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About Big_Spud

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  1. I recall reading that the spacing between the guns was increased to ~50 inches from 46, although the usage of a single sleeve was retained. This may be incorrect. Whatever the internal changes afforded to the mountings were, the Navy considered them to be more accurate and good for a higher rate of fire than those used on the previous Portland's, Northampton's and Pensacola's. As you said though, dispersion on all mountings had been tightened considerably throughout the 1930's (I believe Friedman's fire control book mentions some value close to the one you listed). The increase in train rate I feel had more to do with just general technological progression over the years. There's no reason to not increase train rates if you can do so reasonably, same with rate of fire. Especially since by the late 1930's the USN was beginning to realize that during night actions, rate of fire and the ability to quickly acquire targets had trumped individual shell mass. There's also the predicted types of combat that these ships would ideally be participating in. The long open sight lines of the Pacific during daytime are a very different place to fight than in the North Atlantic during a winter storm, where visibility can essentially drop to zero even in the middle of the day. If you're tracking a target at 10,000+ yards, 3.5-4 degrees per second is going to be exactly as useful as 6 degrees per second in practice.
  2. Because having some issues with early models =/= being completely useless. If you want "sweet jesus this thing is literally broken", go look at the Kirovs turrets or the French fast battleship dispersion patterns. There were plenty of naval rifles that suffered from less than satisfactory dispersion patterns that were still considered adequate. The seven ships of the New Orleans class also had a redesigned turret that solved pretty much all of the earlier dispersion problems by spacing the barrels further apart, and helped bolster the rate of fire to a rather consistent 4 RPM. Rate of train isn't really that important for a heavy cruiser's main turrets to be honest, I can't think of a single instance where it would have actually made a difference if they rotated at 6 degrees per second instead of 3.5. That only really begins to matter when distances have closed to nearly point blank, which is generally not a position you want to be in with a large and slow firing heavy cruiser. Almost every time that happened, regardless of the Navy they were a part of, they were either sunk or crippled.
  3. USS New York

