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About 1An0maly1

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  1. 1An0maly1

    Help choose a Cruiser line for me

    I'm a Zao main. A few hundred battles in that ship and I feel that I know it very well. First off, Zao isn't actually that flimsy if you don't play it moronically. It is the first ship in the game with turtle back-esque armor, flawed turtle back but still turtle back. Really I'm rubbing my head at people saying the Des Moines is tanky and the Zao is flimsy. Bow on they are both impenetrable to other cruisers and from the side the citadel of the Des Moines is gargantuan. To give you an idea of how massive it is, I once shredded a Des Moines with a Grozovoi (tier X destroyer, Russian) with my AP guns. Landing 12 citadels and knocking off 60% of his health before his guns turned. The Des Moines died from my fire and allied fire before he got a salvo off. Zao has a few qualities that make it unbelievably annoying to kill and annoying to deal with Very Low detectibility, ~9.6 km upgraded High speed, up to 36 knots with the flag Excellent rudder shift, fully upgraded with all the bells and whistles it is 2.9 second rudder shift. Better then most destroyers at ANY tier. This does sacrifice concealment to 10.8 km but it is so deliciously worth it. Phenomenal torpedoes, the Type 93 are absolute terrors. You will rarely hit but with a single hit equivalent to half you health pool they can nut punch any ship in the game. It has the most torpedo tubes of any ship it will see. Excellent muzzle velocity and fire arcs, second to the Moskva 12 guns Bonkers good dispersion. 127 meters fully upgraded is the gold standard of every ship in the game that is not a destroyer. A legendary module Zao rarely hits with only one shell. Troll armor, with the turret area citadel being below the waterline and the area of the citadel above the waterline being mostly super-slant 65 mm. To put that in perspective Hindenburg's slant ranges only from 40 mm to 60 mm. That being said its much lower then Zao's so take that with a grain of salt. Excellent HE and fire chance makes the Zao the ORIGINAL flame boat The thing that makes Zao very very hard to kill is that your main batteries are effective past 15 km, in fact they are viable options out to 21 km (need a spotter plan out here though). Mainly because their arcs are low and shells fly fast. At these ranges if a battleship fires at you, and lets say those shells have a 9 second travel time. Then you have 3 seconds to turn left, 3 seconds to sail sideways, and 3 seconds to turn back right to present a narrow front. With a 2.9 second rudder shift, 36 knot top speed it gives the zao the unique capability to crab sideways out of battleship shells. If a Zao gets hit by BB shells past 15 kilometers it is either because the bb is a genius or the Zao was not paying attention. If things turn south then you just go invisible and disappear. At closer ranges from 8-12 kilometers the Zao's excellent AP takes hold. High muzzle velocities and flat arcs leads to the best AP penetration for a 203 mm gun at tier X, end of story. Only Moskva and Henry have better penetrations and they have much bigger guns. Not only that but because the shells fly flatter they impact at closer to 90 degree angles which is better for penetration. https://mustanghx.github.io/ship_ap_calculator/ The price of these phenomenal guns is terribad reload. 15 or so second reloads which kills their dpm. You have to make your hits count or have a way to make sure the enemy's don't. At long range, 12+ km light cruisers and des moines struggle, their high arcs and long travel times make hitting a target difficult. It doesn't matter if you can punch out 36 shells for every Zao volley, if the Zao can dodge every one of them then it is pointless. With a fully upgraded accuracy build the Zao is excellent at digging out entrenched bow tankers since it can hit them with more HE shells per volley then any other ship. Couple this with a float plane for maximum hilarity.
  2. 1An0maly1

    Best Coal Ship?

