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real_icebeast

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About real_icebeast

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  1. WG, Clarity on Free XP Ships?

    That's true. I guess this makes the point "stronger"? I mean, providing clarity on their plans for Free XP ships would be really helpful.
  2. WG, Clarity on Free XP Ships?

    I don't know. I was just postulating some potential scenario for WG's overall plan.
  3. WG, Clarity on Free XP Ships?

    Hello all, With the announcement that Kronstadt will be a 750k Free XP Ship (which we all saw coming), can we get some clarity on Free XP ships? Will Musashi be leaving with Kronstadt's arrival? Is the plan to have 1 BB, 1 CA/CL, 1 DD available for Free XP? Perhaps there is some other plan? Is there no plan? I'd just like to know/plan what to do with all my free XP. Thank you.
  4. I'm very much in the wait and see camp here. Yes, we know what the gunnery of these CLs are but that doesn't mean that these ships are necessarily bad. Will they be difficult to play well? Absolutely. Will they potentially be holy terrors, farming the tears of DDs and BBs alike when played by a high skilled player? Probably. I see these ships being very similar to Atlanta. There have been an equal number of threads here stating that "Atlanta is OP" and that "Atlanta is the worst ship ever made". When played correctly, Atlanta is a terror. When played poorly, the ship is instantly deleted, and no one is even aware that someone played one. I'll admit that Atlanta does have torpedoes, but these CLs have higher caliber guns with, somehow, better angles. WG also has to try to balance these ships with divisions at least partially in mind. We all know how annoying the "cancer" division of Belfasts and Atlantas can be. I can already see how powerful these CLs divisioned with a USN or PA DD and a RN CL can be at cap control. This brief statement does not mean I don't have concerns though. I'm mostly concerned about T8 Cleveland, but this is more to do with the current T8 matchmaking and it's penalty against pretty much any T8 tech tree cruiser at present. That being said, I'm still going to be patient and see how these ships actually play out before calling for buffs or nerfs.
  5. USS Pittsburgh?