    Its trash.
  4. I wonder how certain parties will twist these obvious buffs as nerfs.
  5. You refuted literally nothing, but have fun.
  6. Lee tried a lot of stupid things that have no bearing on this argument. The main was a genius and a great commander, doesn't somehow impact that the Atlanta has the exact same number of 5" directors as any other cruiser.
  7. I have never seen evidence that the Clevelands 6" directors could also direct the 5" guns. I know for a fact that the 8" directors of heavy cruisers were incapable of performing this task. The Mark 37 GFCS was still the primary method of controlling the 5" guns, and the only system capable of anti-air direction. If both of those are gone, then the gun captain opens the hatch below the sighting hood and aims the thing with a literal cross-hair on the roof of the mount.
  8. Funny, because the Clevelands and Baltimores also only had two directors for the six 5" turrets. Only battleships had more than that, mounting four total for ten turrets. One on each broadside, and two central mounts for redundancy, since you know, battleships might get shot and it would be dumb to lose all control for the 5" mounts if they lost a single director.
  9. 40 mm was fine when the targets weren't using literally crashing into you as a primary method of payload delivery. 40 mm will blow an engine out or take off half a wing - which means nothing when the plane is diving on you at an 80 degree angle at 400 miles per hour with no hope or intention of ever pulling up in time.
  10. Larger ships with more directors did NOT regularly split their 5" fire between four of five targets. Usually the battery focuses on a single or at most pair of targets until they are either destroyed or leave the engagement envelope. You can see video footage of this, especially on the battleships and carriers. The entire broadside of 5" guns is clearly tracking a single target while slaved to one director. Even when there are times when only some of the battery can be firing, you'll see the masked guns sitting silent for brief periods. VT fuses help and are a massive step up over set-time fuses, but it still took an average of well over a hundred 5" VT shells to down a single target. If you can drown him in the weight of ten guns to ensure a hit in the first several salvos, that's what you do, and that's what the Navy did. The 5"/38 performed adequately as an anti-surface weapon. Fire was usually checked when it became clear that hit chances were low, but I challenge you to find instanced of 5" guns being used effectively beyond about 15,000 yards against small surface targets, period. Clashes between destroyer screens usually took place well below that range, usually at 10,000 yards or less. At those distances the 5"/38 can still reliably hit a target, and has a rather large advantage in rate of fire over most other potential adversaries. Design top speed =/= battle speed. Destroyers rarely pushed themselves beyond ~33 knots in practice. Just like how carriers rarely broke 30.
  11. You don't usually have you main battery divided between more than two targets at any time to begin with to be honest. Splitting fire beyond that point goes counter to the philosophy that more guns on target = faster time to kill. I will agree that their medium/light AA was small compared to larger ships, but it was perfectly in-line for the actual size and displacement. The difference also being that you can have two Atlantas for one Cleveland, and be used more effectively with destroyers thanks to the unified main batteries and torpedo complement. The ships are very small for a light cruiser of the period for this exact reason..
  12. The losses of the two Atlanta class ships were down solely to negligent command and a series of unfortunate events. Callaghan's lack of a cohesive combat plan meant that neither Atlanta nor Juneau were in a position to take full advantage of their superiority over the Japanese light units that night. It also meant that the destroyers they were meant to be leading were chained to the line of cruisers, unable to move independently to attack the Japanese formation until ranges had literally closed to the point where torpedoes that were fired didn't even have enough space for the safety mechanism to disengage before striking the target ship. Atlanta obliterated Akatsuki before she could even so much as react to being illuminated. She was then struck by another destroyers torpedo and forced to heave out of line as she suffered various power failures and attempted to get her flooding under control (I don't see how this is an argument for the ship being particularly vulnerable to damage for its size, no ship struck by a Type 93 reacted positively to it). It was at this point that San Francisco, blue-on-blue extraordinaire, pumped nearly fifty 8" shells through her hull and upper works. This was not a single salvo, but a prolonged barrage as the heavy cruiser attempted to engage another vessel that Atlanta happened to be in front of. The results of this deluge were that the entire bridge and command crew were killed outright, and all but one turret was disabled or totally destroyed. Nearly everyone who had been topside was either killed or wounded. I challenge you to find another ship in this weight class that absorbed such a punishment and kept going. The fact that she even remained floating long enough for an attempted tow the next day is a miracle in itself. Juneau survived her Type 93 hit that night, and was sailing for repairs when she was sunk by another torpedo hit launched by a sub as she sailed with the other damaged ships back to their base of operations. Nothing out of the ordinary here, unless you now wish to consider ships sunk by submarines to be some indicator of a classes combat ability. Man, the Takaos must have really sucked, two were sunk in the same day by submarines! Or how about the Akizukis, one was even sunk by a motor torpedo boat. The entire class must have been trash to allow that to happen! See how this logic falls apart instantly? The Atlantas were the most heavily armed and armored vessels of their type and weight class in the world, and would have performed their role as a Destroyer Leader well, had they ever actually been released to perform such a function. The fact that the entire battery was dual-purpose was just a handy benefit of using the 5"/38 (since the 6" automatic wouldn't be ready until after the war ended) which meant that they could serve in other roles once surface actions had become less common. They handily outgunned anything the Japanese could have pressed into a similar role (chiefly the ancient Tenryus, Kumas, Sendais and various other similar classes) from their extremely dated arsenal of light cruisers, as well as the more modern Aganos. The only other class we have for direct role-for-role comparison with the Atlantas are the Didos, which make the former look like the greatest thing since sliced bread in both anti-surface and anti-air capacity.
  13. Every time someone says "months" in relation to some broken CV mechanic, the forum filter should automatically change it to "years". The CV mechanics Warships after three damn years makes pre-nerf Tanks artillery at release look like the greatest thing since sliced bread. The entire class is a god damn disaster.
  14. Electrical power output of battleships

    Its honestly hilarious comparing these to the power generation capacity of the turbo-electric driven Battleships and (ex) Battlecruisers built by the United States during the late teens and early 20's. I think Lexington was hooked in and used its 130,000 kW plant as a power generating station for a whole month when a city lost its grid due to a drought shutting down its hydro electric dam. That's a lot of generating capacity, especially for such a prolonged period. Too bad the treaties killed the idea off because of the greater weight, I know the Japanese were also expressing interest in it when they ordered the turbo-electric Kamoi from an American ship builder. Sometimes I dream of turbo-electric South Dakota's...and no I don't mean the 1920 SoDak, although that would be nice.
  15. South Dakota's SPS wasn't actually weaker than North Carolina's in practice anyways. North Carolina had a better design concept, but South Dakota had a better loading pattern and Iowa combined that with a stronger framework. Most of the information regarding this supposed weakness seems to have spawned from a combination of two different preliminary tank tests done during construction that somehow melted into one in most publications, ignoring the fact that a number of minor improvements to the design actually did make it in prior to completion, with larger changes being applied to the last ships of the Iowa class which were never completed. You have to wonder where people get these exact numbers from anyways, since the actual tank tests for the Iowa and South Dakota's SPS are still classified because of the Iowas only being ~20 years out of active service. Even Friedmans doesn't give an exact source for his 317 kg value, and Bill Jurens said he was unable to publish the test data he had accessed in the archives due to its classification status. A North Carolina is no more suited for a close range action than a South Dakota. Less so really, since the South Dakota has a clear advantage in maneuverability (even over the famously maneuverable North Carolina's) and main battery protection. South Dakota's 5" battery also has an extra 1/2 inch of protection, for what it counts.