    Jean Bart has great shell travel times and ballistics. What she lacks in penetration she makes up for in shot grouping. Without citadels you can easily knock 10-20k salvos off enemy bb's. and with the reload booster you can knock them a second and possibly third time. Her low health is more then made up for by her bow tanking game. Without a yamato or musashi to dislodge you, you can easily go shot for shot with any other bb and come out ontop. If they bow tank you can hurl 2 more HE shells per salvo with a faster base reload and especially with reload booster. If they try to broadside to bring all 12 barrels to bear then you can easily knock them into next week with your volleys into their sides. You haven't lived until you've knocked a Kurfurst half his health in a single one of his reloads. Kurfurst might have more guns and bigger barrels but if he can't dig through your bow armor then it is a very moot point. Your turret faces aren't half bad secondary shields either (not half good either, just not terrible). You may be vulnerable to fire but with the layout of the ship if you are bow tanking it is rare to get more then one fire laid on you at a time if you are receiving gunnery from the front. Jean Bart looks much worse on paper then she is. She doesn't play like a BB because there is no reason for her to expose broadside. She alternates between sprinting into a good defensive position and then sitting there shredding everyone who comes by. Her shells fly VERY far, seriously its a 24.5 Km range base, that's bonkers and it allows her to bully her T9 rivals when they retreat by punching them beyond their effective range. That range is without a doubt intended to make her competitive against T10. Take it with a grain of salt though because a middling dispersion means only 8 chances to hit at that range and the odds are not in your favor. Avoid the Yamato siblings though. They will out bow tank you at short range, out snipe you at long, and are too durable in the mid. Their ability to not care about your bow armor is devastating. Otherwise just about all the tier X's are game, not easy game for sure, but you can last much better against the tier X's then just about any other tier 9 bb, including musashi (in my opinion).
  3. By far was the radar guidance of the guns. The radar guided guns, of the 40 mm and 127 mm variety were by far more effective then their unguided breathren
  4. 1An0maly1

    Cryptography in World War 2 - A Primer - Part 1

    Part 2 is up in the history section
  5. Hi everyone. I'm doing a series of posts on cryptography in WW2. In this post I will be discussing the first of the four main cryptographic machines I'll be focusing on and perhaps the most well know, the infamous Enigma. I'll be talking about what made Enigma special, what made it effective, and then I will be diving into the problems that plagued Enigma and which eventually led to the cracking of the machine, first by the Polish, then the British bombes, and finally the American bombe systems. I am assuming everyone reading this knows something about cryptographic theory and the electromechanical rotors of the time. If you don't feel free to read Part 1 which will bring you up to speed. The original post was placed in off topic section of the forums, it feels at home here which is where the rest will go. Part 1 - A Primer Part 2 - Enigma - The German Mystery Part 3 - SIGABA - The American Big Machine Part 4 - TypeX - A British Response Enigma In world war 1 the powers that be used manual code and cypher systems to secure their information. But with the advent of the machine age these methods suddenly became extremely vulnerable to mathematical and mechanical code breaking machines. A better solution was critically needed. Enigma was created as a solution for army level and below cryptography, and the naval equivalent. Although it was not the only device, with D-day approaching other machines like the various SZ-42 and T-52 machines assumed greater importance at higher levels of command. In 1925 the German army purchased several examples of the ENIGMA commercially built cypher. The Enigma machine used by the German army utilized three rotors arranged one after the other in what is a textbook example of a regular rotor machine. As was discussed in the primer every rotor had an input side and output. A letter on the input would be swapped for another. Such as a 'A' becoming an 'F'. This was done by wiring the input contact 'A' to the output contact 'F'. Each rotor did this for the entire alphabet, swapping one letter for the other. This nest of wires was called a 'maze'. The wire maze is shown above. You can see the input contacts on the far right with the output contacts on the far left. You can see three rotors assembled together above. The cleverness of this setup was that on a daily basis they would swap the orders of the rotors and their starting positions. Changing the cryptographic settings of the machine each time. One of the first innovations of Enigma, and perhaps its first Achilles heel, is that the Germans created a reflector at the end. Basically a signal would go through the three rotors, swapping letters each time, until it hit the reflector whereupon it would pull a U-turn and re-enter the final rotor at another entry contact and go back through the rotors again. Making two passes. Above is a paper illustration. Input is on the right side, then the first rotor, then the second rotor, then the third rotor, and at the end on the left is the reflector. See how an output of F is set to a D and then shot back through again? The Achilles heel in this is that any letter entering the rotor system cannot be enciphered back as itself. So if you pressed 'f' it would be impossible to get an 'f' back out. This is crucial, it means that if you are trying to crack Enigma with a 1000 word document. If any letters coming out of your attempted solution matches the enciphered message then you did it wrong. This meant that a lot less time is being wasted on false readings. It would not be a rotor machine if the rotors did not rotate. The Enigma rotors rotated in the following way: Rotor 1 - Advanced one step for every key press Rotor 2 - Advanced one step for every 26 advancements of rotor 1 Rotor 3 - Advanced one step for every 26 advancements of rotor 2 This meant that there were 17,576 possible rotor positions before you repeated the original. This system of advancement was the second Achilles heel of Enigma, TypeX, and just about every rotor system out there except SIGABA (which made SIGABA so great). Every key press changed the cypher. Which meant that no two consecutive letters can share the same position of the rotors. By knowing that the cypher keeps changing every letter you failed to create even a pseudo-random pattern. The next revolutionary step of Enigma was the plugboard. On the front of Enigma is a board with holes for every letter. An operator can manually tie two letters together. If A-O are connected then after coming through the rotor maze a signal reading "O" becomes "A" and visa versa. This massively increased the security of the machine. I cannot understate how much more secure this made Enigma. Before the plugboard the original Enigma in use was cracked by the Polish in 1932, only seven years old and LONG before WW2. It was the addition of the plugboard that resecured the machine. The third major Achilles heel of Enigma, and in my mind the crucial. Was pretty poor operational discipline. To understand why you need to understand the fact that despite all these operational features even the Germans knew that it only takes a determined enemy so much time to break through the cypher. That's why it is so customizable, by the end of the war Army systems had 8 different rotors they could use (and they could flip them backwards), the plugboard could handle anywhere from 1 to 13 different cables (in use they usually stuck with 10). Every day the Germans would change which rotors were in the machine, their starting positions, and the plugboards. These settings were held in the famous code books. In the navy they were written in water soluble ink so they could be destroyed by a simple dunking. Entire buildings in the US and Britain were dedicated to SOLELY figuring out the day's plugboard and rotor settings. Once you have those decryption is easy. Operator error was so predictable that the British figured that they could count on one time a day some operator somewhere would screw up. One example is that after the U-boats were getting slaughtered the navy resecured Enigma by adding a fourth rotor. This threw the allies for a loop, although they were anticipating the switch because the planning for the replacement had been discussed over the previously broken 3 rotor system. One submarine radio man sent a four-rotor encrypted message but messed up his settings. So he reset the machine back to the 3 rotor configuration and resent it. He probably didn't see anything wrong, but he had just handed the British a message encoded with the new system and the correct solution for it. That one screw-up brought the end of the 4 rotor system months earlier then it should have been cracked. Enigma Naval variant, notice the fourth rotor up top. I also have to give the Polish a lot of credit, they cracked Enigma long before anyone else did and built the first cryptographic bombe's dedicated to cracking it. It was only the addition of the plugboard that ended their efforts, they didnt have the resources to cracking that riddle. In 1939 they turned over all of their work to the French and the British which provided an incredible head start to the allies. Shown above is the working rebuilt British cryptographic bombe, created to attack Enigma coded traffic. Each drum represents the action of an enigma rotor. Next time I will be discussing the American SIGABA machine, the opponent of Enigma and PURPLE and ally of TypeX.
  6. 1An0maly1