    As far as I'm aware, it isn't to hide what they're working on (as they announce this on the dev blog) but a limitation in their backend that prevents two ships from having to get same name. It also probably reduces confusion. Like why are there two different Baltimores in my game.
  6. This is correct. If TG 34.5 had left earlier, it would have been without destroyers.
  7. You're referring to TF 34 which was supposed to be deployed against a potential Center Force, and all the miscommunication there unto. What the OP is referring to is TG 34.5, which was dispatched much later consisting of the ships he describes. To quote: "At 1622, when fueling was completed, TG 34.5 was formed, under Rear Admiral Badger's command, and at 1701 Halsey ordered it to push onto San Bernardino Strait. This he did at 28 knots. TG 34.5 included Badger's flagship, Iowa, Halsey's flagship, New Jersey, three light cruisers and eight destroyers". Note that this group was dispatched well after the Battle of Samar was over.
  8. I believe it is part of the point based on the scenario postulated by the OP As stated, the encounter occurs if Center Force had loitered for a few more hours, not had TG 34.5 magically fallen upon Center Force. This means that TG 34.5 arrives on schedule at 0100 on October 26, with TG 38.2 operating 40 - 50 miles to their east lending air support, as both task forces were dispatched simultaneously and TG 38.2 was specifically ordered to lend air support to TG 34.5. The rest of TF 34 was also dispatched later, but may or may not arrived on time. The main problem for Center Force is Nagato. As with most forces, the necessity to operate in formation to decrease the likelihood of collision and coordination of movement (something that failed against TG 74.4) means that the fleet must maneuver as fast as its slowest ship. In this case Nagato. By contrast, TG 34.5 slowest ship are there cruisers, a full 8.5 knots faster than Nagato. The other problem with Center Force was their ineptitude against TG 74.4. Besides the complete disarray shown, their ships also demonstrated significant inability to hit targets, compounded by bad seas and DD smoke. Of the four battleships present, Haruna scored no hits and Nagato scored 1 hit (on a reported cruiser but as the entirity of TG 74.4 was mis-identified, we can say this was certainly a DD) out of ~140 shells fired. Yamato faired better, hitting at least 3 targets, although the number of hits is unclear and Kongo did the best, scoring multiple hits on multiple targets. The additional problem is the 14 in guns on Haruna and Kongo, which the Iowa's had fairly large immunity zones against. Both of these ships were poorly armored against the 16in SHS of Iowa/New Jersey. Iowa's IZ was ~5km against its own SHS and presumably larger (but the sources I can find say not much larger) against Nagato's 16 in shells. Still, the Iowa's main goal would be use their speed to maintain range while using superior fire control and air support provided by TG 38.2 to win. Could Center Force win this engagement? Yes but I suspect it is unlikely and would be mainly driven around if Yamato was able to score multiple hits, as Yamato was the only BB of real threat in this engagement. Further, support from TG 38.2 would need to be limited and ineffective. However, this would almost certainly mean abandoning Nagato and an improvement in naval conditions compared to the engagements of the previous morning. As the engagement drags on, additional forces from TF 34 arrive, swinging things even more heavily into the USN advantage. Finally, to this point about intelligence. It's unclear what the commanders would know by the October 1944 engagement. As quoted below, ONIC already had significant intelligence by mid 1944 that Yamato was not a 40000 ton, 16in BB. Did this get relayed to BF commanders, who knows? "On February 25 the Truk photos were processed at PRISIC in Pearl Harbor: one picture showed the huge ship, obscured at the corner. The Office of Naval Intelligence brought ship-design experts into the discussion, concluding that the Yamato class must displace at least 60,000 tons. That also was the size experts thought necessary to mount 18-inch guns, but the same people argued that problems of stowage and propulsion, plus complications with docking and navigation, would render such a warship impractical. A Seventh Fleet intelligence officer was given this word just before returning to SOWESTPAC, then passed through Pearl Harbor, where he talked to Eddie Layton. Previously a staunch defender of the proposition the Yamatos had only 16-inch weapons, Layton was by this time interrogating prisoner Noda Mitsuharu, former yeoman to Admiral Yamamoto. Noda repeated many jokes current in the Imperial Navy about the 'special type' 16-inch guns of the Yamato, converting Layton."
  9. The reason this what if discussion shows a touch of USN bias is the what if occurs after the engagement with taffy 3. This leaves center force exhausted in terms of ammunition and manpower. Center Force engages sometime after 0300 and disengages around 0911. This means they had 6 hours of combat. Further, Center Force had a difficult time dealing with TG 77.4 consisting of 6 escort carriers, 3 dds and 4 des. This makes you wonder how effective they would have been against TG 34.5. Why people, including the OP are discussing additional TGs is due to the composition of TF 34 and the expected additional ships behind TG34.5 . This partly ignores the carriers of TG 38.2 (Intrepid and 2 escorts) that had been order specifically to shadow TG 34.5 and provide air support if the enemy was engaged. "Admiral Bogan's carriers operated to the eastward of them (TG 34.5) in order to render air support if needed" (Leyte, June 1944 - January 1945). This is why people keep adding things. Now to your original point, if the engagement was with a full strength Center Force, many of these considerations may be different. But the Center Force after engaging TG 77.4 would have been in a seriously negative position.
  10. Ranks 15-11

    Literally this! I went from 20 to 10 in 28 games thanks to Loyang. I decided to skip the rest of ranked since the 10-6 bracket seems so dumb.
  11. Stuck on island?

    As said above, try to send a report to WG. I've found that for the most part, when apparently stuck and can't get free by doing the forward/backward rock, that leaving the vechicle in either full forward or full backward seems to break me free. Only when I've powerslided into a true parallel parking spot and I'm fully stuck.
  12. Stealth firing

    Just to add to the above, it's very important to know the detection range of your competition as well. If you're going to be out detected, you're going to need to adjust your play style accordingly. Similarly, if you have the best detection, you can use that info to your advantage. If you're into mods, there are some mods that will show the best possible detection range for every ship in your game. (included in the official WG pack(s)).
  13. This last point is probably the most important. The non-existant/missing TF 34 would have included Washington and Alabama as well as the remainder of 38.2 and 38.4 and significantly increasing the potency of 34.5. I suspect against this powerful TF 34, only Yamato would have been a significant threat.
  14. This made me chuckle. Although T6 Pensacola isn't "as" bad apparently?
  15. Pigeon's Weekly Thought May 8th, 2018

    The Frontline mode in WoT is pretty cool and something similar would be fun I think.
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