms of redundancy.  US BB had more and larger emergency diesels installed, used more mixed systems... (like electric and steam driven fire pumps for example).  Machinery subdivision was also much better than Japanese practice, particularly on the US turbo-electric battleships.

 

US BB also eliminated port holes in the hull for the most part.  This was done to assist in preventing flooding due to the ship settling or getting a list.  

It's all these sorts of details that make US BB's far, far more resilient to damage compared to their Japanese counterparts.  In a battle line v. battle line fight, the IJN is going to have serious problems right from the start.

 

 

It has to be said though that the USN fleet was very poorly trained in night engagements, combined with the USN Battleships very slow speed, it would indicate to me that it is highly unlikely the USN could dictate when a battle would be fought.  A pack of 4 Kongos could begin an assault on some screen ships and force a battle when and where the IJN wanted, forcing the USN to a situation where it is confused and disorganized.  That said, there's a reason most fleets tried to engage in daylight, and I suspect the IJN fleet, despite coming ahead in ships sunk, will simply run out of shells and torpedoes before the decisive blow can be stuck in a battle, because poor visibility the accuracy of their weapons. Ultimately, I don't see the IJN winning through force of Battleships, simply because getting into a climatic battle with the USN would have ended in a war of attrition in which Japan couldn't afford the the losses.  Sure, maybe the Yamato and the Musashi could have popped the standard Battleships like popcorn, but the fleet would have to risk their WWI capital ships in the progress, which could not withstand any fire from the USN's big guns.  Maybe they could get around this with a massed long-lance torpedo barrage, but at night, I don't see the climatic battle causing enough damage to win the pacific.

[muswp1]

Also, as was proven at Midway, the early war IJN as a whole had a really bad damage control policy.  Even pre-war, the USN took damage control and creating redundant systems much more seriously than the Japanese.  The USN dedicated much more personnel and equipment to isolating and repairing damaged systems than the Japanese did and as a result, once a Japanese ship took serious damage early in the war, it was most likely doomed where the USN could at least have a chance at getting back into port even if it was combat ineffective.  If a serious battleship engagement took place, I don't see the Japanese ships being able to get back into a fight once they get knocked out where the US ships might be able to pull out, make some repairs and come back.

 

As an example, the damage the 4 IJN carriers sustained at Midway versus the pounding the Yorktown took.  If it hadn't been for a lucky strike by the I-168, the US might have been able to get the Yorktown back into port and possibly back into the war within 6 months to a year after taking as much if not more damage than any of Nagumo's carriers took whereas the IJN carriers were doomed shortly after getting hit.