    Interest in history of encryption

    I posted the first one in this forum sub topic. It covers the basics of encryption all the way to the rotor system which is the fundamentals of what was used in WW2
  7. 1An0maly1

    Cryptography in World War 2 - A Primer - Part 1

    Keep in mind though that there are demonstrated instances where messages passed in languages that are completely make believe, where even whole words are replaced with symbols have been decrypted before. Decryption can successfully work against strange alphabets and languages given enough cryptographic depth. If you substituted words in the English language with each other, like instead of saying “place” you said “hamburger” at seeming random, essentially creating an alternative vocabulary. Given enough depth, as in you use it often enough that I have many documents or phrases I will eventually be able to suss our that whenever you say “hamburger” you mean “place” this strategy of attack does work on Navajo, it is exceedingly difficult, but it does work. It’s why, to the best of my knowledge (which I am not a cryptographer so grain of salt), no one used Navajo in the same instance into the mid/late 20th century. In fact they didn’t even use it on a strategic level in world war 2 because they knew it was not very secure. Typical language attacks, such as what Francis Walsingham used, involve searching for words that are very commonly used. The word “a” occurs far more frequently then the word “tobacco” you basically brute force the language. One of of the things imitation game missed was that enigma was first broken in 1932 by the Polish secret service. They built several crypto bombe’s. In 1939 in secret they presented their techniques to the British and French. Spurred by and large because Enigma added the famed plug board which meant it would take more computing resources to crack then the Poles had to attack it with. Their work served a foundation for British work. I haven’t heard of the heil hitler thing. I can’t confirm nor deny it. It does seem odd that they would introduce such an incredibly obvious weakness into their system.
  8. 1An0maly1

    Cryptography in World War 2 - A Primer - Part 1

    The problem isn’t with the language itself, the crypto logical alphabet, the issue is actually more to do with the fact that it never changes. For example, Navajo has no word for “tank” so they used “turtle”. If you transmitted over a strategic transmission that you were deploying a turtle division in X location, your enemy will eventually suss out what “turtle” means. In preparing for the battle of Midway the Japanese used a place holder word for Midway island. The US, not knowing what the placeholder was had Midway transmit in clear text they were low on water (or something like that). When the Japanese transmitted that *placeholder name* was low on water the US then knew for sure that they were talking about Midway. We all know what happened next. Granted it’s a gross oversimplification but it represents how if you don’t constantly change your cryptographic key it will inevitably be broken. On a tactical level it works well because tactical orders are executed in short time spans from minutes to a day. By the time an enemy decrypts your message it’s far too late. But for messages describing the positions of submarines for example once the code is broken you will end up with many dead submarines (a relevant example since the cracking of the three rotor enigma led to the end of the first u boat golden age) Sure. The main source that sparked my interest is centered around the SIGABA. SIGABA: A Beautiful Idea center for cryptological history national security agency During the war American cryptologists scoured German and Japanese transmissions for indications that they managed to break the code. A number of transmissions followed by interrogations of prisoners of war during and after the war including the German code breakers themselves indicated that little if any progress was made. During the closing year of the war the German code breaking group in their diary wrote that they ceased work on the American 5 letter machine as being unprofitable implying they were focusing instead on the weaker field cyphers and typex its publically available via google. It’s a fascinating read. Other sources include the ubiquitous Wikipedia and a few other articles. But I highly recommend starting with the one I mentioned above.
  9. 1An0maly1

    Caption the profile image above you.

    Overly armed Santa elf
  10. 1An0maly1

    Cryptography in World War 2 - A Primer - Part 1

    Actually thats a common misconception. The main advantages of the Navajo code talkers was the ability to relay messages as they heard them, no need to wait for someone to laboriously encrypt a message and then decrypt. They could encode and transmit in one go allowing front line officers to communicate in as real time as you can get. The other advantage is that there is no written language and it sounds like gibberish to the Japanese whom often assumed it was gibberish. The problem is that they suffer from the same vulnerabilities as Mary queen of Scots. It’s only a flimsy substitution cypher. On a battlefield your enemy probably won’t be able to make recordings for crypto analysts so that’s okay. But for strategic distance communications pretty much every crypto agency in use at the time would have eventually, inevitably cracked that code. Like a good Yamato player, the US recognized the fundamental flaw in their system and never put it in a position to be exploited The US made use of several mechanical enciphering tools. The best and most complex of which was SIGABA also known as the Converter M-134. This was the primary ciphering machine used by the US on strategic levels with ground level support being performed by more mobile cyphers including the Navajo code talkers. Not actually true. SIGABA went through the entirety of the Second World War, into the 50’s and was never cracked. In fact the US sold many of its tactical cyphering machines post war but jealously guarded SIGABA machines. Storing them in vaults under continuous guard and when in foreign countries (including allied) under guard and wired with explosives. All because it was so elaborate even American cryptographers who built it could not break a SIGABA code. The nightmare was that another country steals and copies it and will then also have impenetrable codes. The British TypeX, basically a further improved Enigma, also likely went through the war unbroken. It has been suggested that Germany successfully cracked a few messages during lapses in discipline but as a system very little if any actionable intelligence came from it.
  11. Forward My name is anomaly and I have a background in engineering. Recently I've been on a cryptography kick especially with regards to WW2 era cryptography. I'd like to do a series discussing the different systems these men and women used to pass messages that would define the war. These people on all sides fought to break their enemies and to defend their security. At many many points were the lives of millions hung in their hands, and the greatest turning points in the war were often preceded by a broken code. In this first article I wanted to do a bit of a primer to introduce casual readers to the world of cryptography. It starts with basic substitution methods and ends with the rotor system. The rotor being the bread and butter of all the systems I will be discussing. Part 2: Enigma - The German Machine Part 3: SIGABA - The American Big Machine Part 4: TypeX - A British Solution Mary Queen of Scots The basis of cryptography is to manipulate a string of letters into a different string of letters. Substituting one letter for another, for a symbol, or for a picture. Mary Queen of Scots had an entire language where her cryptographers created their own unique letters to represent english letters. Afterall, how do you break a made-up alphabet? Sir Francis Walsingham, the head of Elizabeth's secret service had the inspired idea to bring a mathematical professor into his fold. This man cracked the code by looking at many letters sent between Mary and her cohorts. When he had enough examples of hundreds if not tens of thousands of letters he went to work. He hypothesized that some letters appear more often then others, by understanding that letters like 'e' and 'a' occur far more frequently then 'w' and 'u' he gradually cracked Mary's language letter by letter. What failed in Mary's system? First off is arrogance, the idea that her system was unbreakable because the concept was that clever. This is important, especially in this article because Enigma, PURPLE, and JP-25 all suffered from inventors who believed them invulnerable, hundreds of thousands paid the price for their hubris. Secondly, her cryptographic cypher, the symbols for the letters, never ever changed. If a slash meant 'a' it always meant 'a', her cohorts never changed that. Given enough methods a statistical attack is made easier. This is called cryptographic 'depth'. A good cryptographic system needs to minimize the cryptographic depth they expose themselves to. Simple Substitution Cypher A simple substitution cypher is where one letter is changed to another. The simplest is where you advance letters a given number of spaces. For example, if we have an advancement of three then the cypher becomes: Simple Substitution Cypher Plain Text Cypher - Text A D B E C F D A E B F C A message reading: FAB becomes: CDE What is the flaw with this cypher? It is far too easy to crack. If you crack one letter you crack all of them. Lets make things a bit tougher. Lets 'randomize' (there is rarely, if ever a true random, we try to simulate it but we can only get close) the changes between letters Plain Text Cypher Text A F B C C A D E E B F D FAB becomes DFC This is better but there is a fundamental flaw. Can you guess what it is? To fix that flaw lets throw something fun in the mix Plain Text Cypher Text A C B B C F D A E D F E FAB becomes ECB By allowing B to encrypt into itself I get rid of the fundamental flaw that none of the letters encrypt as themselves. This means that my opponent can no longer assume that any plain text solution where a letter is the same as the cypher text is a wrong solution. In the world of cyptography having the right solution is the best thing, but knowing what you have is the wrong one is just as important. So we have come up with a cryptographic key that has three good things: The letter advancement is pseudo-random The letters are non reversible. A turns to C but C does not turn to A, instead it turns to F* At least one letter encrypts as itself, in this case B encrypts to B * This can be a flaw. A reversible system means that to decrypt your message you can put it through the exact same circuit. Now that you all understand some basics lets talk rotors The fundamental flaw with this key is that the more we use it the easier it is to break. A message of 6 letters might take a little while. But for a 500 letter message or longer there is so much cryptographic depth that it would takes a professional minutes to break. And that's with a coffee break thrown in. How do you create a cypher key with 26 letters that is robust enough to not be broken in the first message? The answer is, YOU CANT. That's right, even by WW2 standards if you made a crypto key and typed up a report, just that one report has more then enough depth for a semi-determined enemy to easily crack. The solution is a key that changes continuously. Enter, the rotor machine. The Rotor Machine Cryptographic rotors are disc shaped devices. At this point in time most only had the letters of their alphabets, no capitals, no spaces, no numbers. Each disk had contacts on each side. The contacts would be connected by wires criss crossing. So the input contact would be connected to an output contact somewhere else on the rotor. "But anomaly, when all is said and done you've really just made an overcomplicated method to transmute a D to an E, how is this different then before?" I am GLAD you asked. The brilliance of the rotors is that every time you press a key the signal transmits the letter, and then a ratchet system rotates the first rotor one time. In the picture above the input message is: BB The cypher text though is: HC The key has changed! Every time you press a letter the first rotor rotates. For a given number of rotations of the first rotor the second rotor will rotate once, and so on to the third rotor. Assuming a simple setup of the second rotor rotating once for every 26 rotations of the first, and the third once every 26 of the second, you would need to type 17,576 letters (26 letter alphabet) to come back to the original position. Every letter has a unique key. Which means your cryptographic depth on any given key in a 15,000 letter document is a single letter! We've gone from a depth of hundreds if not thousands of letters with the keys we made before to a depth of ONE. Fantastic! At this point I think you understand the basics Part 2 and beyond will be located in the history section
  12. 1An0maly1

    Interest in history of encryption

    Hey y’all. I have a background in engineering and recently have been on a kick of studying the various encryption devices of WW2, such as SIGABA, Enigma, Purple, TypeX. I was thinking of writing up a forum post going into these different systems. How they worked both technically and simplified, their flaws and successes, how they inspired each other and most importantly, how they were broken either physically or remotely. It’s a fascinating story and I was wondering if y’all would have an interest in reading it.
  13. Washington engaged Kirishima at 7.7 kilometers (8,400 yards). And nailed Kirishima with the aforementioned 9 main gun hits. I think you are mixing up this engagement with the other Pacific battleship engagement (can’t recall the name).
  14. Are you quoting Washington engaging the IJN B.B.? That was like point blank wasn’t it?